Development and Destabilization in Southern Africa by Sefali, Michael & Bardill, John
DEVELOPMENT AND DESTABILIZATION 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
EDITED BY 
MICHAEL SEFALI AND JOHN BARDILL
SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES SERIESir NO. 3
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES 
ROMA 
KINGDOM OF LESOTHO
1985
DEVELOPMENT AND DESTABILIZATION 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
SELECTED PROCEEDINGS OF THE INAUGURAL 
CONGRESS AND WORKSHOP 
1 8 -20th OCTOBER 1983
Edited by 
Michael Sefali and John Bardill
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LESOTHO 
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES 
ROMA 
KINGDOM OF LESOTHO
1985
CONTENTS
Editors' Introduction
by M i c h a e l  S e f a l i  a n d  J o h n  B a r d i l l
Opening Address
by His Majesty, Motlotlehi Moshoeshoe II
Keynote Address
by the Honourable E.R. Sekhonyana, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Lesotho
1. South Africa's Strategy in the Southern African 
Region: A preliminary Analysis
by Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara
2. The United States, South Africa and Destabilization 
in Southern Africa
by M.M. Ncube
3. South Africa's Strategy of Regional Destabilization
by Yash Tandon
4. The Food Weapon in Southern Africa
by Robert D'A Henderson
5. Destabilization, Political Stability and Trade 
Unions
by Chris Allen
6. South Africa's Strategy of Destabilization: The 
Case of Lesotho
by R.O.K. Ajulu
7. The South African-Swazi State Relationship: 
Ideological Harmony and Structural Domination
by John Daniel
8. Imperialism, South Africa and the Destabilization
of Zimbabwe
by L.M. Sachikonye
9. SADCC and the Development of Regional Co-operation 
in Southern Africa
by Michael Sefali
9
14
21
39
59
76
94 
119 
132 
151 • 
162
1
Appendix: Additional Papers Presented at the Inaugural 
Congress and Workshop of the Southern African 
Development Research Association
180
1EDITORS' INTRODUCTION
Micfiael S e f a l i  
J o h n  B a r d i 11 *
Like most countries in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World the 
independent majority-ruled nations of southern Africa face innumerable 
problems, from the underdeveloped and dependent nature of their economies 
to the fragile and unstable nature of their political institutions. In 
southern Africa these problems have been seriously compounded by an additional 
factor - the vulnerability of such states to economic and political 
pressure from the apartheid regime in South Africa.
Over the past twenty years South Africa's policy towards its neighbours 
has been characterized by a mixture of peaceful diplomatic overtures and 
punitive threats and actions. From dialogue and detente to the proposed 
Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), the overtures have held 
out the offer of South African aid and support to those states prepared to 
accommodate South Africa's domestic and reoional oolicies. CONS£S, however, 
has been rejected by all independent states in the region.
The failure of these diplomatic initiatives led South Africa to attempt 
to secure its interests in the sub-continent by more forceful means, ranging 
from economic reprisals to military intervention. Designed to destabilize 
the economic and political systems of neighbouring and nearby states, such 
actions were intended to realize a number of related objectives. These 
included the neutralization of the ability of such states to provide an 
effective springboard for the activities of liberation movements hostile to
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2South Africa; the perpetuation of the weaknesses and divisions that 
characterize most of the states in the region, thereby reinforcing their 
dependence on Pretoria; and the creation over time of a more favourable 
climate for initiatives such as CONSAS and the strings attached to them.
The achievement of such objectives, although always important, has 
become increasingly crucial for Pretoria in recent years as a result of 
the rapidly changing geo-political situation in the sub-continent and the 
mounting domestic crisis, economic and political, confronted by the South 
African regime. The independence of Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s, 
and that of Zimbabwe in 1980, deprived Pretoria of a vital cordon of friendly 
buffer states on its northern border. In its place was erected a very 
different cordon of states that were hostile to apartheid and sympathetic to 
the aims and aspirations of South African and Namibian liberation movements. 
Not surprisingly these movements, spearheaded by the ANC and SWAPO, took 
advantage of the situation to step up their guerrilla campaigns against 
the white minority regime. This was accompanied by a growing spirit of 
resistance within South Africa itself, revealed most noticeably in the 
upsurge in black working class protest and the Soweto uprising. With the 
South African economic boom of the 1960s showing signs of turning into 
recession in the 1970s, Pretoria's problems were clearly coming to assume 
dramatic proportions.
The South African response was equally dramatic, involving as it did the 
discrediting and removal of Prime Minister Vorster and his supporters in 
1978, the accession to power of a new regime, headed by Prime Minister P.W. 
Botha, that brought the military to the forefront of decision-making, and the 
rapid formulation by this regime of a new and comprehensive strategy aimed 
at resolving the crisis threatening the Republic. Based on the 1977 Defence 
White Paper and bearing the unmistakable imprint of General Malan, Botha's 
Defence Minister and right-hand man, this total strategy, as it has come to 
be known, called for the mobilization of all the economic, political, 
military and psychological resources at the disposal of the state in a 
co-ordinated defence of capital accumulation and apartheid in South Africa.
One crucial aspect of total strategy was the regionalization of the Republic’s 
domestic struggles. Based on the premise that attack is the best form of
defence, the battle was now to be taken to the frontline states. And the 
years since 1978 have witnessed an increasingly determined offensive by 
Pretoria against their territorial integrity, economic viability and 
political cohesion.
If the countries of southern Africa are to succeed in devising and 
implementing national and regional strategies to withstand Pretoria's 
offensive, and to continue their support for the liberation struggles in 
Namibia and South Africa, a detailed understanding will be required of the 
forces underlying destabilization, of the internal weaknesses that render 
such countries susceptible to it, and of the resources that can be mobilized 
against it. It is here that social scientists in the region can play an 
important part. And it is in recognition of this fact that efforts have 
been made in recent years to encourage and co-ordinate their research into 
these and other questions. An important development in this respect was the 
formation in 1978 of the Southern African Universities Social Science 
Conference with the aim of promoting research among social scientists 
working in the independent states of southern Africa. Conferences have 
been held in Botswana, Lesotho, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi.
Another milestone was the International Workshop on research priorities 
in southern Africa, .held under the auspices of the Institute of Southern 
African Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Lesotho, Roma, in 
November 1981. One outcome of the workshop was the adoption of the Roma 
Declaration on research and development in southern Africa, a document that 
attempted to identify strategies for the co-ordination of research and the 
exchange of ideas among scholars in the region. Another outcome was the 
decision to set up a committee charged with the task of contacting univers­
ities and research institutions in the region with a view to the establish­
ment of a regional research association. The committee's coordinator was Dr. 
Michael Sefali, the Director of ISAS at Roma. In 1983 the committee's work 
was consumated in the formation of the Southern African Development Research 
Association (SADRA), which held its inaugural congress at the National 
University of Lesotho on 17 October 1983. The preamble of the constitution 
adopted by congress commits SADRA to "research which upholds the right of 
self-determination and national, social and economic liberation for the 
peoples of Southern Africa."
At the inaugural congress it was decided to establish the headquarters 
of SADRA at the Institute of Southern African Studies at Roma, and to 
convene a second congress in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1985. In assuming respon 
sibility for the co-ordination of development oriented research in the 
region, congress also proposed that SADRA should work closely with the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). It was 
agreed, however, that SADRA should not become a mere agent for SADCC, for 
this could well impair the academic freedom of SADRA members engaged in 
SADCC related research.
The inaugural congress was immediately followed by a three-day workshop 
on Development and Destabilization in Southern Africa. Both the congress 
and workshop were funded by much appreciated donations from SAREC, NORAD, 
and the IDRC. The EEC and the Ford Foundation also expressed their willing­
ness to contribute to this and future congresses.
This present volume contains the selected proceedings of SADRA1s 
inaugural workshop, held at the National University of Lesotho from 18-20 
October 1983. In addition to the opening and keynote addresses, delivered 
respectively by His Majesty, King Moshoeshoe II, and Lesotho's Foreign 
Minister, the Honourable E.R. Sekhonyana, fourteen papers were presented on 
various aspects of development and destabilization in southern Africa.
Despite the generous financial assistance mentioned above, constraints of 
length and cost have made it impossible to publish all of them here. But 
an effort has been made to ensure that those papers that have been included 
reflect as comprehensive a range of topics as possible. A list of those 
papers that have not been included can be found in the Appendix on page 180 
of this volume. Copies can be obtained from ISAS, the National University 
of Lesotho, P.O. Roma 180, Lesotho, as can additional information about the 
aims, organization and activities of SADRA.
The workshop took place before the signing of the Nkomati Accord between 
South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984. To a certain extent, therefore, 
this volume has been overtaken by events. Nevertheless, the papers presented 
here still provide a useful background to the conditions that have brought
4-
5about this apparent "victory" for South Africa's destabilization strategy.
In any case, it would be premature to think that Nkomati, as well as the 
possibility of similar security agreements with other states in the region, 
represents an end to destabilization and the beginning of a new era of 
peace in the sub-continent. For whilst it cannot be denied that 
the accord was a set-back for the ANC and the liberation struggle in South 
Africa, it would be equally foolish to ignore the fact that Nkomati was the 
outcome of coercion rather than'consent, and that the only effective basis 
for lasting peace in the region continues to be the dismantling of apartheid. 
Until this happens, southern Africa will continue to be plagued by violence 
and instability - a point echoed by all the participants at the workshop.
The scene for this present volume is set by King Moshoeshoe II in 
his opening address to the workshop. Identifying destabilization as a 
major challenge to the ability of southern African states to achieve 
economic liberation, political cohesion and social justice, his Majesty makes 
an eloquent plea for greater national unity, regional co-operation, and 
international support and understanding. This plea is endorsed by Lesotho's 
Foreign Minister, the Honourable E.R. Sekhonyana, in his keynote address. 
Dismissing Pretoria's argument that destabilization is a justified reaction 
to Communist inspired threats directed against South Africa's security, the 
Minister demonstrates convincingly that destabilization should be seen 
instead as a typically arrogant response by the apartheid regime to efforts 
by countries like Lesotho to determine and pursue their own independent 
policies, especially with respect to such issues as the hospitality afforded 
to South African refugees, the non-recognition of the bantustans, and the 
establishment of diplomatic links with the socialist countries. Although none 
of these policies represents a direct threat to South Africa, they have 
been sufficient to excite the paranoid wrath of Pretoria. The tactics 
used by South Africa to compel Lesotho to reverse its stance on these issues 
are outlined briefly by the Minister, as are some of the conditions that 
render Lesotho vulnerable to them.
Following the keynote address are three papers - by Robert Davies and 
Dan O'Meara, M.M. Ncube, and Yash Tandon - that deal with the general
• background to destabilization. Davies and O'Meara argue that destabilization
bshould not be seen merely as a desperate response by Pretoria to the 
internal and external crises confronting it, and more specifically as 
an attempt to frustrate the advancing liberation struggles in Namibia and 
South Africa. Rather it should be seen as part of a wider regional policy.
A succinct analysis is presented of the origins, objectives, tactics, and 
changing nature of this policy. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
regional and destabilizing implications of the total strategy of the Botha 
regime, on its successes and failures to date, and on the arguments 
presently taking place within the South African power bloc concerning the 
future directions this strategy should take.
Ncube offers a definition of destabilization and shows that Pretoria's 
attempts to justify its attacks on neighbouring states, on the grounds of 
self-defence and hot-pursuit, have no foundation in either logic or inter­
national law. The main purpose of his paper is to locate South Africa's 
regional policy within the wider context of the dynamics of global imperial­
ism. According to Ncube, destabilization has been designed to serve not 
only South Africa's economic and political interests but also those of 
the Western imperialist nations, and especially the United States. The 
evolving nature of US policy towards southern Africa is discussed in detail, 
as are the close economic links that bind South Africa to the US and other 
Western powers. This economic harmony of interests, it is argued, has led 
America and other Western nations to provide both overt and covert support 
for the South African war machine and its aggressive policies in the sub­
continent. Ncube's conclusion is that the southern African states should 
not be deceived by public criticism of apartheid in £he West into thinking 
that they can rely upon support from the US and its allies in their struggles 
against destabilization.
This last point is taken up by Tandon. Like Ncube, he takes issue 
with the prevailing view that South Africa is the sole or principal 
architect of destabilization. The implication of this view is that Western 
support for Pretoria can be reduced or withdrawn, providing sufficient 
pressure is brought to bear on Western governments by southern African 
states and their supporters in the international community. Tandon rega td s  
this view as dangerously shortsighted, ignoring as it does the fact that 
such governments, and especially that of the United States, are unlikely to
7trade the certainty of profits, strategic raw materials, and opposition to 
the Soviet Union that the present apartheid regime guarantees for a new 
regime that could well jeopardize all these things. According to Tandon, 
therefore, both Pretoria and Washington have powerful vested interests 
in the preservation of the status quo in southern Africa. And much of his 
paper is devoted to a detailed examination of the tactics that have been 
used to achieve this goal.
One tactic that has been contemplated but not as yet used by South 
Africa's decision-makers is the "food weapon." This is the subject of 
the paper by Robert Henderson. Notwithstanding the efforts of SADCC in the 
area of food security, Henderson demonstrates that the continuing inability 
of most states in the region to attain self-sufficiency in food production 
exposes them to pressure from their major supplier of imported grain 
the Republic of South Africa. Despite calls from within the Republic for 
a more aggressive use of the food weapon, he nevertheless argues that there 
are good reasons for believing that Pretoria will think twice before 
reducing or suspending its grain exports to neighbouring states as a means 
of extracting immediate concessions from them, not least because of the 
adverse effects that this would have on white South African grain producers. 
Although it is unlikely that the manipulation of grain exports will be used 
as a direct weapon of economic warfare, Henderson still feels that Pretoria 
may well be tempted to make use of food exports in a more subtle and limited 
way, as a means of exercising influence and maintaining the status quo in 
inter-state relations.
One of the most common tactics employed by Pretoria in destabilizing 
its neighbours has been the manipulation of domestic conflicts through 
support for opposition groups such as UNITA, the MNR, and the LLA. Such 
conflicts are a reflection in part of the tenuous economic situation 
prevailing in most southern African states. But they are also a reflection 
of political weaknesses, and particularly the tendency for governments to 
respond to internal dissent through repression rather than accomodation.
In many cases this tendency has been particularly noticeable in the relation­
ship between the state and trade union movements. The nature and implications 
of this relationship are explored at length in Chris Allen's paper on
8destabilization, political stability and trade unions.
The themes presented so far are given more detailed substance by 
R.O.K. Ajulu, John Daniel, and L.M. Sachikonye in their respective case 
studies of Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Ajulu and Sachikonye emphasize 
those factors that have made Lesotho and Zimbabwe targets for the more 
coercive end of South Africa's destabilization spectrum, and provide 
details of the specific mechanisms employed by Pretoria. Such mechanisms 
have not been used to anything like the same extent in Swaziland, for, according 
to Daniel, the harmony of ideological and economic interest shared by the 
South African ruling class and the Swazi traditional ruling oligarchy, 
particularly in the period since the death of King Sobhuza, have rendered 
Swaziland's leaders far more accomodating than those of Lesotho or Zimbabwe 
to Pretoria's demands. Swaziland's conservative readiness to accept the 
status quo in South Africa^ araues Daniel, has made it unnecesarv therefore for
Pretoria to resort to t^e touaher measures used so <:i'eouent]v in other narts 
of the region.
All the participants at the workshop endorsed the need for greater 
regional co-operation through the framework of SADCC, as a necessary 
precondition for the defeat of South Africa's destabilizing offensive. The 
prospects for this are explored by Michael Sefali in the final paper in 
this volume. The background to the emergence of SADCC is outlined, as are 
the organization's achievements to date. These, it is argued, have been 
significant, given the magnitude of the problems that have had to be faced.
Many difficulties still remain, of course, and these are examined in some 
detail. Whilst acknowledging, along with all the other workshop participants, 
that the long-term success of regional co-operation will depend upon the 
dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a new non-racial democratic 
order in South Africa, Sefali nevertheless remains cautiously optimistic 
about SADCC's future in the short-term.
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9OPENING ADDRESS BY 
HIS M AJESTY, MOTLOTLEHI MOSHOESHOE II
On behalf of the National University and the people and Government of 
.Lesotho may I welcome you all - distinguished delegates, researchers, 
and workshop participants - to this, the inaugural Congress and Workshop 
on Development and Destabilization in Southern Africa, organised under the 
auspices of the Southern African Development Research Association.
The theme of this Workshop is most appropriate at this particular 
period of our history and at this stage in the political and economic life 
of our region. The black majority-ruled states in our region are faced by 
the most demanding and urgent task of developing their economies and 
democratising their political systems in order to ensure both the material 
upliftment of their citizens and their participation in democratic and 
popularly based institutions. This is the greatest challenge of our time. 
We are called upon to work for societies that are fair, just, and humane, 
where people care for each other and share with each other.
We are therefore converging here because we have accepted that the 
moral duty and political commitment to the well-being of our societies and 
the stability of our region should be the paramount objective of all of our 
policies - social, economic, and political.
We deeply appreciate the fact that the urgent concern about establish­
ing priorities for policy-oriented research, itself the subject of an 
earlier Research Priorities Workshop held at Roma in November 1981, has 
now led to the establishment of the Southern African Development Research 
Association (SADRA). This reflects our commitment to the eradication of 
the scourges of poverty, deprivation, and apathy in our region and in the 
world at large. This workshop therefore endorses the spirit and embodies 
the ideals of the "Roma Declaration" which expressed the concerns of the 
committed research communities in our region, and reaffirmed the earlier 
joint declarations of the political leaders of our region. The Lusaka
10
Declaration, for example, committed all of us to work together towards 
the vital goal of freeing all of our peoples in Southern Africa from 
misery and abject poverty, and from the one-sided dependency of the 
weak upon the strong that so easily distracts and even destroys 
our efforts towards self-reliance. We are committed also to work towards 
the development and freedom of each and every one of our citizens.
Economic and political liberation are part of the same struggle 
towards freedom from poverty and all forms of discrimination, whether 
racial, religious, social, economic, or political. On the occasion of the 
independence of Mozambique, President Samora Machel said..."The first day 
of our political independence is also the first day of the harder and 
longer struggle for economic independence."
Eight years later, we can all echo President Machel's words from our 
own experiences, experiences that have led us to form a vital Organisation 
aimed at promoting collective self-reliance in the region - the Southern 
African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). We know that 
having established the political will at Lusaka our goal is attainable. We 
are also aware, however, that it is no easy task that we have on our hands. 
Much'more needs to be done before we can begin to see the end in sight, and 
we are aware that we shall have to exercise much vigilance if we are to 
avoid exchanging one form of dependency for another and if we are to 
resist the tactics of divide and rule that are being used against us. We 
have come to substitute the phrase "economic liberation" for that of 
"economic independence" because we have become increasingly aware that we 
are indeed dependent on one another, nationally, regionally, and inter­
nationally. However, in recognising such interdependence, we have come 
to realise also that unless interdependence is based on genuine partner­
ship then the continuing exploitation of the weak by the strong is all too 
frequently and sadly accomplished.
The establishment of SADCC therefore reflects our need - as small 
nations in the throes of struggle *- to develop all of our potential to 
secure a more equitable and more rapid rate of development for all our peop­
les; our need to free them from deprivation, want, and poverty; our need 
to seek, respect and honour the basic human rights of our people; and our 
need to unite together to ensure that the kind of exploitation referred
*
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to earlier is made more difficult. Together the SADCC countries have 
a combined GDP of some twenty billion US dollars, human resources of some 
sixty million people, an area of over five million square kilometres, and 
considerable reserves of iron, copper, gold and diamonds, as well as coal 
and oil potential. We have vast energy sources in hydro-electric power, 
as yet not fully developed, and an almost endless potential in the field of 
solar energy. We have the basis for’a balanced agricultural and industrial 
development. All this potential is far from being realised, however, not 
least because of our continuing and debilitating dependence on the Republic 
of South Africa, a situation which Pretoria is keen to perpetuate at almost 
any cost.
If we are to find economic liberation from this kind of dependence we 
have literally no alternative but to join together and work out active and 
realistic strategies that will help to accelerate the development processes 
in the region. SADCC is obviously of crucial importance here.
Regional co-operation is largely an intergovernmental affair - 
planned, pursued and carried out by officials - and that co-operation 
is dedicated to the greater benefit of all the partners. But the consumers 
of that co-operation are the people of the region themselves who we must 
never forget are both the instruments and beneficiaries of development.
Without their co-operation realistic development cannot take place. The 
degree of popular support will indeed have a significant effect on the 
prospects for success. Such support will in turn depend on each country's com­
mitment to the philosophy of total involvement of each and every citizen of 
our respective countries. The need to feel part of one's own destiny, to 
feel relevant to one's own community and country, and to feel valued as a 
full member of society is as much a basic human need as freedom from 
poverty. As an essential component in the development process, the people 
are entitled, therefore, to the fullest possible consultation, involvement, 
and accountability.
Destabilization does not only originate from outside our borders.
It can occur within them, and when it does it can seriously obstruct our 
domestic development processes. We therefore need both regional and 
national unity if we are to win our struggle against exploitation and 
destabilization. These two types of unity are, of course, inextricably
12
interlinked. If we cannot unite as one nation, how can we possibly unite 
as one region? And if we cannot begin to establish the regional strength 
necessary to reduce our dependence on South Africa, our chances of 
promoting internal unity in the face of Pretoria's destabilization efforts 
will obviously be remote.
Fortunately progress is being made on both these fronts. We already 
appear to the World as a genuine collective force, standing together 
against the common threat of External destabilization. This is a united 
stand of our own making, a creation of the founding fathers of SADCC and 
not an inheritance from pre-independence arrangements by the metropolitan 
powers. This is an advantage in our favour. Problems have been and are 
being identified by us, and possible solutions are being worked out by us 
and not for us. The late Sir Seretse Khama said..."Southern African 
development will be achieved by Southern Africans, for Southern Africans." 
Our continuing progress will not be trouble-free, however, and the many 
problems that lie ahead will have to be faced with openess and frankness, 
and with a resolve that will confound our enemies.
%
In addition to our dependence on South Africa we are also heavily 
dependent on the international aid community. Our development plans 
cost money, much more than we ourselves can find. We must be ever aware 
of the need to convince our aid donors of the mutual benefits that.may be 
gained through our development strategies and plans. We must convince them 
of the justice of our cause. And we must convince them of our ability to 
ensure that all of our peoples benfit from our actions. Not all our 
friends are convinced of our likelihood of success. Some prefer a selective 
country approach, an approach that can cause discord and lead to destabili­
zation. We must ensure that our solidarity and unity of purpose are not 
undermined, either directly or indirectly. We must ensure that our mutual 
trust is so strong that no one can come between us, to divide us and to 
create and perpetuate what are called "speheres of influence." The danger 
of exchanging one form of dependency for another can be offset by the 
diversification of our external links, and above all by the will to convince 
the outside world of the wisdom of collective self-reliance within the 
SADCC framework.
Together with other African states we have achieved considerable
success in focussing the critical attention of the internationaj 
community on the iniquities of apartheid and oppressive minority 
rule in South Africa. We must also strive to convince the same 
international community of the dangerous consequences of South 
African destabilization for social, economic, and political development 
in the subcontinent as a whole. We have to play our part in providing 
a persistent voice of protest. We must involve all our citizens in 
this unity of purpose.
The realities of the present situation determine the nature of our 
struggle,-and we mean to achieve our goals in the sure knowledge that, 
if we do not, our situation will become more and more untenable. Success 
is both essential and possible. We, here, today, must play our part in 
that success to the best of our ability and with the sure and certain 
knowledge that we have a basic human right to freedom from political 
domination and economic exploitation. We owe it to all of our peoples 
in the region to seek to identify the fundamental obstacles to development, 
to the eradication of poverty, and to the guaranteeing of popular partic­
ipation in our political institutions. Accordingly, we owe -it to the 
people to highlight these obstacles to our national and regional decision­
makers.
May I take this opportunity to wish you all the best success in yotir 
deliberations.
k h o t s o : p u l a : n a l a :
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY 
THE HONOURABLE E.R. SEKHONYANA 
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO
Mr C h a i r m a n  
Y o u r  M a j e s t y  
Mr P r o - V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r  
M e m b e r s  of the D i p l o m a t i c  C o r p s  
L a d i e s  and G e n t l e m e n
May I start by thanking the organisers of this workshop for inviting 
me to give the keynote address. I will not dwell too much upon a reiterat­
ion of the points made by His Majesty this morning. Instead I will restrict 
myself to the causes and effects of destabilization, and to some possible 
solutions, using Lesotho as my principal example.
In showing why South Africa wishes to destabilize the situation in 
Lesotho let me first dispel a number of myths propagated by Pretoria. The 
first is that South Africa needs to defend itself and retaliate against 
attacks by elements of the refugee community in Lesotho, especially ANC 
refugees. Hence the Maseru raid of December 1982, the economic blockade 
of our borders in 1983, and the de facto embargo placed recently on arms 
shipments destined for the Lesotho Defence Force, all designed to force 
us to capitulate to Pretoria's demands.
South African fears of attacks from Lesotho are the result of an 
unsophisticated appraisal of what we are as Basotho. We know our 
position. We are a very proud nation. We want to normalise our 
relationship with Pretoria. But let us appreciate our differences. We 
do not share your position, but at the same time we can never use Lesotho
1*
as a springboard for attacks against South Africa, because we canno* 
afford to. It is just that simple. We know what the costs would be.
The second myth is that South Africa needs to protect itself against 
the threat posed by the Communist posture assumed recently by the Lesotho 
Government. Lesotho has admittedly just extended its ties with Communist 
countries, but in Pretoria's oversimplistic logic this now seems to mean 
that Lesotho has immediately become Communist. This, of course, is a very 
oversimplistic assessment. Communist China's population is well over a 
billion people, but we are being told that such a country - comprising 
over a quarter of mankind and a permanent member of the UN Security Council 
does not exist. We should not recognise them and have diplomatic 
relations with them. But why not? Many other countries have diplomatic 
relations with the Communist bloc without becoming Communist themselves.
All we want to do is to affirm our right to enter into diplomatic ties 
with any country we chose. We not only want to be labelled as independent, 
we want to be seen as independent. That is a characteristic of any small 
state. We w ant to show that we are not one of the so-called "independent 
homelands." People should see that this is very important as far as we are 
concerned. But we do not want this to be interpreted as a potential threat 
of violence against South Africa. We obviously could not afford that. So 
the Soviet Union, or China, or anybody else will never have the opportunity 
of using our country for their own purposes. Pretoria has nothing to fear 
from us on that score, and should perhaps begin to revise its paranoia 
about Communism accordingly.
If Lesotho, like so many other states in the region, poses no genuine 
threat to South Africa we may well go on to ask why Pretoria has gone to 
such lengths to destabilize our regimes. I am sure that the many reasons 
for this will be explored most fully in the remaining proceedings of this 
workshop. Here I would like to focus on one very crucial aspect from the 
point of view of Lesotho.
We all know that South Africa's apartheid policy has come under 
increasing attack recently, both internally and externally, and that 
Pretoria's attempt to legitimize its oppressive minority rule by granting 
■so-called self-government to its black majority has failed because of the
world-wide refusal to recognize the "independence" of the bantustans. But 
if a country like Lesotho could be forced into recognition of the bantustans 
this could well open the floodgates to wider international recognition. This 
would provide an opportunity to those Western countries that are already 
investing in the homelands to go much further towards full-scale economic 
and political support for these creations of apartheid. In many ways, there­
fore, Lesotho holds the key. But in the light of our responsibilities to our 
oppressed brothers in South Africa - responsibilities that have been imposed 
upon us by the OAU and the whole of the progressive world - we have refused 
and continue to refuse to unlock the door.
Our refusal has not been motivated by concern for the balkanization of 
South Africa. Lesotho has nothing to do with the question of whether 
South Africa is balkanized or not. This is a matter for the South Africans 
themselves - white, black, coloured, and Indian. Had the bantustans been 
evolved after genuine consultation with the people who live within these 
geographical areas, our position would probably have been different. But 
this was not the case. Recently I asked a South African friend of mine 
a Mr Bizi who appears on the King Korn advertisements - why he no longer 
visits Lesotho. He replied that he no longer had a passport, and to obtain 
one he would have to go to the Transkei. I asked him why he did not do so, 
and he said that he had no roots, no connections whatsoever with the Transkei. 
Yet he is being told that the Transkei is his country. He is no longer a 
South African. The trauma which goes with this is incalculable. This is sin. 
This cannot be described in any other terms but as a crime against human 
nature. When we accept the independence of the homelands we would be 
legitimizing the denationalisation of 18 million black people. It is 
for this reason that Lesotho has steadfastly refused to recognize the 
bantustans. And it is for this reason, amongst others, that we have been 
subjected to merciless pressure from Pretoria to force us to reverse our 
position.
The tactics pursued by Pretoria to force us to do this have contained 
elements of both the "carrot" and the "stick", of conciliatory overtures 
coupled with punitive threats and actions. The name given to the overtures 
(the carrot) has changed over time, from dialogue and detente to the 
Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). But their content has 
remained essentially the same - the promise of South African aid and
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nsupport to those states that are prepared to roe Pretoria'?: line
Like most other states in the region we have refused to be taken-in 
by Pretoria's offers. And it is because of the failure of the carrot 
option that Pretoria has switched in recent years to much more forceful 
means, ranging from threats of economic reprisal to outright military 
intervention, aimed at destabilizing the economic and political systems 
of her neighbours and making them more susceptible in the future to 
the carrot option and the strings attached to it. Destabilization has 
taken a variety of forms in Lesotho, some of which have already been 
mentioned - the Maseru raid which far from being designed to destroy 
ANC military bases in Lesotho (which never in fact existed except in the 
minds of the South African authorities) was intended as a brutal threat 
to the Government and people of Lesotho of what can happen to states that 
refuse to yield to Pretoria's wishes; the hold-up by the South African 
authorities of arms shipments urgently needed by the Lesotho Defence 
Force; and the damaging economic blockade of our borders which was 
introduced in May 1983.
Here I can briefly highlight a number of additional tactics that 
have been used by South Africa. The most obvious of these has been 
the support and training given by South Africa to the Lesotho Liberation 
Army which has been trying since 1979 to overthrow the Government of 
Lesotho by force. Recently South Africa has moved elements of the LLA 
to the Matatiele portion of the Transkei, with the specific purpose of 
keeping things stirred up in Lesotho. This has helped South Africa in at 
least two ways. First, South Africa does not have to accept liability in 
terms of the territorial origins of the aggression. And secondly, it helps 
South Africa in its attempt to force Lesotho into the recognition of the 
Transkei, as well as other homelands. We are told that if we want to 
deal with the LLA bandits we must deal with the bantustans where they 
are based.
Additional techniques have been used to blackmail us into recognizing 
the homelands and adopting a more favourable attitude towards South Africa's 
plans for a Constellation of Southern African States. Lesotho has long 
tried to get South Africa to consider our legitimate historical claims 
to the conquered or ceded territories that we lost in the wars against
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the Orange Free State in the 1860s. These included the territory of 
East Griqualand. When the Transkei received its so-called independence,
East Griqualand was attached to it by Pretoria. We voiced our protest, 
but Pretoria rudely retorted that Lesotho could negotiate the issue with 
the Transkei. This was, of course, absolutely unacceptable as it was a 
clearattempt by South Africa to force Lesotho to recognize apartheid 
and separate development.
Another example of South African blackmail has been Pretoria's attempt 
to tie long needed reforms of the 1969 Customs Union Agreement to the 
recognition of the bantustans. If Lesotho recognizes them we will get 
a better deal from the Customs Union. Otherwise we will not. The whole 
rationale is again to make South Africa's neighbours accept apartheid and 
its creations, the bantustans.
An important fafctor in explaining South Africa's increasing reliance 
on the stick rather than carrot option is what I would refer to as the 
"herrenvolk" syndrome, or "super white racism." The racial superiority that 
characterizes the attitudes of the Afrikaner ruling class in its dealings 
with South Africa's black population is matched by an equally contemptuous 
attitude towards Pretoria's black neighbours. When such foreign "natives" 
refuse to cower to Pretoria's wishes, their viewpoint is not taken seriosuly. 
Instead South Africa resorts to its usual policy - instant punishment 
to bring them into line. Shoot first and talk later becomes the order of the 
day, as the Maseru raid and many other tragic incidents in recent years have 
clearly shown.
If the black majority-ruled states of Southern Africa are to contain 
and off-set the effects of destabilization they must strive, as his Majesty 
has eloquently argued, for greater regional and national uhity. Perhaps I 
might dwell a little on the latter point, that of national unity. One reason 
why destabilization is such a danger is that it can exploit and magnify the 
internal divisions that exist within our societies. This has been the case 
in Lesotho with South Africa's support for Ntsu Mokhehle and the LLA. But 
other groups in Lesotho, perhaps unwittingly, have helped to make the ground 
more fertile for Pretoria's schemes. This has been particularly and very 
unfortunately the case with the Roman Catholic Church in Lesotho, which 
through its fear of Communism finds itself in harmony with South African
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policy. This is not of course the position of the Catholic Church in 
global terms. I am not even sure whether it is the position of locals 
within the local Church. But it is very much the position of external 
members of our local Catholic Church who are a very important influence 
within it, not least because they control the purse strings to a 
considerable extent. These members are drawn largely from an order 
based in Quebec which is well-known for its conservatism and paranoiac 
fear of Communism. And the storm of criticism that they have unleashed 
recently at the Lesotho Government's attempt to broaden its international 
links to include members of the Communist bloc has seriously undermined 
the national unity the Government is trying to foster in order to counter 
Pretoria's campaign of destabilization.
Finally, if destabilization is to be defeated, and South Africa 
itself is to be liberated, much more understanding, sympathy and support 
for our cause will have to be forthcoming from the Western world, and 
particularly from the United States. Whilst we can appreciate the 
rationale behind the American policy of constructive engagement, we 
nevertheless feel that South Africa will take advantage of this to 
continue to oppress its own black majority and to harass and intimidate 
its neighbours, free from the fear of Western, and especially American, 
pressure. The West has .major investments in South Africa which not unnatur­
ally it is keen to protect. And this is undoubtedly why the Western 
reaction to the evils of apartheid and more recently to the dangers of 
destabilization has frequently been less strenuous than it might otherwise 
have been. But if the Western countries wish to continue to profit from 
their investments in the long-run then it is in their economic as well 
as moral interests to put all the pressure at their disposal to secure 
rapid and peaceful change towards majority rule in South Africa and an 
end to Pretoria's campaign of destabilization. Otherwise the level of 
insecurity and instability in the region will inevitably escalate, as 
undoubtedly will violence, a situation which will not only have damaging 
consequences for the states of the subcontinent but for Western 
investment as well.
To conclude, if we are to understand destabilization in all its 
forms, and if we are to attain the national, regional, and international
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solidarity to counteract it effectively, then much more research needs 
to be done. It is for this reason that I and the Government of Lesotho 
warmly welcome the establishment of the Southern African Development 
Research Association, and hope that this inaugural workshop on Development 
and Destabilization in Southern Africa will be the first of many attempts 
to grapple seriously and realistically with the problems that beset our 
region.
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SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION 
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
R o b e r t  D a v i e s  and D an O ' M e a r a *
It is obvious even to the casual observer of the struggle in the 
Southern African region that the South African apartheid state is engaged 
in various actions against independent states in the region. It has been 
involved in numerous large scale invasions of Angolan territory; it has 
carried out more limited but nevertheless brutal raids against Mozambique 
and Lesotho; it has organized and sponsored armed puppet movements acting 
against the governments of a number of independent states; and it has 
applied economic and other pressures - all in an attempt to destabilize 
these states. South Africa has also offered various incentives 
including economic aid and the cession of territory - to states willing 
to collaborate with it.
These actions are generally seen as the desperate response of the 
apartheid system and state to the deepening crisis confronting it both 
internally and externally. More specifically, it is widely recognized 
that through such actions the apartheid regime is attempting to thwart the 
advancing liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia, and to 
undermine attempts by the independent states to challenge the stranglehold 
of South African capitalism in the region. It is less widely understood, 
however, that these actions are also elements or tactics of a broader 
regional strategy. And the aim of this paper is to offer a preliminary 
analysis of this strategy as a basis for discussion and further research.
* Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universitade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo
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The Historical Roots of Current South African Regional Strategy
South Africa's current regional strategy has to be understood primarily 
as an aspect of the so-called "Total National Strategy" of the Botha regime.  ^
Total Strategy has served as the basic strategic and ideological framework 
within which both the internal and external policy of the .apartheid state 
has been organized since Botha's accession to the premiership in September 
1978. However, since Total Strategy was formulated in a particular historic­
al conjuncture in response to specific concrete conditions of struggle, an 
analysis of the regime's current regional strategy has also to be located in 
the context of the history of previous regional strategies and struggles.
It is not the intention of this paper to present a lengthy account of
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the history of South Africa's regional policy. Nevertheless, a number 
of aspects of this policy in the period since the Second World War are 
important. Historically the development of capitalism in Southern Africa 
led to the formation of a regional sub-system in which the principal poles 
of accumulation were located in South Africa, while the other territories in 
the region were subordinated to serve the needs of capital accumulation in 
South Africa. Among other things neighbouring territories were subordinated 
as labour reserves (supplying 300,000 migrant workers for the mining 
industry alone in 1973); as suppliers of cheap raw materials and/or specific 
Services such as transport; and as markets for South African commodities.
One longstanding objective of South Africa's regional policy has thus been 
to ensure that neighbouring territories continue to serve South African 
capitalism in these ways. Another increasingly important objective has 
been to thwart the advancing liberation struggles of the peoples of the 
region.
Until the mid-1970s the fundamental bedrock on which the apartheid 
state based its attempts to achieve these objectives was the existence of 
a number of buffer states surrounding it. To the west was the Portuguese 
colony of Angola and the South African occupied territory of Namibia; to 
the north was the settler-ruled colony of Rhodesia; and to the east 
was the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. The principal focus of regional 
policy was that of reinforcing these buffer states to serve as a protective 
barrier for South Africa itself. This involved the formation of alliances
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with the colonial regimes in these territories and the rendering to them 
of various forms of support, including military assistance.
With respect to other countries in the region, until the mid-1960s 
South Africa sought the direct incorporation of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland. These three territories were administered from South Africa 
by the British High Commissioner who also served as Britain's ambassador 
to South Africa. The absorption of these territories by South Africa 
would have had the advantage of placing them under its own control. It 
would also have had the additional ideological advantage of enabling 
the racial division of land in an enlarged South Africa to be presented 
as a fair 50:50, instead of the existing and clearly unfair division of 
87 percent white and 13 percent black.
When it became clear that Britain would not accede to the demands 
for incorporation and that the territories would eventually become 
independent the Verwoerd regime proposed in 1963 the establishment of 
a common market/commonwealth in Southern Africa. This forerunner of Botha's 
Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) envisaged as a first 
step the establishment of a free trade zone in the region. Once this was 
established it was felt that the economic links between territories would 
be so strong that the basis would be laid for the establishment of a region­
al political institution - a commonwealth of associated black and white 
states with South Africa as the mother country.
The commonwealth project failed to materialise. Nevertheless, 
increasingly close links were forged throughout the 1960s and early 1970s 
with the colonial regimes of the buffer states, while none of the indepen­
dent states which came into existence at this time were able or willing 
to mount an effective challenge to South African hegemony.
With its base in the region thus apparently secure, a new offensive 
was launched by the Vorster regime in the late 1960s in direct response to 
the -process of rapid decolonisation then underway and the increasing 
international condemnation of apartheid. This offensive, known as the 
outward looking policy or dialogue initiative, had as its objective the 
search for allies within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). And 
it scored some initial success. In 1971, for example, six OAU members 
(Malawi, Gabon, Ivory Coast,-Mauritania, Madagascar and Lesotho) voted
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against a motion condemning Pretoria's dialogue proposals as a manoeuvre 
designed to "divide African states and confuse public opinion in order 
to end the isolation of South Africa, and thus to maintain the status quo
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in South Africa. Five other states (Dahomey, Niger, Swaziland, Upper
Volta and Togo) abstained. The Vorster regime also achieved its biggest 
diplomatic coup in the same year with the state visit to South Africa 
of Banda, followed by the establishment of formal diplomatic relations 
with Malawi.
Although these developments gave the impression that things in the 
region were going Pretoria's way, in reality the balace of forces were 
being dramatically altered by the advancing liberation struggles in 
territories still under colonial rule. This became strikingly clear in 
April 1974 when the Portuguse regime was overthrown as a direct result 
of the heightening of contradictions in Portugal through the impact of the 
colonial wars. This was followed by the indepndence of Mozambique and 
Angola in 1975 under governments formed by the liberation movements 
FRELIMO and the MPLA. This changed the balance of forces in the region 
dramatically and undermined the basis on which South African policy had 
hitherto been built. Two key buffers had fallen. Furthermore it was 
becoming clear at the same time that the Smith regime in Zimbabwe had 
been forced onto the defensive, in large measure due to the facilities 
made available to Zimbabwean freedom fighters by FRELIMO. South African 
forces in Namibia were also placed under increasing pressure by SWAPO 
guerillas who were now able to operate along the entire 1,000 kilometre 
northern border. The situation in the region had changed dramatically.
The bedrock on which South Africa's regional policy had up to this point 
been built - the buffer states - had finally proved to be sandstone 
rather than granite.
The collapse of Portuguese colonialism gave rise to a hasty reform­
ulation of regional strategy by the Vorster regime in 1974. One aspect of 
this involved a further expansion of military forces. The military 
budget for 1974-75 was one-and-a-half times that of the previous year. By 
1977-78 it had risen to three-and-a-nalf times that of 1973-74. Another 
aspect was the launching of a new diplomatic initiative, known as detente. 
Orchestrated and conceived by the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), detente
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had as its objective the desperate search for allies within the OAU.
Bribery, secret diplomatic contacts (often arranged through BOSS's 
connections with Western intelligence services), and ultimately a visit 
by Vorster to a number of countries in West Africa, as well as a meeting 
with President Kaunda of Zambia, were all means used in the attempt to 
achieve this end. At the same time some minor internal changes were 
made, such as the scrapping of some forms of "petty apartheid." These 
were clearly intended to suggest that detente was a much more viable 
alternative than confrontation.
Despite some initial success, however, the detente initiative began 
to crumble as a result of the South African invasion of Angola in 1975 
and more especially as a result of the brutal repression of the Soweto 
uprising in 1976. Not even the most conservative African regime could 
now afford to be seen to be collaborating with a regime that slaughtered 
school children in the streets.
By the end of 1976, therefore, the apartheid regime faced both an inter­
nal crisis and the collapse of its regional policies. At the same time, 
top military strategists, allied to monopoly capitalist class forces, 
had become stridently critical of the bases on which regional as well as 
other aspects of state security policy had hitherto been conducted. This 
critique covered important aspects of the organization of military interven­
tions in the region, as well as of an approach towards winning allies that 
relied on influencing individual decision-makers rather than the objective 
environment in which decisions were made. In the 1977 Defence White Paper 
(the document in which top military commanders first publicly called for 
the adoption of a Total Staregy) it was argued that the mobilization of 
economic, political, and psycho-social resources, as well as military 
resources, was necessary to defend and advance the interests of South 
Africa at the internal and regional levels. More specifically, the 
White Paper identified the need "to maintain a solid military balance 
relative to neighbouring states and other states in Southern Africa." It 
also called for "economic action" and "action in relation to transport 
services, distribution and telecommunications" to promote "political 
and economic collaboration among the states of Southern Africa." **
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Total Strategy at the Regional Level
The period following the rise to power of the Botha regime in 
September 1978 and the subsequent adoption of Total Strategy has seen 
a number of steps being taken to restructure regional policy. First, the 
objectives of regional policy have been reformulated. The ultimate object­
ive has been identified as the establishment of a constellation of anti- 
Marxist states, tied to apartheid South Africa through a range of joint 
economic projects. In some ways this represents a resurrection of the 
Verwoerdian commonwealth proposals. But there are some notable differences. 
Terminology has been modernized to exclude some of the cruder formulations 
of the Verwoerdian era, such as South Africa acting as the "mother 
country" in the region. More importantly the constellation proposals 
represented a new departure in that they clearly sought to influence the 
objective environment within which decisions were made rather than 
influencing individual decision-makers directly which was the policy 
adopted during the detente phase. In other words the CONSAS proposals 
envisaged extending economic links with neighbouring states as a means 
of entrapping them politically.
In addition to this ultimate objective, a number of more immediate
and limited objectives have also been defined. With CONSAS so far
failing to attract any interest in the neighbouring states, these have
come to assume a particularly important role. A clear statement of these
immediate regional policy objectives appears in a paper by Deon Geldenhuys --
one of Botha's leading academic consultants on foreign policy issues -
which was commissioned by the Institute of Strategis Studies of the Univer-
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sity of Pretoria early in 1981. Geldenhuys defined the first of these 
objectives as ensuring that:
Neighbouring states are not used as springboards for a guerilla or 
terrorist attacks on South Africa. South Africa clearly not only 
wants neighbouring governments to give an undertaking to this effect 
but also wants to implement it effectively, thus ensuring that 
unauthorised incursions do not take place. Furthermore, South Africa 
would wish that black states in the region (not merely neighbouring 
countries) would not provide training facilities for anti-South African 
liberation movements and, ideally, would not allow the fighters transit 
facilties or allow the movements to establish offices in their 
countries.
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What is clearly being demanded here is not only that independent states 
in the region refrain from providing active support to the armed 
liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia, but also that they 
act as police agents for Pretoria and prohibit any form of political 
organization and expression by refugees resident in their territories.
The second objective, reflecting the Botha regime's definition of 
the crisis confronting it as a product of Soviet orchestrated "total 
onslaught", is to ensure that "Soviet bloc powers do not gain a political 
and least of all a military foothold in Southern African states."
The third and fourth objectives are directly aimed at thwarting any 
attempts by independent states to reduce their economic dependence on 
South Africa. According to Geldenhuys, South Africa wants to see that:
Existing economic ties with states in the region are maintained and 
indeed strengthened. An obvious precondition for the strategic 
application of economic relations (exertion of economic pressure 
RD/DOM) is that these links have to exist in a meaningful way.
Pretoria also wants:
Black states in the region not to support calls for mandatory trade 
sanctions against South Africa. For some of them, implementation 
of sanctions would have devastating results; others may be prepared 
to run the risks, as in the case of sanctions against Rhodesia. The 
stronger the economic ties with South Africa, perhaps the lesser the 
chances of their supporting sanctions. Black states could, in 
other words, shield South Africa from mandatory sanctions.
Finally, according again to Geldenhuys, the apartheid regime wants:
Black states in Southern Africa (to) display some moderation in 
expressing their customary criticism of the Republic's domestic 
policy and in suggesting solutions. To try to induce some 
moderation in the heady antu-South African rhetoric is however 
a secondary objective and its limits are obvious: it simply cannot 
be expected of OAU member states to refrain from denouncing 
apartheid; at issue is the manner in which it is done.
In addition to the reformulation of strategic objectives, new 
instruments have been developed to achieve these objectives. Of crucial 
importance has been the rapid‘mobilisation of military resources. The 
period since 1978 has seen a considerable expansion of the armed forces, 
with defence expenditure nearly doubling between 1977-78 and 1983-84 to
28
reach R3,050 million (an amount greater than the GDP of Zimbabwe). In 
addition, the period has also seen the development or reinforcement of 
partciular military capabilities for aggression against neighbouring states, 
most of which have been well tested in practice. These include reconnaiss­
ance commandos, ethnic battalions, and puppet groups. The reconnaissance 
commandos are specialist units containing a high proportion of mercenaries 
for use in hit and run operations, such as those against Matola in 1981 
and Maseru in 1982. Ethnic battalions are units stationed near the 
borders of neighbouring states and composed of black soldiers of the 
same language and cultural group as the people of the neighbouring state. 
These are ready for raids into these territories to support puppet groups, 
such as UNITA, the MNR and the LLA, purporting to be indigenous resistance 
movements and indeed drawing recruits from the country concerned, but 
supplied, led and directed by the South African Defence Force.
Since Total Strategy envisages the mobilisation of economic, political 
and psycho-social as well as military resources, the period has also seen 
considerable efforts being devoted to examining ways in which economic 
links can be used as a means of furthering the apartheid state's strategic 
objectives in the region. In the terminology of the apartheidi strategists, 
these can be used either as "incentive levers" or "techniques of persuasion" 
on the one hand, or as "disincentive levers" or "techniques of coercion" on 
the other. Among the possible incentive levers are the offer of aid and 
co-operation in joint infrastructural projects. This was originally to 
have been channeled through the institutions of CONSAS, and in particular 
through the proposed Southern African Development Bank. Other institution­
al forms have also been used, particularly the Southern "African Customs 
Union, as wellas straight bilateral channels.
With respect to the levers of disincentive, or the techniques of 
coercion, it is worth citing Geldenhuys again. In his 1981 paper, 
referred to earlier, he reccomends ways in which "South Africa (can) 
use its economic links for strategic purposes." ^ Among the measures 
he recommends for consideration are the following, all of which have 
been applied or threatened since 1981:
1) Limiting or prohibiting the use of South Africa's railways and
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harbour facilities for the export of goods from black states. There 
are, needless to say, numerous ways of limiting the use of these 
facilities, by manipulating the availability of railway trucks or 
berthing facilities in harbours, or harsher measures such as imposing 
surcharges on goods transported, or officially announcing restrict­
ions on the amount of goods that may be exported via South Africa.
(In 1981 Zimbabwean exports were subjected to just such a manipulation of
the availability of trucks and berthing facilities).
2) Limiting or banning the importation of labour from the black states. 
(While the reasons for the reduction in the numbers and proportion of 
foreign migrant workers in the South African mining industry are complex, 
it is no accident that the country most affected has been Mozambique. 
Moreover, the threat of a reduction in the numbers recruited from countries 
like Lesotho, for example, has been made on a number of occasions).
3) Regulating the access to and movement through South Africa of nationals 
from black states. Without going to the extreme of prohibiting entry 
into the Republic, the authorities have various means open to them to 
make access difficult, e.g. by deliberate delays at border posts.
(This was applied against Lesotho in 1983).
4) Placing curbs on the imports of goods from black states...(or) 
regulating the export of goods to black states. The two most crucial 
items are undoubtedly food and oil, but machinery, spares and 
various other goods could also be added.
(Zambia was subjected to precisely such action in respect of maize, imports
in the period immediately prior to the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979,
and Zimbabwe in respect of oil imports in a crude attempt to force it
into negotiations following the sabotage of the Beira-Mutare pipeline
in 1982).
5) Curtailing or terminating the provision of technical expertise to 
these states, e.g. in the operation of Maputo harbour.
(Technicians were withdrawn in 1981 shortly after the Matola raid).
One important point stressed by Geldenhuys is that if South Africa 
were to be seen to be openly applying economic coercion against other 
states, it might be more vulnerable to calls for sanctions against it.
For this reason some explanation or justification is needed in terms 
other than attempts to exert pressure. In practice, some such 
explanation has been proffered on each occasion that these techniques have
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been applied.
How then has the application of this strategy proceeded in practice 
and what have been the results to date? Here it seems to us that three 
phases can usefully be identified. The first ran from the end of 1978 
to mid-1980. This phase saw the launching and promotion of the Constell­
ation of States proposal. It was during this phase (in November 1979) 
that the first of several meetings took place between officials of the 
Botha regime and leading capitalists. At this November meeting Botha 
called for support from the private sector to launch a proposed Southern 
African Development Bank to finance the infrastructural projects which 
would be the key to the establishment of the constellation.
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According to press reports at this time, apartheid strategists
had drawn up a schedule for incorporating independent states in the region
into the proposed constellation. The key was to have been Zimbabwe. If
Zimbabwe could be brought to an internationally recognised independence
under a government led by Muzorewa, it was calculated that it would be
a ready adherent. With Zimbabwe secured, it was felt that Malawi and
Swaziland - the two most conservative states in the region with strong
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existing economic links with South Africa - could easily be attracted. 
This would almost certainly compel Lesotho and Botswana to join. It was 
then felt that Zaire could be persuaded to affiliate, and that this would 
put strong pressure on Zambia to associate as well. Apart from Namibia, 
which Pretoria hoped to bring to a Muzorewa type independence under the 
puppet Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, this left Angola, Mozambique, and 
Tanzania. These three countries were not considered as candidates for 
membership of the constellation under their existing governments, but 
apartheid strategists were reasonable hopeful that these governments 
might be changed in due course.
In the event, the constellation project failed to materialise. Two 
main factors were responsible. First, ZANU(PF)'s defeat of Muzorewa put 
paid to any hopes that Zimbabwe would provide the key to the whole plan. 
Instead, independent Zimbabwe became a member of the Front Line States.
The second factor, which sealed the fate of any hopes for an early 
establishment of CONSAS, was the formation of the Southern African
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Development Coordination Conference(SADCC). SADCC was officially 
established in April 1980, although the proposal had been discussed 
at a meeting of the Front Line States in Arusha in 1979. SADCC defined 
its principal strategic objective as "a reduction of external dependence
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and in particular dependence on the Republic of South Africa." SADDC 
documents identify three levels of transformation that will be necessary 
in order to achieve this: a transformation at the level of the economies 
of the individual member states; a transformation in the relationships 
between member states; and a transformation in the relationship between 
the nine member states and the outside world. To bring about these 
transformations SADCC has launched a multi-lateral development programme, 
concentrating on infrastructural development and food security, but also 
focussing on semi-arid agricultural development, energy, industrial 
co-operation, and training.
It is quite clear that SADDC was not established merely to frustrate 
South African regional policy. A reduction in external dependence and a 
radical change in the historical pattern of accumulation in Southern 
Africa are vital for the implementation of any development programme 
capable of satisfying the needs of the masses of the region. But one 
important consequence of SADDC has been the challenge it poses not only 
to CONSAS but also to one of the more immediate objectives of South African 
regional policy - the maintenance and even deepening of economic ties 
with the independent states.
One immediate effect of this was that when the apartheid regime 
eventually established the various apparatuses of CONSAS it had to confine 
itself to a so-called inner constellation of white South Africa and the 
"independent bantustans." Any wider constellation was relegated to 
the realm of a dream for the future.
Perhaps the most important effect of the stalling of the CONSAS 
initiative was that it inaugurated a new phase of South African action 
in the region, which lasted roughly from mid-1980 to the end of 1981. This 
second phase saw the apartheid regime applying destabilizing tactics in a 
fairly generalised and indiscriminate manner. The period saw a rapid 
escalation of military aggression against neighbouring states. There 
were numerous large-scale invasions of Angoland territory; a raid against
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ANC residences in Matola; a substantial increase in the level of activity
by puppet movements (the MNR and LLA in particular); and threats to turn
Swaziland into a "second front", backed by a number of operations by 
South African agents against refugees.
In addition, the period saw the first major attempts to apply economic 
techniques of coercion. South African Transport Services withdrew a number 
of locomotives on hire to Zimbabwean railways, and created blockages for 
Zimbabwean exports passing through South African ports. Pretoria also 
threatened to cancel a longstanding trade preference agreement under which 
Zimbabwean manufactured goods were admitted to the South African market on 
favourable terms.
Mozambique too found itself subjected to the same kind of action. 
Shortly after the Matola raid, South African technicians were withdrawn 
from Maputo harbour and for some time South African Transport Services 
refused to send railway wagons into Mozambique. Various justifications 
were offered by the South African authorities in a thinly veiled attempt 
to conceal from the outside world that these actions were in reality a means 
of puting further pressure on Zimbabwe and Mozambique, as well as on other 
countries in the region.
This period of generalised destabilization was followed by the third 
period, beginning in 1982, in which the apartheid regime seems to have acted 
more selectively in the region. This has particularly been the case with 
South African objectives. The apartheid regime appears to have identified 
two immediate objectives and has concentrated on trying-to achieve them.
The first has been its demand that states in the region limit both the 
numbers and actvities of ANC members in their countries. This has largely 
been the result of the deepening crisis in South Africa itself, particular­
ly the advances made in the armed struggle since 1977. And this has led 
to an attempt to internationalise this crisis. For some time the regime 
has sought to present social struggles and conflicts that arise out of 
contradictions internal to South African capitalism as the product of 
external, and particularly Soviet, intervention. By doing so it has 
clearly hoped to draw the Western powers into a more active defence of 
apartheid. More recently, a further dimension to such attempts to
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internationalise the South African struggle has surfaced. The regime 
now appears to want to compel states in the region to place such pressure 
on the ANC that the organization is forced to reduce the scale of its 
political and military activities.
The second objective pursued in this third phase has been the 
maintenance of economic links and the frustration of efforts by its 
neighbours to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa.
In addition to greater selectivity at the level of objectives, it also 
appears that some attempt has been made to discriminate between states in 
the region in the application of particular tactics. The apartheid 
strategists seem to have divided the states in the region into three broad 
categories: the conservative states who are seen as real or potential 
collaborators; those states considered to be the most vulnerable to press­
ure; and those states whose political systems and development strategies 
are deemed to constitute the most fundamental challenge to South African 
capitalism and apartheid.
The states in the first category have been offered various concessions 
with the aim of either encouraging them to deepen their economic links 
with the Republic or of rewarding them for good behaviour. The most 
striking example perhaps has been the case of Swaziland. Among the 
incentives offered and accepted by the Swazi regime have been assistance 
in building a railway line through Swazi territory, linking the Eastern 
Transvaal with the port of Richards Bay, and a supplementary R50 million 
payment under the customs union agreement. The controversial offer to cede 
the KaNgwane bantustan and part of the KwaZulu bantustan to Swaziland has 
been enthusiastically embraced by the dominant political faction in Swazil­
and, and remains under negotiation. In return the Swazi regime has clamped 
down severely on the ANC. It has also indicated that a considerable part 
of its sugar and other exports will be diverted from the port at Maputo 
to that at Richards Bay. Apart from their impact on the ANC and the 
weakening of Swaziland's committment to the SADCC principle of reducing 
links with South African capitalism, these measures have also had a major 
political impact within Swaziland itself. The conservative Swazi ruling 
class has been split into two violently squabbling factions. The most 
reactionary of these now appears to have established its dominance through
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drastic measures which seem to have undermined the very ideological 
framework of Swazi traditionalism on which its rule has hitherto rested.
In contrast, states in the second and third categories have been 
identified and subjected to an intensified assault. This has now become 
the principal and most visible form of South African action in the region.
The three states which have borne the brunt of these assaults are Lesotho, 
Angola and Mozambique.
South African aggression against Lesotho has been directed at trying 
to force the Lesotho Government to crack down on South African refugees, to 
expel ANC members, and to reverse its policy of non-recognition of the 
Transkei and other bantustans. In addition, there is some evidence that 
Pretoria believes that by destabilizing the Government (through a combinat­
ion of LLA attacks, SADF action, and economic pressure such as border 
closures) Premier Jonathan could well be toppled from power and his regime 
replaced by one which was more accomodating to Pretoria's demands.
In the case of Angola and Mozambique, further considerations are 
clearly involved. Apart from the considerable support which these states 
give to the ANC and SWAPO, they are the only states in the region that are 
ruled by Marxist-Leninist parties, committed to a process of socialist 
transformation. As such they pose a direct ideological challenge and 
potential alternative to apartheid capitalism. Moreover, as well as being 
one of the prime movers of SADCC, Mozambique is also of considerable strategic 
importance to the realisation of SADCC's objectives. The country's ports 
and harbours offer the only realistic alternative to continued dependence 
on South African transport facilities for many of the SADCC states.
It is no surprising, therefore, that Angola and Mozambique have been 
the major victims of South African aggression. In Angola's case this has 
involved repeated invasions of the southern provinces by South African 
forces, together with an attempt to foist a UNITA presence onto the 
population of these provinces. In the case of Mozambique it has involved 
an intensification of activity by the Pretoria-sponsored MNR, numerous 
incidents of sabotage against strategic transport installations by members, 
of SADF, and the May 1983 air attack on Matola/Liberdade.
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Conclusions
In assessing the results of the application of the above measures 
to date, it should be noted at the outset that they have achieved a 
number of successful results from the standpoint of the South African 
ruling class. Swaziland has been persuaded to act as a South African 
policing agent against ANC refugees, and more recently Lesotho has been 
forced to expel refugees from its territory. Pretoria's policies have 
also succeeded in causing considerable disruption in Angola and 
Mozambique.
Although Total Strategy originally envisaged the application of a 
sophisticated package of incentives and threats, in practice these 
successes have been increasingly achieved through what the Economist 
described as a "flexible and amoral" application of "military and 
economic power." ^  This points to both the strengths and weaknesses 
of South Africa's regional policy. The apartheid state has at its 
disposal vastly superior economic and military resources to those of the 
independent states in the region. According to World Bank figures,
South Africa's GDP of $52,920 million in 1979 was three times 
that of the nine SADCC countries combined ($17,679 million). South 
Africa's military budget is greater than the GDP of Zimbabwe. Its 
capacity to exert considerable pressure on neighbouring states thus 
cannot be in doubt.
It is important to note, however, that with a few significant 
exceptions South African successes have not been achieved through 
winning the ideological consent of the states in the region. The 
CONSAS proposals have failed to attract even the most conservative 
pro-capitalist regimes. Moreover, while incentives have been a factor 
in some cases (notably that of Swaziland), Pretoria's regional policy 
objectives have been pursued primarily through the application of 
coercion or threats of coercion. Pretoria has failed, therefore, to 
build up a ring of allies or collaborators to replace the lost buffer 
states.
This point has been recognised by a number of leading academics with 
close links to the Botha regime. Several of these (including Geldenhuys
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who was referred to earlier) have now become critical of the recent 
direction of regional policy. They argue that the sophisticated approach 
envisaged in the original Total Strategy (with which they agree) has given 
way to a tendency to resort to "military quick fix solutions",not located 
within a broader strategy. The broader strategic vision has become blurred 
while the application of diplomatic techniques and incentives has, by and 
large, been a failure. A continuation of this trend they argue will lead 
to an escalation of conflict in the region and an even more widespread 
resort to destabilization tactics. In the long-run this could easily 
prove counterproductive and pose "formidable risks" for the apartheid 
state. "Outside forces" may be drawn in and "a wider conflict would 
severely affect foreign investment and destroy South Africa's vision 
of a Constellation of Southern African States." To avoid such an outcome, 
these academic critics advocate a more effective use of diplomacy and 
economic action, as called for in the original formulations of Total 
Strategy. ^
What the impact of such criticisms from within the heart of the 
South African foreign policy establishment might be is at present a matter 
for speculation. However, it is important to note that these views are by
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no means shared by all strategic studies experts who support the regime.
A number of counter-insurgency specialists have in fact argued a contrary 
position. This has been formulated most coherently by a senior member 
of the South African Institute of International Affairs at the University 
of the Witwatersrand, who argued in the official journal of the South 
African Defence Force as follows:
All terrorist concentrations threatening peace and security in SWA/ 
Namibia or South Africa regardless of where they are located must be 
attacked and destroyed. So-called diplomatic considerations must 
not be allowed to interfere - that is the road to d e f e a t S t a n d i n g  
on the defensive is not enough. The ANC must be attacked abroad. 
Attacks like that on the ANC headquarters in Maputo (sic) and Maseru 
must be r e p e a t e d ^ - again and again. .;Containment is not the aim. 
Destruction is.
Similarly, the Economist article, cited earlier, reports that "the military
pragmatists" currently directing South Africa's regional policy are
convinced "that no concessions should be made to an enemy until absolutely 
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necessary." Politicians and diplomats had in fact been giving too much
away recently, according to such military pragmatists.
The academics' critique of Pretoria's strategy faces additional 
problems. Whilst correctly pointing out that South Africa has succeeded 
"in throwing its weight around the subcontinent... but not in ruling it"
(in the words of the Economist again), the fact that their analysis is 
located within the framework of South African ruling class perspectives 
places severe limitations on their capacity to explain the reasons for this 
state of affairs. In particular, they have failed to recognise that there 
is a fundamental contradiction between the interests of the masses of the 
Southern African region and those of South Africa's capitalist ruling class. 
They fail to see, therefore, that the refusal of the progressive and 
socialist regimes to collaborate with the apartheid state is much less 
a result of the failure of South African diplomacy and much more a result 
of the incompatibility of the advancement of the interests of the people 
in these states with the maintenance of the status quo in the region. It 
is thus unlikely that for these states the future holds anything other 
than increased aggression by South Africa.
This is not necessarily true, of course, for all independent states 
in the region. The SADCC alliance consists of states with widely 
differing class characters. If a more sophisticated South African regional 
policy were to emerge, it could be expected to take this fact into account 
to a greater extent than hitherto. A package of well-directed threats 
and incentives may succeed in making some headway with some of the more 
conservative and pro-capitalist regimes, as the limited experience of the 
Swaziland case seems to suggest. In short, the countries of Southern Africa 
may well be about to experience at the regional level an attempt to apply 
the well known techniques of divide and rule.
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THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH AFRICA AND DESTABILIZATION 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN
M. M. N c u b e *
Introduction
The phenomenon of destabilization is nothing new in international 
politics. But the sophisticated form it has assumed today - one which poses a 
threat to peace and international order, and thus to the survival of 
mankind - is a direct product of monopoly or finance capital. This is 
the reason why Lenin described finance capital as a decisive force in 
all economic and international relations • It has a capacity to subdue 
and control even countries that have attained formal political independence.
Destabilization in the present context refers to cultural, political, 
economic and military measures taken by one or more governments individually 
or collectively against another government in order to overthrow it or to 
force it to do their bidding. It is the imposition of limitations on the 
territorial and decision-making soveriegnty of a state. In the case of a 
colonial state which destabilizes neighbouring independent states, destab­
ilization is the final form of resistance to decolonization and is charac­
terised by increasing participation by imperialist forces.
Destabilization may be carried out through covert or overt acts, or 
through a combination of both, but it falls short of full-scale war. At 
times, however, the conflict may assume the proportions of a full-scale 
but undeclared war. As used here, the term destabilization does not 
include internal conflict that results from the objective social, political 
and economic conditions of a country which is the target of destabilization.
* United Nations Institute for Namibia
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But quite frequently what might appear to the casual observer to be such 
a purely internal conflict is revealed on closer inspection to be a conflict 
covertly engineered from outside. Care must be taken, therefore, to 
distinguish between the two types of conflict.
The desire on the part of one government to actively seek the overthrow 
of another stems from that government's dislike of the other's policies. 
South Africa's destabilization of neighbouring countries in the region 
has a class and ideological basis. Destabilization is a weapon for the 
defence of the immediate interests of the Afrikaaner dominated South African 
ruling class and of the international bourgeoisie in their attempt to 
safeguard their social privileges and property interests. At the same 
time, it is a weapon against the ability of independent black states in 
the region to assert their independence and to develop along lines they 
chose themselves, be they socialist, communist or whatever. Destabilization 
of the region by South Africa is therefore clearly an imperialist policy, 
designed to serve not only South Africa's political and economic interests- 
but also those of the imperialist countries, led by the United States. We 
would therefore expect to find joint destabilization actions by imperialist 
powers and South Africa. Such joint actions are more than jus*t a response 
to the challenge posed by the liberation movements in South Africa and 
Namibia. They are also an imperialist response to the whole struggle 
in the region for social transformation and the elimination of neo-colonial 
control and exploitative social and productive relations. The South African 
Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, openly confirmed this when he stated that 
South Africa's sphere of influence extended to all its neighbours in the 
region.*
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Contrary to the view put forward by Steenkamp and Jenkins, the policy 
of destabilization was not hatched in December 1977 at Prime Minister B.J. 
Vorster's cottage at Oubos in discussions with the top military brass. 
Instead, this meeting was called to re-examine destabilization policy 
which had already been inoperation since the days of the national liberat­
ion struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Such a re-examination 
of existing policy was clearly necessary in the light of Angolans iarid 
Mozambique's independence. Zimbabwe also appeared to be well on the way 
to freedom. New tactics would clearly be necessary, and new arguments to
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justify them.
South Africa's Destabilization Measures and International Law
In trying to justify its attacks against neighbouring states, South 
Africa has invoked all sorts of arguments, including the need for self- 
defence and hot pursuit. In this it has been tacitly supported by the 
United States and other Western countries, who have constantly tried to 
make it appear that South Africa has been legitimately responding to 
attacks on itself orchestrated from neighbouring states. For example, 
in discussions with the Mozambican authorities in December 1982 Frank 
Wisner, US Deputy Under Secretary of State for African Affairs, is reported 
as telling these authorities that South African attacks on Mozambique will 
have considerable justification if Mozambique continues to allow ANC refugees
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to live there.
Chester Crocker and other American State Department officials speak of 
"cross-border conflict" as threatening heightened violence.'* In this way 
they subtly charge independent African states in the region of using 
violence against South Africa. It is obviously useful for US policy in 
the region if the idea can be implanted in the minds of both the American 
and African public that South Africa's neighbours are contributing to 
the violence in the region. If frontline states can be made to shoulder 
part of the blame for such violence, then South Africa can justify its 
attacks on these states as necessary for self-defence.
Such a justification, however, is hard to sustain in international 
law. The right of self-defence under customary international law allows 
a state to attack another when it is left with no choice of means and 
little time to deliberate on how to respond following an attack or the 
violation of its territorial integrity by another state.^ What is crucial 
in the present case is that no neighbouring country has attacked South 
Africa or violated its territorial integrity. Attacks by ANC or SWAPO 
freedom fighters cannot fall within the ambit of the concept of violation 
of territorial integrity since the attackers are nationals of the 
territories under attack. The most that South Africa could ever argue 
is that it has a rebellion or civil war on its hands. In the case of 
Namibia there is an additional factor that weakens Pretoria's claim that
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South Africa's territorial integrity has been violated. South Africa's 
own occupation of Namibia has been illegal in international law since 1966, 
when the United Nations General Assembly terminated its madate over 
Namibia. Thus to invade Angola from an illegally occupied Namibia 
supposedly in self-defence is absurd in the extreme.
South Africa, therefore, cannot claim the right of self-defence, because 
no foreign troops from any of the neighbouring states have entered and 
remained, even for a brief moment, on its soil. Under international law, 
the presence of such troops would clearly constitute a justification for 
attacking the country from which they originated. But what South Africa 
wants to persuade the world to view as "foreign troops" are in reality 
its own citizens, engaged in an internationally recognised struggle to 
regain the right of self-determination denied for so long by the apartheid 
authorities to the overwhelming majority of the people of South Africa and
*
Namibia.
Even if Pretoria had a stronger claim in international law to justify 
its attacks on neighbouring states as legitimate self-defence against the 
activities of anti-South African guerrillas based in them, it wou^ld still 
be very hard to see how many of South Africa's actual attacks could possibly 
be described as self-defence. For the targets of most South Africa attacks 
(Cassinga, Matola and Maseru are just a few of the better known examples) 
have not been guerrillas, about to launch raids into South African 
territority, but defenceless refugees and civilians.
Another international law doctrine which the apartheid regime often 
invokes to justify its aggression is that of hot pursuit. At the moment 
the bulk of the literature on the subject of hot pursuit concerns pursuit 
on the high seas. Nevertheless, many of the principles which govern such 
pursuit also apply to hot pursuit on land. This is particularly true of 
the stipulations that pursuit should commence immediately and should be 
continuous and uninterrupted, with the fugitives always in sight.^ In the 
case of South Africa, very few if any of the attacks by the South African 
army and airforce against targets such as private houses, schools, factories, 
refugee camps and other civilian centres in neighbouring states have been 
the culmination of a pursuit of guerrillas which commenced immediately after
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a raid into South Africa and which was continuous and uninterrupted, with 
the fugitives (guerrillas) always in sight. So-called hot pursuit by 
South Africa is nothing more, therefore, than naked aggression directed 
against those states that provide legitimate and internationally recognised 
hospitality to South African and Namibian refugees. It is not directed 
against specific offenders against South African security. One telling 
point about South Africa's hot pursuit is that it almost invariably leads 
the South African armed forces to refugee camps where there are few if any 
active freedom fighters. Cassinga, Matola and Maseru are again fresh in 
most perople's minds.
With the noted exception of the US, the UK, France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Canada, and a handful of reactionary clients of imperialism 
in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere, United Nations member states 
have consistently rejected Pretoria's claims of justified attacks against 
its neighbours, and have strongly denounced these attacks. They are 
convinced, as we are, that South Africa is using the "harbouring-of- 
terrorists" argument as an excuse for more sinister and wide-ranging 
imperialist objectives. We can now turn to a more detailed examination 
of these objectives, with specific reference to the common interest in 
them shared by South Africa and the Western imperialist nations, most 
notably the United States.
The Link Between the US and South Africa: The Common Interest
Ever since the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, South 
Africa has become more and more enmeshed in the struggle for control of its 
wealth by the leading financiers of the different capitalist countries, 
and also in the political and economic strategies dictated by the needs 
of finance capital. Naturally, the most dominant imperialist power, the 
US, and its finance capital are today at the centre of the formulation of 
imperialist strategies in southern Africa. These strategies concern, among 
other things, how to roll back the gains made by the national liberation 
movements in the past twenty-five years. It is therefore in the formulation 
and implementation of these imperialist strategies in southern Africa that 
the US is linked to South Africa and is contributing to destabilization in 
the region. It is a link brought about by the mutual political and economic
The United States' political position on South Africa and southern 
Africa was enunciated in a classified National Security Study Memorandum 
(NSSM 39) - sometimes known as "Tar Baby" - prepared for the Nixon 
Administration in 1969. The memorandum presented five policy options, 
ranging from close association to disassociation with the various White 
and Black regimes in the region. Option 2 was finally chosen. This 
option was premised on the fact that Whites were in southern Africa 
(Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, and Namibia) to stay, and 
that no constructive change from the American point of view could be 
brought about without their participation and co-operation. The memorandum 
warned that increased political violence by Blacks would lead to chaos and 
an obvious opportunity for Communists to take over. And its proposed 
strategy against such an eventuality was two-fold. First, sanctions against 
Rhodesia and South Africa should be lifted, and their economies tied even 
more closely to those in the West. This would help to foster the emergence 
of a pro-Western Black bourgeoisie which could be gradually brought into 
government. Secondly, lines of communication should be built and strength­
ened with the leaders of independent African states (or at least those 
states that were thought to be the most susceptible to American pressure), 
and increasing aid should be offered to them. Such leaders could then 
be persuaded to convince (in other words to put pressure on) the liberation 
movements to accept evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, leading 
to the establishment of typical neo-colonial states under Western economic 
hegemony.
Some of the objectives of NSSM 39 were implemented, causing consider­
able pressure to be placed on liberation movements. But NSSM 39 had to be 
held in abeyance when pressure by liberation movements on Portugal's 
military forces in Mozambique and Angola brought about a coup in Portugal 
which ushered in a new government amenable to granting independence to the 
two colonies. Nevertheless, the underlying principles of NSSM 39 continue 
to remain the cornerstone of US policy towards southern Africa today. 
Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" has essentially the same 
objectives as NSSM 39: standing between South Africa and the international 
community to ward off blows against South Africa; doing everything possible
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needs of the ruling classes in South Africa and the US.
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to ensure the survival of the present South African political and economic 
system; working harder and harder to enmesh South Africa in the US dominated 
imperialist system; preventing the development of genuinely socialist states 
in the region; and finding ways to convince the liberation movements to 
give up their demands and social programs in return for a limited share 
in power with the apartheid regime. However, because of the advanced nat­
ure of the armed liberation struggles in Namibia and South Africa, military 
destabilization of countries in the region seems now to be the only option 
left to force such countries to abandon their support for the liberation 
movements, and to try and persuade such movements to give up the struggle.
One of the most essential aspects in the realisation of the policy
objectives contained in NSSM 39 and in Reagan's constructive engagement
proposals is the presence in South Africa of massive imperialist capital.
US corporate involvement in the South African economy has grown steadily
since the early days of the Union. In his study of such involvement,
Blyden Jackson presents a systematic account of the involvement of key
US companies in the development of South African industry and infrastruct- 
8 9
ure. Many other studies have revealed the same trends. US corporations 
were attracted to South Africa by its natural resources, some of them 
strategic (uranium and chromium for example) and for the most part 
unavailable in quantity outside the Communist bloc. They were also 
attracted by the existence of a vast cheap labour pool, a deliberate 
creation of South African capital and the state, and the resulting 
high yield per dollar of investment because of the cruel level of 
exploitation.
As long ago as 1972, Fortune, a major US business magazine, captured 
the essence of the attractions of apartheid South Africa for finance 
capital:
The Republic of South Africa has always been regarded by foreign 
investors as a gold mine, one of those rare and refreshing places 
where profits are great and problems small. Capital is not 
threatened by political instability or nationalization. Labour is 
cheap, the market booming, the currency hard and convertible. Such 
are the market's attractions that 292 American corporations have 
established subsidiaries or affiliates there. Their combined 
direct investment is close to $900 million, and their returns on 
that investment h a v e ^ e e n  romping home at something like 19 per cent 
a year, after taxes.
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Little wonder therefore, in the words of Elizabeth Schmidt, that "American 
corporations rapidly expanded their investments in South Africa without 
remonstrance from the American government. Between 1943 and 1978, US direct 
investment in South Africa from $50 million to $2 billion - an increase 
of 4,000 percent." ^
In all this there has of course been something for the ruling class 
in South Africa, particularly the Afrikaner section whose apartheid policy 
has helped to createthese windfalls for the international bourgeoisie.
The apartheid rulers have received in return much needed material and 
political support for apartheid and its programmes. A US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee report published in January 1978 revealed, for example, 
that American investments and loans to South Africa have saved Pretoria 
from serious problems during periods of economic crisis. Moreover, the 
funds enabled the South African government to ward off campaigns by the 
international community to abolish apartheid and democratize society.
In the words of the report:
International credit provided the margin of funds needed by South 
Africa in the 1974-76 period to finance its military build-up, its 
stockpiling of oil, and its major infrastructure projects'in 
strategic sectors such as transportation, communications, energy, 
and steel production, all of which are related to security needs...
The net effect of American investment has been to strengthen the 
economic self-sufficiency of South Africa's apartheid r e g i m e . ^
South Africa's nuclear technology has also been fostered by Western
13
assistance, particularly from the US and West Germany. All of this 
has taken place in violation of the UN Security Council's mandatory 
arms embargo against South Africa and also in violation of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty of which those assisting South Africa are signat­
ories.
There are other technological benefits that have accrued to the apart­
heid state machinery and those in control of it by reason of the presence 
of US transnational corporations. Mobility and communication - two 
capabilities essential for the creation and maintenance of the apartheid 
state - have been greatly enhanced by the sale of American vehicles to 
strategic South African government departments on an ever increasing basis.
tt
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Figures for 1973 to 1978 show that the sales of Ford vehicles to non-
strategic departments, such as the railways, have fallen progressively since
1973, whereas sales to the Ministry of Defence and to the Police increased
14
between 100 and 400 percent.
Similarly, the US computer industry, which controls 70 percent of
the market in South Africa, has also served to bolster the regime's
oppressive stance towards its own people and its aggressive stance
towards its neighbours. Companies involved include Sperry Rand, NCR,
IBM, Control Data, Burroughs, Honeywell, and ICL. ICL produced a system
specifically designed for use by the South African police. The increasing
spread of computers has been of vital importance to the realization of
Pretoria's Total Strategy policy, adopted in 1977. This prescribed a
militarized national security system, integrating all branches and levels
of the state machinery, industry, business, the educational system, and
all other institutions to ensure that political control continues to
remain in White hands, and more specifically in the hands of the Afrikaner
section of the ruling class. The US computer industry obliged by providing
all types of systems for storing information on such matters as fingerprints,
racial classification, pass details, marital status, work and work place,
and so on. They also provided storage and retrieval systems for advanced
military technology. In addition, advanced computer equipment and other
war related equipment has come from NATO, of which the US is the leading
member, to assist South Africa's military build-up against her neighbours
and her own oppressed population. NATO supplied sophisticated computers
for Project Advokaat, an advanced system for monitoring air traffic and 
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ocean going vessels.
It is clear, therefore, that US capitalists have not only been able 
to reap enormous profits for themselves; they have also made a major 
contribution to strengthening the apartheid system. At the same time, 
their capital has helped to secure the political and economic position of 
the-Afrikaner ruling group. This ruling group, under pressure as it is 
from its own internal contradictions and from the armed struggle of the 
oppressed majority, has therefore come increasingly to see that its 
very survival lies in greater identification and collaboration with the 
international bourgeoisie, politically, economically and militarily. The
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interests of the Afrikaner ruling group and the international 
bourgeoisie inevitably coincide. They must protect apartheid together.
They must plan together and fight together. Despite attempts to 
camouflage the truth, US involvement in destabilization in southern 
Africa is therefore an open secret. It is carried out in support of 
the apartheid regime, against the liberation movements, and defended as 
a necessary step to thwart Communist expansion in the sub-continent.
Destabilizing Actions by the US and South Africa
The efforts by the United States to ensure world imperialist domination 
in general and US domination in particular has led to a long and well- 
documented history of American subversion in Africa, from the intervention 
in the Congo in the early 1960s to the equally sinister and damaging 
intervention in Angola in the mid and late 1970s. American subversion 
has been orchestrated by the CIA which far from being a mere "spook 
factory" is an institution which in varying degrees and through different 
tactics "has had and continues to have a largely negative effect on the 
process of development of Third World countries." ^  In addition to its 
now famous or infamous "dirty tricks", the CIA has used more subtle means 
to destabilize African countries, and especially those that have attempted 
to attain genuine political and economic indepence and posed a challenge 
to continuing US imperialist domination and exploitation (such countries 
are usually labelled "Communist" in the oversimplistic and distorted logic 
of Washington foreign policy makers). One particularly effective 
technique has been the attempt to divide such African countries on ethnic, 
religious, or other lines in order to prevent the achievement of social 
cohesion and national unity.
Of the US sponsored military destabilization activities in southern
Africa the operations against Angola head the list for their callousness
and brutality. Descriptions of how children in attacked refugee camps
ran naked to show they were unarmed but were nevertheless summarily gunned
down by South African soldiers are little different from the descriptions
of the horrors of Auschwitz. "To the CIA, the South Africans were the ideal
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solution for central Angola," says Stockwell, who was one of the CIA 
operatives in the invasion of Angola by South Africa in 1975. The CIA flew
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in the arms which were used by the South African troops and UNITA in
their quest to overthrow the MPLA government. Willem Steenkamp, a
South African journalist and a soldier in several operations in Angola,
including "operation Savannah", says that the South Africans went into
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Angola at the "instigation...of Dr Henry Kissinger himself."
Operation Savannah began on 14 October 1975 and was carried out by 
combined South African and UNITA forces, as well as by CIA military 
logistics personnel and mercenaries from North America and Europe. The 
operation was designed to prevent the MPLA government from formally 
receiving independence from Portugal on 11 November 1975. The US and 
South Africa feared that an MPLA government, if allowed to legally receive 
and consolidate independence, would not only set an example for independet 
development in Africa but would also provide moral and material support for 
the liberation movements, SWAPO especially. It was during this attempted 
invasion that the Angolan government invited Cuba to send military 
assistance.
The counter-offensive by FAPLA and Cuban forces stopped the invaders 
at the River Kwevi on about 8 November and began to push back the enemy. 
Thousands of people lost their lives in this Kissinger inspired invasion. 
But with the assistance of their friends the Angolan people stood firm.
When the South African and UNITA forces withdrew to Namibia they began to 
plan more invasions of Angola. The objective was to give the MPLA no 
chance to consolidate independence and rebuild the infrastructure destroyed 
in Operation Savannah. Aggression against Angola has persisted since then. 
The South African army and UNITA have carried out numerous daily acts of 
sabotage and destabilization in which many innocent people have died. In 
addition to such daily harassment, the South Africans, UNITA, and the 
Americans have launched a number of major military operations against
a i 20Angola.
In September 1977 the CIA planned "Operation Cobra" against Angola's
oilfields in Cabinda. The goal was to set up an independent state in
Cabinda. "US army personnel were heavily involved, along with the South
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African Defence Force." The plot was foiled, however, by the Angolan 
security forces. Shortly afterwards, the CIA armed the FLNA, FLEC and 
UNITA and unleashed a terror campaign against civilians in Cabinda, Huambo
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and Bie, hundreds of whom were slaughtered. Meanwhile the South Africans 
had been training more members of the Mushala gang in Namibia, together 
with UNITA, to commit similar acts of destabilization in Zambia. In 
1978 the South African army, together with UNITA and mercenaries, invaded 
Angola once more, slaughtering villagers and carrying out the massacre 
at Cassinga in which almost 800 defenceless Namibian refugees were killed, 
most of them women and children. In 1981 "Operation Protea" was launched.
The objective was for South African troops to invade and permamently 
occupy the southern part of Angola. During this occupation they have 
murdered civilians and destroyed roads, railways, bridges, hospitals, 
clinics, schools, and anything else of economic value - all in an 
attempt to prevent SWAPO from coming to power in Namibia.
In a similar way the CIA and South Africa have built up the so-called 
Mozambique Resistance Movement (MNR) which in reality is a special unit of 
the South African Defence Force, made up of Mozambicans and elements of the 
South African Special forces, known as Recces. In Zimbabwe there have been 
several military attacks by South African Defence Force, including the 
sabotage of air force planes. South Africa is still holding an estimated 
5,000 former Rhodesian soldiers in camps in the northern Transvaal in 
readiness for acts of destabilization. In Lesotho South Africa has used 
three forms of destabilization: direct intervention, as in the Maseru 
raid; sponsorship of the so-called Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA); and 
sporadic economic embargoes. South African security forces have also 
infiltrated into Botswana on occasion.
In all these operations, and many more, South Africa receives invaluable 
military intelligence from high-flying US spy planes and satellites. The 
same intelligence is of course useful to the CIA and Africa policy formulat- 
ors in the US State Department.
It is also a well-known fact that since 1982 members of Pretoria's 
powerful State Security Council (and especially General van der Westhuizen, 
Chief of South African Military Intelligence) have frequently visited 
America for consultations with the CIA. It is also known that at a time 
when Pretoria's destabilization actvities were being intensified, William 
Casey, head of the CIA, visited South Africa amid utmost secrecy to help 
co-ordinate US-South African policy in the region.
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Besides covert and overt military actions carried out in conjunction 
with its local friends, the US has also attempted to destabilize the 
region through the political decisions it takes, especially those decisions 
> *
that have had the effect of postponing the implementation of UN Resoution 
435 on Namibian independence. First, the US opposed the franchise and 
electoral procedures; then came the linking of Namibia's independence to 
the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Now there is the issue of 
"regional security" which will be discussed shortly.
Considerable information about the objectives and tactics of the
United States' policy towards southern Africa was revealed in secret
US State Department documents that were leaked to the American press in
1981. These documents confirmed what those struggling for freedom and
independence in southern Africa have long suspected - that America's
real policy is at complete variance with its publicly stated policy.
Grandiloquent speeches are made, proclaiming the US's respect for
the independence and self-determination of nations, whilst at the same
time the US is actually engaged in actions with theopposite effect. While
George Bush, the US Vice-President, was making such a speech in Nairobi in
22
November 1982, his Administration was colluding with South Africa to 
prevent the implementation of UN Resolution 435 and therefore to deny
the Namibian people the very self-determination he had glibly been
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referring to.
One of the many tactics for delaying Namibian independence was 
the formation of the Western Contact Group in 1976. This comprised the 
US, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada. Ostensibly, the main 
objective of the Contact Group was to get South Africa to the negotiating 
table as soon as possible. In reality the objective was the opposite 
to delay Namibian independence until such time as it could be stage- 
managed effectively in the interests of South Africa and the West. No 
sooner was the Contact Group operational than the world saw one reversal 
after another of what had been achieved by the UN. For rexample, the 
Contact Group soon scuttled UN Resolution385 which called for the withdraw­
al from Namibia of South Africa's illegal administration and military 
presence before elections were held. Now the Americans and their allies 
amended the plan to require only a phased withdrawal, with the South 
African administration in charge in Namibia until the time of the elections.
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Given its lack of legitimacy and popular support in Namibia, South 
Africa has used these delaying tactics by the Contact Group to try 
and create a Black petty bourgeois leadership to defend a neo-colonial 
state against SWAPO. Hence the frantic attempt to create such bodies 
as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. This particular attempt collapsed, 
however, in January 1983 because the DTA had no real roots amongst the 
people of Namibia. Nevertheless, Pretoria has not given up. After the 
collapse of Turnhalle Namibia reverted to direct control by South Africa 
through the Administrator General. The South Africans are now hoping that 
they might use the newly created Council of State as a nucleus for a new 
neo-colonial machinery.
The importance to the US and South Africa of creating an alternative 
to SWAPO cannot be over-emphasised. They see this as the surest way to 
remain in control of Namibia's resources and to use Namibia as a springboard 
in their anti-socialist and anti-Communist crusade in the region. Such 
advatages would be lost if SWAPO came to power. With this in mind, the 
US clearly tonsiders that any form of political subversion of the UN plan 
will put off the day of defeat and hold out the hope, however distant, 
that something can still be done to save the situation for imperialism.
The linking of Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola has no validity in either logic or history. It should be 
remembered that the linkage issue only arose recently, long after South 
Africa's first invasion of Angola in 1975 which gave rise to the MPLA's 
call for Cuban assistance. The US and South Africa had originally thought 
that the MPLA government, even with the support of Cuba, would easily 
crumble, thus opening the way for a UNITA government. When the Angolan 
people proved much more resolute in their support for the MPLA, then and 
only then did the Americans and South Africans begin to argue that 
Namibian independence could only come after the withdrawal of the Cuban 
forces. In this way they were able to but time and to mount more and 
larger offensives against Angola.
The latest political tactic in US-South African strategy is the call 
for so-called "over-all regional security arrangements." In effect, what 
the Americans are saying here is that the lack of security in the region 
arises largely because South Africa's neighbours have failed to guarantee
#•
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the Republic's security from attacks by guerrillas, and that "if there
is to be security in southern Africa, South Africa must be involved in 
24
shaping it." In practical terms the US is saying that the armed
liberation struggle should be stopped, and frontline states should 
enter into non-aggression treaties with South Africa. The effect of this 
would be that the ANC and SWAPO would have to give up the struggle. 
Frontline states would have to refuse asylum and refugee status to 
Namibians and South Africans. By so doing they would implicitly be 
recognizing apartheid and turning their backs on support for the 
internationally recognized right of self-determination for the peoples 
of Namibia and South Africa.
The US and its allies in the Contact Group are known to have floated 
the idea of non-aggression pacts between frontline states and South 
Africa in a document they called the "Non-Paper" which they gave to 
frontline states and SWAPO. This Non-Paper suggests that South Africa and
its neighbours should "provide reciprocal assurances of non-interference •
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and non-resort to force." These assurances would "contribute to the
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stability of the region." In making such a proposal the US and its 
Western friends effectively accept the legitimacy of the South 
African government in both South Africa and Namibia. They also 
conveniently ignore the fact that the main danger to peace and security 
in southern Africa is the apartheid regime and its aggressive and 
oppressive policies.
Briefly, therefore, the call for overall security arrangements 
is a call for the frontline states to surrender and submit to the 
dictates of the US and South Africa. Non-aggression pacts would 
represent a victory for apartheid and South Africa's Constellation 
of Southern African States concept, which is based naturally on South 
Africa being the dominant state in the constellation. This is essentially 
what the Americans mean when they say that there will be no security 
in southern Africa if South Africa's legitimate security concerns are 
not addressed.
A Response to Destabilization
It has been shown that the destabilization of southern African states
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by South Africa and its allies is a policy rooted in the interests of the 
international bourgeoisie to protect their investments in the region. It 
is also rooted in the interests of the South African ruling class. The 
imperatives for destabilization are built into the US and South African 
political and economic systems. It goes without saying that any real or 
perceived support by South Africa's neighbours for the national liberation 
movements will attract destabilization from South Africa and its allies in 
the West. There has been extensive collaboration between the US and South 
Africa to counter the growing movement for national liberation and independ­
ence. These two countries have employed every possible measure, from 
subtle persuasion to brutal violence, to prevent genuine growth and 
development in the region in an effort to maintain their political and 
economic stranglehold on southern Africa.
An effective response to destabilization ought to begin with a 
recognition that the US and South Africa will not stop their programme 
of destabilization until they have either subdued the region in their 
own interests or have been faced with overwhelming resistance. Because 
of their commitment to liberation, we can state here without doubt that 
the peoples of South Africa and Namibia will in fact resist, put the more 
they do so the greater will be the repression from South Africa, and the 
larger will be the numbers that will have to flee to seek asylum in the 
neighbouring countries. South Africa will of course continue to 
"punish" those states that grant asylum. This will increasingly place the 
leaders of such states in a terrible moral dilemma. Should they send the 
refugees back to almost certain death or should they subject their own 
citizens to the well-known dangers of South African reprisals? Many leaders 
may ultimately be tempted to place national survival ahead of the interests 
of the liberation movements. This would be an understandable choice, but 
in my opinion it would be the wrong one. For the basic problems in southern 
Africa would still remain; in fact they are bound to until the machinery 
of apartheid is dismantled. The African states in the region, placed as 
they are at the frontier of right and wrong in southern Africa, have no 
real choice, therefore, but to stand on the side of justice and history.
They have to confront reality for what it is.
Frontline states must concentrate on educating the masses about the
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fact that history and imperialism have imposed on the people of southern 
Africa an onerous but heroic task of having to continue the struggle, even 
after their countries are independent, because of the dangers of the 
apartheid state in South Africa. I believe strongly that if people 
were informed much more clearly of the choices and why they should struggle, 
they will be better able to understand the inevitable hardships they 
will have to suffer to ensure economic independence and social justice 
throughout southern Africa. Without the support of the masses, the 
frontline states will never be able to counter South Africa's destabilizat­
ion.
Public power in these countries as yet does not coincide with the 
population organizing itself as an armed force. Armies are still basically 
instruments of individual rulers or strata. Only when a whole population 
is ready to take up arms can we speak of a population ready to stand up to 
any enemy, however formidable. The critical factor that has so far 
prevented the US from launching an all out invasion of Cuba is the fact 
that American foreign policy makers are well aware (despite their public 
utterances to the contrary) that this would involve them in a fight to 
the death with almost the entire population of Cuba.
Because of the historical forces confronting each other in the 
region we cannot see room for peaceful co-existence with the present 
South African regime, irrespective of the theoretical desirability of 
this position for some leaders and states in southern Africa. With 
respect to the question of Namibia, the US and South Africa want to roll 
back the gains of the struggle for freedom and to overthrow the MPLA 
government, which will mean denying SWAPO vital support and to force it 
to sue for a neo-colonial settlement. There is also a belief in some 
circles that Angola has no way out other than by entering into a deal 
with UNITA and sending the Cubans home. In my opinion this is wishful 
thinking rather than a likely possibility.
A close examination of the policies of the MPLA government since 
it took over power makes it unlikely that it will give in to American 
and South African pressure. The MPLA's ideological stance also makes 
it highly unlikely that it will be forced into sharing power with
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agents of imperialism such as UNITA. Angola was one of the few African 
states that right from the beginning made no secret of its strong 
socialist orientation. It is also interesting to observe that it is 
in Angola alone in the region that one cannot find South African goods.
To say all this is not to suggest that Angola is not facing serious 
economic difficulties, that make it vulnerable to pressure. But I 
nevertheless feel that there is a realization in Angola that a country 
cannot rely for its economic and political survival on its enemies. I 
am convinced that other countries in the region would like to take the 
same position but have not as yet been able to bring themselves to do so. 
However, with the certainty of intensified destabilization from South 
Africa it is difficult to see how neighbouring states can continue to 
import South African goods. Denying South Africa markets should become 
a fundamental imperative of SADCC. Such a position could only be success­
fully maintained if SADCC is able to generate a surplus of all vital 
commodities. This view may be dismissed as an "ultra left" solution.
But let us hear what others propose as realistic solutions to these 
very serious problems.
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SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGY OF REGIONAL  
DESTABILIZATION
Y a s h  T a n d o n *
The Washington-Pretoria Axis and the Conceptualization of Destabilization
There are a variety of interpretations of the destabilization taking 
place in southern Africa today. One view, put forward by Pretoria and 
some Western apologists for apartheid, sees the liberation movements, 
the frontline states, and international Communism as the main forces of 
destabilization in the subcontinent. South Africa, in contrast, is 
viewed as a stabilizing force in the region. None of us at this workshop 
would accept this view. But amongst those who correctly see the apartheid 
regime as the main agent of destabilization in southern Africa there 
are important differences of opinion as to whether Pretoria is the sole 
author of the crisis or whether its actions are merely part of a wider 
strategy of global imperialism, orchestrated by the US.
The dominant view at present, not only amongst most frontline states 
but also among liberal critics of apartheid in the West, is that South 
Africa is the sole or principal architect of destabilization, although 
it clearly draws support from West and particularly from the US. The 
strategic implications of this view are clear. American and other Western 
leaders must be persuaded to stop their support for South Africa. The 
situation in southern Africa would then hopefully change. This was 
the underlying assumption behind the statement issued after a meeting 
in Nampula in January 1983 of the Politburo of FRELIMO and Mozambican 
governors and military commanders. While explaining why Maputo was 
taking the initiative to improve relations with the US (the first
* African Association of Political Science, Harare
60
US aid team had then just visited Mozambique), the statement said...
"these initiatives are intended to denounce and isolate our enemy (South
Africa), making it easier to neutralize it." * Foreign Minister, Joaquim
Chissano went on to explain that relations with the US "would be improved
immediately if, instead of remaining silent, the United States condemned
2
South African aggression against our country."
The same sort of assumptions are shared by a number of well-meaning 
Americans. The mayor of Atlanta, Andrew Young, and US Congressman,
Howard Wolpe, for example, are among those who think the US can be 
persuaded to de-link itself from South Africa, for in their view it 
is politically immoral to support apartheid. This was the theme underlying 
the thirteenth African-American Conference that took place in Harare in 
January 1983. One of the participants at the Conference, the veteran 
American academic, Gwendolen Carter, said the US policy on South Africa
3
was "misguided."
The second view, which sees destabilization not as a South African 
initiative but as part of a much wider strategy of international 
imperialism, has been argued forcibly by people such as Paulo Jorge, 
the Angolan Foreign Minister. Addressing the inaugural session of the 
International Conference of Solidarity with the Frontline States in 
Lisbon in March 1983, he said that..."It must be understood that the 
struggle in Southern Africa is the struggle against the plans of
4
international imperialism and the global strategy of the United States." 
This cenceptualization of the southern African situation has a radically 
different strategic implication from the first view. For if destabilizat­
ion and other actions by South Africa are the initiatives not just of 
South Africa but of global imperialist strategy, it would be an illusion 
to think that the US can disassociate itself from South Africa simply 
because it finds apartheid morally repugnant. It would therefore be 
wrong to personalize US foreign policy as if it were the brainchild of 
a "reactionary" Reagan or a "misguided" Chester Crocker. Strategically, 
the liberation movements and the frontline states, according to this view, 
would have to stop counting on the US and concentrate instead on ways 
in which the liberation struggle could be waged by the people themselves.
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I would argue that it is this second view that is the most realistic. 
This is not to say, of course, that every act of banditry or sabotage 
by South Africa must have the prior approval of the US State Department. 
Within the broad US global strategy, South Africa, like Israel and other 
countries, has a degree of relative autonomy. But the broad dimensions of 
Pretoria's policy in southern Africa cannot, I believe, be determined 
by South Africa on its own. Consultations go on all the time between 
the US and South Africa at various levels, official and unofficial, at 
intergovernmental meetings and in the boardrooms of corporations. It is 
at such meetings that the broad outlines of South Africa's southern 
African strategy are fashioned. One important aspect of this strategy 
is that the US is not about to trade the certainty of profits, strategic 
raw materials, and opposition to the Soviet Union that the present 
apartheid regime guarantees for a regime that may well jeoparize all 
these things. It does not really matter, therefore, who is in power 
in Washington. Whether the Democrats or Republicans, Carter or Reagan, 
the compulsions of international politics and the interests of finance 
capital must necessarily impose strategic constraints that no American 
administration can afford to ignore.
Destabilization and the Preservation of the Status Quo in Southern Africa
What do South Africa and the United States hope to achieve by a 
policy of destabilization in southern Africa? Basically the answer is 
very simple. They hope to preserve the status quo for as long as it is 
possible. Simple as it sounds, this has been the basis of all regimes 
in history that were opposed to revoltionary change. The Austrian 
Chancellor, Metternich, kept the German states weak and disunited for 
thirty years in order to preserve the status quo under the hegemony of the 
Austrian empire. Of course, such a policy has inherent contradictions, 
and never lasts forever. Eventually the forces of change take command.
But the status quo powers must resist as much as they can the pressures 
for change, whether by diverting them, transforming them into something 
controllable, or postponing them for as long as possible. An example 
of such tactics is provided by the Western Contact Group's policy 
towards Namibia, which has been compared by one commentator to a footballer
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keeping the ball in the air with his feet and head:
The Guiness Book of Records says that Irish football player 
Adrian Walsh kept the ball in the air with his feet and head for 
more than two hours...Walsh looks like a dabbler and his achievement 
pales into insignificance in comparison to the record of this 
group (the Western Contact Group), which has contrived to keep 
hanging in the air the destiny of a whole nation for more than 
five years. ^
To prolong the status quo in southern Africa for as long as possible, 
South Africa and US imperialism must do at least the following:
1) Build South Africa's economic and military power.
2) Institute a programme of reforms within South Africa which would 
remove "petty apartheid" and polish the rough edges of 
segregationist social policy.
3) Maintain a total control over the movement of the black population.
4) Isolate the more extreme elements among the white population to 
prevent them from unnecessarily provoking the black majority.
5) Isolate the black population by integrating the other communities 
the Coloureds and Indians - into decision-making structures, 
admittedly as junior partners.
6) Keep the liberation movements weak, divided, and suppressed.
7) Prevent the liberation movements from operating freely from 
neighbouring independent African states.
8) Infiltrate the military and security organizations of the 
frontline states.
9) Encourage opposition to the governments of frontline states 
by giving support to dissidents.
10) Intimidate neighbouring countries through acts of sabotage 
and other actions so that they recognize the reality of South 
African power and are afraid to give support to southern African 
liberation movements.
11) Prevent neighbouring countries from uniting into a common front 
against South Africa.
12) Keep neighbouring states (and especially Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland) economically weak and dependent on South Africa, and 
ensure that SADCC does not become a viable economic grouping.
13) Prevent Namibia's independence for as long as possible. If
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independence becomes unavoidable, steps should be taken to 
ensure that the government that takes over power is either 
politically weak and divided, or economically so dependent 
on South Africa that it would be difficult for it to give 
support to South African liberation movements.
14) Keep in overall control of the situation, so that should change 
within South Africa become unavoidable the US can step in as 
an "honest broker" to work out a settlement that would preserve 
white settler interests in South Africa and protect the wider 
economic and strategic interests of Western imperialism.
Destabilization, narrowly conceived, would refer to objectives 7 to 13 
above. But these cannot really be isolated from the rest, especially when 
it comes to evaluating the capacity and will of South Africa to sustain 
a policy of destabilization. For to destabilize an enemy, one must be 
internally stable oneself. And this is where perhaps the biggest 
contradiction lies in South Africa's destabilization policy. The more 
difficult South Africa makes it for the liberation movements to operate 
from neighbouring countries, the more necessary it will be for the liberation 
movements to build resistance from within South Africa itself. This may 
prove a long and difficult task, but as Soweto showed in 1976 when the 
spirit of the people is aroused no battery of armaments can stop the forces 
of change.
We can now examine.and evaluate each of the above fourteen objectives 
in slightly more detail.
Objective 1
Those who want to separate South Africa from Western imperialism 
should examine in some detail the tremendous extent to which the 
South Africa economy is penetrated by multinational capital. This 
penetration has been conclusively demonstrated in other papers 
presented at this workshop. Here I will focus briefly on the cases of 
oil and armaments.
Oil is one resource South Africa does not possess. The oil-from-coal 
plant (SASOL) is very costly and, in any case, supplies only a fraction 
of South Africa's needs. Most of South Africa's oil therefore comes 
from Western oil companies, in total defiance of the UN oil embargo. Big 
companies like Shell and BP deny of course that they ship oil to South Africa.
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But the same denials were made during the UN embargo against Smith's 
Rhodesia. Ultimately they were found to be lies.
The two major sources of oil supply to South Africa are Brunei and 
the Netherlands Antilles. Brunei, a small enclave in the Indonesian island 
of Borneo, has plenty of oil to sell. The Antilles has no oil itself, 
but acts as a conduit for oil from other countries, especially Mexico 
and Venezuela, to be stored there for later shipment to South Africa. Thus, 
by using intermediate storing and camouflaged shipping networks, the big
oil companies continue to supply South Africa with as much oil as it needs, 
while maintaining "official" compliance with the UN embargo.
It is the same story on the armaments side. To ger around the 
1963 Security Council resolution imposing a mandatory arms embargo,
Western'corporations, with tacit official approval from their governments, 
have sold arms and nuclear technology to South Africa to enable it to 
build its own defence capability. In 1965 South Africa established 
the National Institute of Rocket Research, which has already tested 
its own ground-to-air missiles. In 1968, with assistance from Western 
arms manufacturers, it set up a massive state-owned arms industry 
ARMSCOR - which by 1981 had assets of Rl,200 million and was listed 
as the third largest industrial group in the country. This has made 
South Africa almost self-sufficient in weapons production, from jet 
fighters to napalm bombs and computer-controlled military technology.
In addition, in September 1983 the US State Department approved an applic­
ation by seven US firms to provide "non-sensitive" maintenance and 
consultative services to South Africa for a nuclear power facility 
near Cape Town. ^ South Africa, it should be remembered, is the world's 
largest producer of uranium, and has refused to sign the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. US surrogates, such as Israel, have also provided 
South Africa with military hardware, including Reschef naval missile 
crafts, Gabriel anti-ship missiles, Shafir air-to-air missiles, and 
American M113 armoured personnel carriers.
This Western assisted military power of South Africa forms the 
backbone of the regime's destabilization strategy. During Operation 
Protea in Angola in 1981 the South African Defence Force (SADF) undertook
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161 bombing and strafing attacks, 95 ground operations, 61 landings
g
of heliported troops, and 1651 reconnaisance flights. None of this 
would have been possible without Western oil and Western-backed arms 
technology,
Objective 2
The removal of "petty apartheid" is also a policy that South Africa 
pursues at least partly at the behest of US imperialism. It is hardly 
an accident, therefore, that the US should become excited about the 
limited reforms that have taken place in South Africa in recent years.
This forms the basis of the American argument to African states that 
they should not support a violent solution to South Africa's problems, 
since by gradual evolution South Africa will change through internal 
reform. 'The liberation movements and many African states know better 
of course. For it would take South Africa as many years to change through 
"evolution" as for the leopard to change its spots.
Objective 3
The control of the black population in white areas and Pretoria's 
whole bantustan policy is part of a wider strategy of ensuring a cheap, 
docile and divided labour force, from which multinational corporations 
can reap enormous superprofits. The bantustans also provide a recruiting 
ground for dissidents and mercenaries who are trained by South Africa to 
carry out acts of sabotage and violence against the frontline states.
For example, the north-eastern bantustan of Venda, which shares common 
borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique, formed the Venda National Force 
in 1979 with 450 volunteer recruits. 90 per cent of the budget comes from 
South Africa, and the force's commander, Brigadier T.R. Malaudzi, spent 
20 years in South Africa's Special Branch of the Intelligence Service. In 
February 1981 Venda was the first bantustan to start arms production, 
through a company called Paramex International, which manufactures 9mm 
firearms. President Patrick Mphephu of Venda has also been persuaded 
by the SADF to create "buffer zones" along Venda's borders with Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique, and to set up counter insurgency units to fight against 
infiltration by liberation forces.
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Another new development in the bantustans is that they are beginning
to charge their own "citizens" for engaging in "terrorist" activities. In
1982 four people appeared in a Ciskei court for being members of the ANC
and possessing banned literature, and six people were charged in the
Transkei for inciting blacks to undergo military training outside the 
9
country.
Objective 4
Like the removal of "petty apartheid", the isolation of the more extreme 
elements among the white population is designed by those in power to 
help to present themselves as a group of sophisticated and moderate 
leaders who are always prepared to listen to reason. In reality, they 
continue to represent the interests of the South African ruling class 
and those of international capital. To carry on doing this, however, 
it is essential to avoid unnecessary provocation of the black majority. 
This is why the more reactionary elements in the white population, and 
particularly those associated with Andries Treurnicht, the former 
National Party leader in the Transvaal, and his recently formed Conservat­
ive Party, have been pretty much isolated from the mainstream of South 
African political life. The success of this policy can be gauged in 
part from the fact that the recent plan of Prime Minister Botha to 
create ethnic chambers in parliament for Coloureds and Indians received 
massive support from whites in the Transvaal, despite the fact that 
this is the place where Treurnicht's strength really lies.
Objective 5
The Coloureds and Indians have always occupied an ambiguous middle 
ground between the ruling class and the oppressed masses in South Africa. 
By offering them representation in parliament through their own ethnic 
chambers, the government has very clearly exploited this ambiguity. In 
the process it has divided them further and attempted to isolate them 
from the major movement of resistance and struggle. Despite some 
success in this attempt, it still seems likely, however, that important 
sections of the Coloured and Indian communities will refuse to be 
taken-in by Pretoria's schemes.
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Objective 6
The methods used by Pretoria to keep the liberation movements 
weak, divided and suppressed are too well-known to require elaboration 
here. A point that can be mentioned, however, is that the apartheid 
regime's oppressive machinery is now being used more frequently to 
hit an increasing number of white sympathisers.
Objective 7
South Africa has for years operated freely in Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, and Malawi (and before the independence of Angola, Mozambique 
and Rhodesia in these countries as well) to keep South African liberation 
fighters as far from South African borders as possible. With the independ­
ence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and with the increasingly bold 
initiatives taken by Botswana, Lesotho and to a lesser extent Swaziland, 
the freedom fighters have come too close to these borders for South 
Africa's comfort.
Pretoria has become paranoic with fear, and in desparation has 
increased its military activities against these states. According to 
one political commentator there was a 200 per cent increase in the number 
of sabotage incidents orchestrated by Pretoria in the first six months 
of 1981, compared to the last six months of 1980. ^  In December 1982 
South Africa launched a brutal and unprovoked raid on Maseru, killing 42 
Lesotho citizens and refugees. In Swaziland, under the late King Sobhuza
II, the ANC was allowed a relatively peaceful presence in the country. 
Following the raid on Maseru, however, and no doubt inspired by South 
Africa, the Swazi police swooped on known residences of ANC refugees.
About 300 ANC members were believed to be living in Swaziland at this 
time. The authorities arrested an unknown number of them, and withdrew 
the passports of about 30 refugees. The rest were either evacuated from 
the country by plane, or escaped through various routes.
Very little noise was made in the Western media about the happenings 
in Lesotho and Swaziland, especially when compared to the very loud 
noises which were made when Zimbabwe arrested white officers accused
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of having taken part in the blowing-up of airforce planes at the 
Thornhill base in Gweru. In general, the unstated official line 
in the US seems to be that the ANC members get what they deserve.
Objective 8
South Africa has infiltrated the military and security establishments 
of frontline states with spies and agent provocateurs. The actual extent 
of this infiltration is not known, but periodic revelations indicate 
that it is extensive. In June 1982, for example, Jorge Costa, a high- 
ranking official of the Mozambique security service defected to South 
Africa. Zimbabwe has a special problem, for it has inherited the entire 
Central Intelligence Organization from the Smith regime. Many of its 
members have since left, but of those that remain some are undoubtedly 
South Africa spies and informers. In 1981 the chief security officer 
responsible for investigating the death of ANC representative Joe 
Gqabi used his authority to help a South African spy suspected of 
murdering Gqabi to slip out of the country. Later he too followed the 
suspect.
In July 1982 two men appeared before a Harare court charged with 
contravening the Official Secrets Act. Th e  two, Philip Edward Hartleybury 
and Colin David Evans, were former members of CIO and were recruited into 
the South African spy network by Geoffrey Burton Price, who had earlier 
defected to South Africa in connection with the Gqabi case. The Director 
of Public Prosecutions said that the two accused passed on to South Africa 
security information they had obtained in the course of- their duties, 
including the movements of the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet.^
Finally, the destruction of military hardware at Inkomo Barracks 
in 1981, and airforce plains at Thornhill in 1982 (both of which consider­
ably reduced the strength of the armed forces in Zimbabwe) could hardly 
have been carried out without the complicity of some of the high-ranking 
white Zimbabwean officers connected with the army and airforce.
Objective 9
One of the major techniques of destabilization employed by South Africa
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is the support it gives to dissident elements, opposed to the governments 
of neighbouring states. The internal dissention which exists within 
such states provides South Africa and imperialism with fertile ground 
for their policy of divide and rule.
In Zimbabwe this policy began before independence. South Africa
created a special "slush fund" out of which it supported politicians
who were believed to be favourably disposed towards Pretoria. Enormous
amounts of money were given to Muzorewa and his supporters during the
independence elections of 1980, in the hope of putting into power a
government like that of Banda's in Malawi that would accept South African
soveriegnty as a legal fact on which an acceptable state-to-state
12
relationship could be built. The election results disappointed
Pretoria, but within less than two years problems developed between ZANU(PF)
and Nkomo's ZAPU. Pretoria saw this as a good opportunity to intervene
once again. In January 1983 the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's
Office (Security) in Harare. Emmerson Munangagwa, revealed that South
Africa had formed a "Matebele Brigade", headed by Colonel Brightenberg,
to infiltrate bandits into Zimbabwe. The brigade recruited Zimbabweans
working in the South African mines, and trained them at Spencer, Madhibo,
13
Phalaborwa and Ntabeni camps. At the same time, South Africa beams
hostile propaganda against the Mugabe government over "Radio Truth", 
which was launched in March 1983. Programmes are targeted at Ndebele- 
speaking people, and its broadcasts are in English and Sindebele. 
Furthermore, it was reported that South Africa is planning to create a fifth 
bantustan, KwaNdebele, as a way of attracting the Ndebeles of Zimbabwe to 
defect to South Africa. ^
Even if the veracity of these reports is not always easy to confirm, 
from the actual evidence we have of South African activities in Zimbabwe, 
as well as in Mozambique and Angola, it wouldsurprise nobody if Pretoria 
was indeed involved in fanning the fires of dissidence and discord in 
Matabeleland. After their capture in October 1983, two young Zimbabwean 
dissidents, Watson Sibanda and Spar Mapula, gave graphic accounts on 
Zimbabwe Television of South Africa's complicity in encouraging and training 
dissident activity in the south of the country.
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The perimeter of South Africa's destabilization activities does not 
stop at neighbouring or frontline states. The revelations by the mercenary 
force which was sent by Pretoria to topple the Rene government in the 
Seychelles in 1981 were interesting not only in bringing to light the 
extent of South Africa's activities in southern Africa and the Indian 
Ocean, but also and more importantly in making a mockery of Pretoria's 
offical denial of complicity in an adventure that turned out to be a total 
fiasco for South Africa and imperialism.
Objective 10
South Africa, of course, is prepared to go much further than mere 
support for opposition movements in the neighbouring states. It is also 
prepared, when necessary, to send its own troops into these countries.
We have already given examples of raids into Angola and Lesotho. Raids 
on that scale have not as yet taken place in Zimbabwe, but cannot be 
ruled out in the future. Prime Minister Mugabe has repeatedly alleged 
that since independence Pretoria has been training 5,000 former auxilliaries 
in a secret Transvaal bush camp for sabotage work in Zimbabwe. In 
September 1982 a group of 17 men (13 blacks and 4 whites) crossed into 
Zimbabwe, wearing SADF fatigues, in an eight-day operation of sabotage 
and reconnaisance. They were engaged by the Zimbabwean army, and four 
of them were killed. ^
The objective of these raids into the frontline states is to 
intimidate them so that they refuse to allow South African and Namibian 
liberation movements to operate from their countries. This policy 
has achieved some success. The Swazi Foreign Minister, R.V. Dlamini, 
at the same time as throwing ANC refugees out of Swaziland is reported 
to have said..."We will no longer tolerate people who come here under 
the guise of refugees and then abuse our hospitality and set about 
spoiling the country's name and reputation purely for their own ends."
In Lesotho it has been the leader of the opposition United Democratic 
Party, C.D. Mofeli, who has been the most vocal advocate of the removal 
of all South African political refugees from Lesotho. He is reported 
to have said..."the question of granting political asylum to South 
African refugees who might harm Lesotho's national security is a concept
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we do not endorse at all."
Objective 11
Through a combination of intimidation and economic inducement, South 
Africa has tried to keep the frontline states divided, so that they 
cannot present a united front. As in Palestine where Israel has for 
years pursued a policy of separate negotiations with each of the Arab 
states, South Africa has also tried to persuade frontline states to 
agree to separate non-aggression pacts with it.
In general the frontline states have so far turned this offer down. 
They have argued that since there is no intent of aggression on their part, 
there is no basis for such bilateral agreements. In particular cases, 
however, the ranks have been broken. Mozambique and Angola, for example, 
have met separately with South African officials in the neutral territory 
of the Cape Verde Islands to see if bilateral agreements could be arrived 
at on problems of specific concern to them. Nevertheless, the frontline 
states, at least so far, have managed to present a more solid front than 
their Arab brothers on the question of Palestine.
Objective 12
An important element of South African strategy has been the attempt to 
prevent neighbouring states from forming a common economic bloc against it. 
The frontline states' answer to this has been the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), formed in 1979 with the 
avowed aim of jointly reducing the collective dependence of the member 
states on South Africa. South Africa has a vested interest, therefore, 
in trying to ensure that SADCC does not get off the ground. In pursuing 
this objective it has employed a variety of means.
On the eve of the SADCC meeting in Maseru in January 1983, Pretoria 
sabotaged the second biggest dam in Angola, the Lomaum Dam in Benguela 
Province, killing 10 people, causing widespread flooding of nearby 
agricultural land, and cutting off the power supply to three provinces.
At the same time, South Africa and the LLA also sabotaged the pumping 
station at the new abattoir near Maseru. The timing of these attacks was
18
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clearly no accident.
The MNR in Mozambique, supported by South Africa, has repeatedly 
sabotaged the railway line linking Zimbabwe's export and import trade 
to the ports of Maputo and Beira. Much of Zimbabwe's trade is therefore 
forced to pass through the South African port of Durban, which is a third 
dearer than if it was able to pass through the Mozambican ports. Transport 
is of such strategic importance to international trade that the effects of 
railway sabotage are far-reaching. Taking Zimbabwe as an example, its 
import-export trade becomes much more expensive when freighted through 
Durban, thus increasing the country's balance of payments deficits. In 
addition, Zimbabwe's exports become more expensive and less competitive 
than South African exports of the same commodities. Moreover, because 
the goods have to pass through Durban and are carried on South African 
Railways, Zimbabwe is at the mercy of the South African port and railway 
authorities. Delays in the import of essential commodities can cause 
serious bottlenecks in production, and delays in exports could lose 
Zimbabwe valuable export markets.
It is for this reason that SADCC has placed a very high priority 
on the development of a viable system of transport and communication.
With the help of foreign capital, such a system might be set up in a few 
years. But as long as South Africa is able, almost at will, to sabotage 
the transport systems of Mozambique and Angola, the viability of such 
a scheme will continue to remain in question.
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are in some ways special cases.
As well as being members of SADCC, they are also members of the Southern 
African Customs Union, and depend for an important part of their revenue 
on customs dues collected by South Africa. Pretoria has offered these 
three states a larger share of customs revenue as an inducement to leave 
SADCC, but this offer was refused and subsequently withdrawn. But weaker 
governments in these countries, especially in times of severe economic 
crisis, might still in future succumb to the temptation. The Swaziland 
government, in addition, has been offered land by South Africa in the 
neighbouring areas of Ingwavuma and Kangwane as a further inducement 
to distance itself from the politics of the SADCC countries. This
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controversial land deal, first proposed in 1982, led to the first major 
breach between the Swazi government and the ANC. The ANC tried to persuade 
the Swazis to postpone territorial adjustments until majority rule had 
been achieved in South Africa, but the Swazis obviously thought that this 
would be too long to wait.
Objective 13
The US-South African strategy towards Namibia is well-known. The 
Namibian economy is largely in the hands of South African and Western 
multinational corporations, such as Amax and Newmont (US), Rio Tinto 
Zinc and Consolidated Goldfields (UK), and Falconbridge (Canada). in 
April 1977 five Western powers (the US, UK, France, West Germany and 
Canada) formed a so-called Contact Group and staged a diplomatic coup 
against the UN by taking the initiative into their own hands and pushing 
UN Resolution 435 on Namibian independence into the background. Gradually, 
however, the initiative has passed from the Contact Group almost exclusively 
to the US and South Africa. Since then the Namibian question has been put 
into cold storage. South Africa and the US have linked any progress on 
Namibia to the essentially irrelevant side issue of the withdrawal of 
Cuban troops from Angola.
In the meantime South Africa has built-up its military presence in 
Namibia dramatically (to 90,000 men), and has started a massive "passific- 
ation" drive against the population, which is suspected of harbouring 
SWAPO supporters. Pretoria and Washington have tried to buy time, therefore, 
both to try and eliminate SWAPO from the political scene, and to try and 
build counterweights against it, most notably the Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance. They have failed on both counts. SWAPO could not be crushed.
And serious contradictions developed between South Africa and the DTA, 
leading to the collapse of the Alliance in 1982 and the return of direct 
South African administration of the territory. Not able to move forward 
since then, the US and South Africa have decided to place the whole 
Namibian issue in limbo until they are able to think of new strategies.
Objective 14
Overall, therefore, South Africa and the US have tried to keep the
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situation in Southern Africa pretty much under their control. They have 
tried to either forestall change or to divert and direct it it in directions 
that will preserve their long-term interests in the region. In so 
doing, the US has tried to cultivate the posture of an "honest broker", 
much as it has in Palestine. All the dirty deeds that have taken place 
are laid at the doorstep of South Africa, and some of Pretoria's "excesses" 
are censored in appropriate diplomatic forums. This has been designed 
to provide the US with a degree of credibility so that when change in 
southern Africa is no longer avoidable, the US can step in as a mediator 
to reconcile conflicting interests between South Africans and African 
nationalists, while still preserving its broader imperialist interests 
in the subcontinent.
Conclusion
Destabilization and stabilization are relative concepts. What 
for us are acts of destabilization are for the United States and South 
Africa measures designed to stabilize the region. For them the most 
dangerous sources of instability (actual or potential) are the presence 
of the Soviet Union in the region, and the emergence of governments 
in southern Africa that could threaten imperialist economic and strategic 
interests.
From their point of view, therefore, everything possible must be done 
to forestall such developments. This requires, among other things, that 
the agencies of revolutionary change (and particularly the ANC in South 
Africa and SWAPO in Namibia) are frustrated in their operations for as long 
as possible. In addition, South Africa and the US would also like to 
see the emergence of alternative agencies of gradual and moderate change 
in the region. So far they have been largely disappointed in this respect. 
Hence they have had little choice but to carry on with their negative 
policy of frustrating the development of more radical and revolutionary 
forces in the region. For them, these are measures of stabilization.
For us, in contrast, they are negative measures taken in a futile attempt 
to forestall developments that are historically inevitable.
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THE FOOD WEAPON IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
R o b e r t  D ' A  H e n d e r s o n *
At the end of 1979 President Jimmy Carter implemented a grain embargo
against the Soviet Union in an attempt to pressurise it into reversing
its intervention into Afghanistan. This American action was widely
interpreted as an attempt to use food as a political or diplomatic weapon. ^
Less than two years later Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, reversed
this policy by authorizing renewed grain sales to the Soviet Union, despit.e
the fact that Soviet troops still remained in Afghanistan. This change in
policy was primarily a response to domestic demands from American farmers
for export sales in view of increased stockpiling of grain harvest surpluses
which had tended to depress the world market price. A recent study by the
US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment concludes that the grain
embargo may have hurt the American economy more than that of the Soviet 
i t  • 2Union.
The use of food as a weapon that can change the behaviour of nation­
states has therefore generally been discounted, although it may have certain 
utility in a wartime situation. It has in fact been described as a 
"singularly ineffective" instrument of foreign policy. There are a 
number of reasons for this. First, a food embargo as an act of economic 
warfare against a foreign country would also have financial and social costs 
for the exporting country, in terms of lost foreign exchange earnings from 
its exported products. Second, since no country is one hundred per cent 
dependent on imported food, and certainly not from a single food exporting 
country, a denial of food imports would not have an immediate impact, 
necessitating a change in state behaviour or policy. Third, other food
* National University of Lesotho
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exporting countries may be only too willing to fill the gap and supply 
the required food imports for reasons of additional foreign exchange, 
a larger share of the world market, additional global influence, increased 
international prestige, and so on. Fourth, food production and storage 
are far more subject to natural conditions and world economic forces 
than other forms of production, especially petroleum (the "oil weapon"). 
And finally, there is the question of whether it would be morally fair 
to withold food supplies from a foreign population who may not necessarily 
influence or even endorse their government's policies. Undoubtedly such 
a policy would be seen as anti-humanitarian and would draw a considerable 
amount of international condemnation.
Although it is difficult, therefore, to see how food 
exports, food aid, and "food power" could be used as a realistic weapon 
of economic or political warfare, these techniques could still be used, 
however, as a source of influence and pressure in inter-state relations. 
This, I would argue, is the case in southern Africa today. The white 
minority South African government is currently pursuing a regional policy 
of political destabilization by economic and military means against its 
neighbours. This is largely the result of the support by neighbouring 
countries for the struggle of the black populations in South Africa and 
Namibia for majority rule. Within this destabilization policy South 
Africa has launched land and air attacks against Angola, Mozambique and 
Lesotho, and supplied material support and training to dissident groups 
in these countries. Similarly, South Africa has utilized economic 
pressures against neighbouring countries. For example, it has delayed 
the re-signing of the preferential trade agreement with Zimbabwe which 
expired in March 1982; it has failed to renew the work permits of Zimbab­
wean workers in South Africa; and it has recalled twenty locomotives 
on loan to Zimbabwe Railways.
The manipulation of South Africa's food exports has also been 
contemplated as part of the destabilization plan. In 1980 the South 
African Minister of Agriculture, Hendrik Schoeman, said:
full grain silos will mean that we (the South African government)
can talk and negotiate from a position of strength. With rising
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populations all around us, more and more black states will depend 
to some extent on this country (South Africa) for basic foods. It 
is strongly in our interests that we should be able to meet the 
demand. 5
Similarly, a recent study of the strategic implications of regional 
economic relations noted that one way South Africa could exercise its 
economic power was by "placing curbs on the imports of goods from black 
states...(or) regulating the export of goods to black states. The most 
crucial items are undoubtedly food and oil." ^
While South Africa is implementing a policy of destabilization against 
its neighbours, the use of food as a political weapon, in the view of this 
writer, would not be adequate by itself to overthrow the governments of 
these countries. Instead, I believe that South Africa will continue to 
use food exports, and primarily maize, as a foreign policy instrument to 
influence and pressure neighbouring countries into maintaining the status 
quo in regional inter-state relations. In other words, regional political 
opposition (but not military opposition) to apartheid would be acceptable 
to the Pretoria regime, provided that pragmatic trading relations and the 
regional status quo were maintained. Such pragmatic relations ‘act as an 
external support for the South African economy, and by implication the 
South African internal political status quo.
Because of the crisis in African food production,^ and the supposed
g
existence of a "food weapon" in southern Africa, it would still be useful,
therefore, to consider the view that South Africa's food exports to
9
the SADCC countries could be used as a foreign policy instrument to 
destabilize the governments of neighbouring states and to force them 
to stop supporting the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia.
In doing this it will be necessary to examine a number of factors, 
including the level of food production in South Africa and the SADCC 
countries, the level of South Africa's maize exports to the SADCC countries, 
the internal and external limitations on South Africa's use of the "food 
weapon," and SADCC's regional efforts towards food security. Finally, 
the extent to which the SADCC member states will continue to have to rely 
on South African grain exports will be assessed.
79
According to official figures, South Africa's physical volume of 
agricultural production (including non-food production) has doubled 
in the past twenty years. In the past ten years the average rate of 
increase was 3.42 per cent, compared with a population growth of 2.3 per 
cent. Agricultural exports are reported to be worth about Rl,500 million 
a year, approximately one-fifth of total South African exports, excluding 
gold. ' ^  Using FAO indices on food production and per capita food product­
ion (see Tables 1 and 2), South Africa has generally increased its food 
production ahead of its domestic population growth. In both of these 
categories it is above the average for all African countries. Since 
1970 at least, South Africa has produced maize crops above the six million 
tons needed for internal consumption, ^  thus generating grain surpluses 
for export.
In comparison, and using the same FAO indices, the SADCC countries 
have been unable to increase their food production ahead of, or even 
parallel to, their population increase. Only Malawi and Swaziland have 
consistently increased their food production, and only Swaziland has kept 
rood production ahead of domestic population growth. In addition, according 
to the US Agency for Development's indices for 1976-78 (see Table 3), only 
Zimbabwe, or Rhodesia as it then was under the UDI regime, had an average 
daily per capita calories intake sufficient to meet the full daily 
requirement. And only Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia had a calorie 
intake of more than 90 per cent of the daily requirement. But neither 
the FAO or the US Aid indices show the degree to which agricultural 
production in the SADCC countries has been in turmoil as a result of 
poor weather conditions, colonial liberation struggles, and recent economic 
and military destabilization actions by the Pretoria regime.
South African Maize Exports to African Countries
With the exception of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland (the BLS countries) 
and Namibia, maize export figures for sales to black African countries 
from 1977 onwards have been treated as a strategic secret by the South 
African government (see Table 4). As such, all other maize exports to Africa
Food Production in Southern Africa
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are listed in the "destinations unknown" category of the South African
monthly trade statistics. In 1981-82 South Africa reported an export of
4.9 million metric tons of coarse grain, including maize, the majority of
which went to Japan. The "destination unknown" category was second and
12
accounted for about 30 per cent of the total. The South African 
Foreign Trade Organization has claimed that 47 of Africa's 53 countries 
bought maize and wheat from South Africa in 1981, though no figures were 
produced to substantiate this claim.
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According to the London Economist, some South African statistics 
"may be a bit fishy, since it has an obvious interest in exaggerating 
Black Africa's keenness to trade with it." Those published statistics 
show that South Africa's total exports to black Africa increased 52 per 
cent to US$1.4 billion in 1980, after a 74 per cent rise in 1979. This 
would tend to indicate that 10 per cent of South Africa's non-gold exports 
were shipped to black Africa, in contrast to only 3 per cent in 1976.
South Africa's imports from black Africa were only US$350 million in 1980, 
nearly all of which were from Zimbabwe. ^  Despite South Africa's dubious 
statistics, it is clear, therefore, that South Africa enjoys a very 
favourable trade balance with black Africa. ’
This favourable trade balance raises the question of South Africa's 
market price for the sale of its surplus grain, and whether credit 
facilities are offered for such sales. According to the general manager 
of the South African Maize Board, Hendrik Nel:
We (the Maize Board) do not disclose our prices. Not because we 
are ashamed of them but from tactical considerations. The countries 
concerned would not like it. But I deny categorically that we have 
sold at a discount. 15
Up unti 1977 South Africa maintained an internal subsidy on maize to keep 
consumer prices down. The subsidy also reduced the price of imported maize 
and maize products into the BLS countries and Namibia, since they were 
memebers of the Southern African Customs Union. ^  The subsequent 
abolition of the subsidy sharply increased the price of maize to these 
countries. There have been unconfirmed reports that South Africa has 
sold maize below world market prices to neighbouring African countries
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in an effort to exert additional economic pressure upon them. At the 
present time, however, the government-set Sout’n African maize board 
prices are higher than the world market price. This government-imposed 
constraint on the South African economy is discussed below.
One of the main boosts for South Africans favourable trade balance 
with black Africa came in 1978 when Prime Minister P.W. Botha authorized 
the government's Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation to give full 
insurance cover for all South African exports to black Africa. Export 
credit insurance was upto this time normally only offered for exports of 
South African capital goods. Payment for these exports was usually prompt 
since the neighbouring African countries, though generally lacking in 
foreign exchange, often had a surplus of South African rand which had 
been remitted by migrant workers in South Africa. Even so, the lack 
of foreign exchange or surplus rand acts as an economic rather than 
political constraint on increased maize imports from South Africa.
Zimbabwe has often been cited as an alternative regional grain supplier 
for SADCC countries, due to its normally substantial grain harvests (of 
both maize and wheat). But Zimbabwe's jjrain production is of course 
susceptible to varying climatic conditions, such as the current drought 
in southern Africa. And for the first time it has had to request food 
aid (approximately 15,000 tons of vegetable oil and 150,000 tons of wheat) 
from Western donor countries. ^  In addition, South Africa is in a much 
better position financially than Zimbabwe to offer credit facilties.
Limitations on South Africa's U9e of i:he "Food Weapon"
There are three general types o1: limitation in relation to South 
Africa's use of the "food weapon": the effects of South African government 
policy; natural processes such as t'.ie weather conditions and population 
growth; and external factors, particularly the actions and policies 
taken by foreign actors. In the first category, one important factor 
has been the South African government' s decision to create a national 
Maize Marketing Board with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for establishing the local 
producers' selling price for mai;:e. This government-established price 
has consistently ensured that South African maize producers (almost all
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of them white farmers with large agricultural units, who form a strong 
constituency for Botha's National Party government) are guaranteed a good 
profit on their grain production. This consistent level of profit has 
encouraged the farmers to produce even more grain, resulting in even 
larger grain surpluses for expor. t. This was one of the major contributing 
factors in the rise of the net income of South African farmers to R3,150
18
million in 1981, an increase of more than 25 per cent over the 1980 level.
The current local selling price within South Africa is considered to be
the highest of all the major maize exporting countries (the US, Canada,
the EEC, Argentina, Australia, and Thailand). Even so, given the present
abundance of maize on the world market, South Africa is forced to sell
exported maize at a price considerably below what the local maize farmers
are guaranteed by the Maize Board. In fact, locally produced maize is only
cheaper in South Africa than imported maize due to to transportation costs.
The South African government, in effect, is covering the substantial losses
that result from the difference between the guaranteed high local selling
price and the comparatively lower foreign buying price. Thus,at present,
South African maize cannot be sold at. a profit on the world market. The
Financial Mail estimated in 1981 that the Maize Board would lose up to
19 '
RAO on every ton it marketed abroad.
Part of the reason for the government-determined high price for 
maize is the fact that farmers, in turn, are required to pay high government- 
determined prices for many of their lccally manufactured inputs
fertilisers, weed-killers, insecticides, diesel fuel, tractors, farm
20
machinery, and so on. Farmers are thus obliged to pay inflated prices
for these items produced by local manufacturing concerns (many of which 
are subsidiaries of overseas multinational corporations), since they 
have been designated as "protected strategic industries" with government- 
determined prices for their products. These higher prices act as a 
consumer subsidy for government designated strategic industries and 
raise the domestic inflation rate by decreasing the purchasing power 
of down-stream industrial and public consumers. This government policy 
of guaranteeing the economic viability (guaranteed high sale prices) of 
specific strategic industries to ensure national self-sufficiency prevents 
the operation of competitive market forces. Instead, it encourages 
inefficient production, especially in relation to imported foreign
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products.
Recently the South African government proposed a new quota scheme for 
maize farmers, under which the Maize Board would determine a production 
quota for each maize farmer. For this quota the farmer would receive 
the higher home market price set by the government. Any maize grown by 
the farmer in excess of his quota would be sold by the Maize Board on the 
world market, and the farmer would receive the average price realized from 
such sales. The National Maize Producers Organization (NAMPO) has strongly 
argued that this scheme would lead to a reduction in maize surpluses for 
export, and perhaps even to increased domestic consumption.
In the second category of limitations on the use of the "food weapon"
“*by South Africa, the uncertainty of the weather is particularly important.
At the present time southern Africa is experiencing its worst drought for
21
at least ten years, and in some parts the worst for fifty years. As a
result the Maize Board in South Africa is importing 1.5 million tons of
yellowmaize, primarily for feeding stock. This is the first time since
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the early 1960s that South Africa has had to import maize. Another
factor is the growth of South Africa's population, especially in relation
to the increase in total agricultural production. A recent study by the
Bureau for Economic Research at the University of Stellenbosch has pointed
out that "conservative estimates show that 2.9 million children under the
age of 15, mostly black and coloured, suffer from or show signs of
23
malnutrition in South Africa. This study goes on to note that in 1977 
one-third of South Africa's maize crop was exported. In view of the 
high level of mass removals conducted by the government , and the high 
level of unemployment among black and coloured families, it is important 
to note that malnutrition and other problems associated with poverty 
in South Africa are not a result of the non-availability of food 
supplies but of the non-availability of money with which to pay for food.
The third category of limitations on the use of the "food weapon" 
includes the current trend for the Maize Board to enter into barter-trade 
agreements to exchange bulk consignments of maize for goods necessary 
for the "protected strategic industries." Such barter arrangements help 
to offset the decreasing purchasing power of the rand in the world market,
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as well as to counter worldwide inflationary pressures. One such barter 
agreement was the exchange through a European intermediary of 1 million 
tons of South African maize for 208,000 tons of dry-bagged fertilizer 
from Eastern Europe. Both the South African Foreign Trade Organization 
and the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce have backed calls for South 
African exporting industries to make use of barter-trade arrangements,
as well-as to make further efforts to develop trading relations with
24
Eastern Europe, using middlemen for this purpose.
Despite these internal and external limitations on the use of the 
"food weapon," there would still appear to be some short-term benefits 
(in terms of inter-state pressure) that South African could obtain from the
manipulation of its food supplies. Indeed, the strategic value of food
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is increasingly being recognized in South Africa. According to a
high government source, the prevailing view in Pretoria is not to use 
food "aggresively as a weapon" to extract immediate political concessions 
from African countries, if that were possible. Instead:
the real potential is more long term. If you have an ongoing programme 
like this, it tends to undermine efforts to fragment the subcontinent 
(efforts of SADCC countries to reduce their economic dependence 
on South Africa)." 26
This reported government position does not appear to be supported, 
however, by all those groups that have access to key government decision­
makers. Within the South African business community, for example, there 
has been support for a more aggressive use of South Africa's agricultural 
exports to support South Africa's foreign policy in the subcontinent. 
According to the chief executive of the giant Premier Group of grain 
milling companies, Tony Bloom, South Africa's political and economic 
reserves, particularly within Africa, are powerfully based for production 
against a worldwide food shortage. He goes on to say that:
I am a very firm believer that South Africa should produce 
agricultural surpluses because they give a lot of political 
leverage...agricultural supplies are more important than oil 
(in the coming decades)." 27
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SADDC's Regional Programme Towards Food Security
At the Blantyre SADCC summit in November 1981, Zimbabwe was delegated 
the responsibility for developing regional programmes for food security 
for SADCC member states. An initial and detailed programme was prepared. 
This identified nine projects, covering early warning systems, crop 
storage, strategic reserves, processing, and the exchange of information. 
Contact was also made with potential donors. Within the Zimbabwean 
Ministry of Agriculture a small administrative unit was set up to 
co-ordinate the programme with the various national projects that were being 
undertaken.
Nationally, greater efforts are being made to improve the transport 
infrastructure to assist in emergency grain distribution during times 
of disaster or drought, to create more grain storage facilities as an 
insurance against poor harvests and price increases, and to pursue progr­
ammes of national food self-sufficiency. But in the short run, the less- 
developed countries of southern Africa, like other countries in the Third 
World, lack the foreign exchange to purchase the necessary foodstuffs 
tc cover the short-fall in national production, despite the current surplus 
on the world grain market. This has become especially true for southern 
African countries in the past few years, due to drought and the resulting 
poor harvests.
A number of SADCC member states are increasingly relying on foreign 
food aid to make up the deficit between national food production and 
consumption. Most of this food aid has come from the US, the EEC, and 
some individual European countries, though considerable food aid has been 
provided through multilateral organizations such as the World Food Council. 
Two SADCC countries (Botswana and Tanzania) were in fact elected to 
the World Food Council in 1982, and attended the eighth WFC Ministerial 
session in Mexico in June of that year. In addition, under its regional 
programme for Africa for 1982-86, the UN Development Programme has 
allocated US$33.08 million for various food self-sufficiency projects in 
Africa as a whole. This represents about 17.2 per cent of the total 
funding for the programme. A significant portion of this allocation 
will be used in the SADCC countries.
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In addition to direct food aid through bilateral relations and
indirect food aid through multilateral relations, the United States
and Australia have also entered into a "swap" agreement with Zimbabwe, under
which consignments of wheat will be shipped to Zimbabwe in exchange for
Zimbabwe distributing part of its maize reserves to neighbouring countries.
Zimbabwe has also agreed to provide direct food aid itself in the form
28
of 25,000 tons of maize to both Mozambique and Tanzania.
International Factors Affecting Regional Food Security
Perhaps the most crucial factor affecting regional food security is
the constant fluctuation in the world market price for grain over the
past two years. Early in 1983 the US Department of Agriculture projected
that there would be a marginal fall in world supplies of wheat and maize,
despite an estimated 1.7 billion bushels in the American farmer-owned
maize reserve, and 1.22 billion bushels in the US Federal Commodity Credit
Corporation. The recent heat-wave over the midwest grain producing regions
in the United States damaged a significant proportion of this year's crop,
and the world market price has gone up to a contract high of US$3.2375 a
bushel. Most predicitons suggest that the price will continue,to fluctuate,
29
though in an upward direction.
Another major international factor that must be considered is 
the possible impact on regional food security of the implementation
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of economic sanctions against South Africa. According to a 1981 study, 
both the short and long-term effects of trade sanctions on the South 
African agricultural sector would be substantial, "even if only applied 
by the industrialised countries of the world." Due to the high degree 
of economic dependence (including dependence on food imports) of most of 
the SADCC member states upon South Africa, any implementation of economic 
sanctions would have immediate and adverse effects upon their own economies. 
At the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa,held in 
Paris in May 1981, it was agreed to call for a programme of assistance to 
those countries in the southern African region that would be most seriously 
affected by the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. Such assist­
ance would include the provision of supplies of food, oil and other essential 
commodities, the establishment of facilities for their stockpiling, and the
necessary financial assistance. Donor countries are currently being
approached through SADCC for financial assistance for the construction of 
storage facilities for national strategic grain reserves in Lesotho and 
Mozambique, and a regional strategic grain reserve in Zimbabwe.
Prospects for the Southern African Region
Basically this paper has argued that there are few grounds for 
predicting the utilization of a "food weapon" as such in southern Africa. 
Instead, South Africa has used and will continue to use food exports as a 
foreign policy instrument for influencing the behaviour of its neighbours 
towards it. Viewed even in this weaker sense, the use of food is still 
an imprecise instrument which will take time to have an impact. It may 
also well be seen by the international community as an anti-humanitarian 
instrument in inter-state relations.
In times of grain harvests that are in excess of domestic needs, South 
Africa will be able to export grain to neighbouring countries, though 
possibly at a loss given the its farmers' high input and production costs. 
This would boost South Africa's image of itself as maintaining co-operative 
economic relations with its neighbours. While exporting grain shipments, 
South Africa could subtly exert pressure by increasing or decreasing the 
amount of grain available, or by speeding up or slowing down the transport 
time, especially if the grain shipments were sent by rail within the region. 
Nevertheless, such actions by themselves are unlikely to destabilize any 
of the SADCC economies in a major way, or to result in a fundamental change 
in the policies of the governments of the SADCC countries.
In times of grain harvests that are below the level of domestic 
consumption, South Africa may not have any surplus grain to sell to 
its neighbours. If South Africa has to import grain, as it is currently 
doing, it may or may not have imported grain to re-export, or it may chose 
simply not to import grain in excess of its domestic needs. Further, if 
the new South African government proposals for fixing maize quotas are 
inplemented, this could well result in less grain being grown, thus 
making less or even no grain available for export within the region. Any 
of these possibilities would reduce the level of dependence of the SADCC 
countries on imported foodstuffs from South Africa. At the same time, they
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would obviously reduce South Africa's ability to use the export of food 
as a means of exerting influence and pressure on neighbouring states. 
Although the dependence of the SADCC countries on South Africa for grain 
might well be reduced under such circumstances, this dependence could 
of course be simply transferred to other overseas suppliers, possibly 
at higher prices given the extra transportation costs involved. Alternativ­
ely, this dependence might be replaced by a greater level of dependence on 
food aid from overseas.
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TABLES
Table 1: Food Production Index for Southern African
Countries , 1976-■81.
(1969-71 = 100)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
WORLD 116 119 124 125 125 129
AFRICA 112 111 115 117 121 129
ANGOLA 102 100 101 101 102 102
BOTSWANA 114 106 90 105 92 » 117
LESOTHO 91 112 119 107 103
116
MALAWI 118 122 133 127 128 147
MOZAMBIQUE 96 94 92 93 94 92
SWAZILAND 127 117 136 130 154 167
TANZANIA 116 118 121 122 121 124
ZAMBIA 135 130 130 117 123 135
ZIMBABWE 132 138 134 112 116 161
SOUTH AFRICA 116 126 131 128 130 144
NAMIBIA 108 100 105 104 106 105
Source: FAO Production Yearbook 1981. Rome : Food and
Agriculture Organization, Vol. 35, 1982, p.75 •
91
Table 2: Per Capita Food Production Index for
Southern African Countries, 1976-■81
(1969-71 = 100)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
WORLD 104 104 107 106 105 106
AFRICA 95 92 92 91 91 92
ANGOLA 89 85 84 82 81 79
BOTSWANA 99 90 74 83 71 88
LESOTHO 79 95 99 86 82 90
MAIAWI 99 98 104 96 94 105
MOZAMBIQUE 83 79 76 74 73 70
SWAZILAND 110 99 112 103 119 126
TANZANIA 97 96 95 93 90 89
ZAMBIA 113 106 102 89 91 96
ZIMBABWE 109 110 103 83 84 111
SOUTH AFRICA 99 104 106 100 99 107
NAMIBIA 92 83 84 82 81 77
Source: FAQ Production Yearbook 1981. Rome: Food and
Agricultural Organization, Vol. 35, 1982, p.79.
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Table 3: Food Supplies of Southern African 
Countries, 1976-78
Average daily per Index of per Per cent of
capita calorie capita food self-suffic-
intake as percent- production, iency, annual
age of daily annual average average 1976-78
requirement, 1976-78 (1961—
1976-78 65 = 100)
ANGOLA 69 59 NA
BOTSWANA 73 111 71a
LESOTHO 95 100 78a
MALAWI 93 101 100
MOZAMBIQUE 73 82 89
NAMIBIA 95 NA NA
SWAZILAND 94 103 89a
TANZANIA 81 106
\
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ZAMBIA 95 141 NA
ZIMBABWE 109 NA NA
Source: Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on
Foreign Affairs , Food Production in Africa:: The
International Challenge. The Senate, 97th Congress,
Second Session, Hearing, 6 August 1982. Washington,
D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 20.
a = 1976-77 average 
NA = Not Available
Table 4: South African Maize Exports to African
Countries, 1969/70 - 1980/81 
(In Tons)
Year BLS and Namibia (1) Other African Countries
1969/70 103,675 37,185
1970/71 201,797 166,098
1971/72 69,604 65,286
1972/73 82,984 34,643
1973/74 139,274 18,844
1974/75 60,000 106,109
1975/76 73,000 53,851
1976/77 131,000 55,943
1977/78 171,000 NA (3)
1978/79 248,000 NA (3)
1979/80 250,000 NA (3)
1980/81 347,000 NA (3)
Source: South African Maize Board Annual Reports,
1969/70 - 1980/81. Reprinted in Africa
Insight, Pretoria, 13, No. 1, 1983. p.77.
(1) Maize and maize products.
(2) Whole maize.
(3) Not Available.
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DESTABILIZATION, POLITICAL STABILITY  
AND TRADE UNIONS
C h r i s  A l l e n *
Trade unions will not be an effective instrument 
of participatory democracy if they are manipulated 
by government, or by a political party, or by an 
external agency (President Seretse Khama, 1971).
Introduction
i
The most visible and vicious aspect of contemporary South African 
destabilization is military intervention, direct and indirect. I under­
stand by destabilization, however, something much broader than military 
intervention in neighbouring states. Important as this is, it is only 
part of a longstanding and multi-faceted attempt by South Africa to 
achieve a deep cordon of states between it and the rest of Africa 
states which are aligned to it economically and politically. Even where 
it has proved impossible to install its own choice of regime - as in 
Zimbabwe - the South African government has engaged as much in the promotion 
of opposition and the manipulation of conflict as it has in military inter­
vention. The concept of destabilization should include both military 
and non-military forms of intervention. The goal is the same and the 
transition from one form of intervention to another is easy and commonplace.
Outright military intervention is in fact a relatively recent move 
by South Africa, although collaboration with the Portuguese and Rhodesian 
armies occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Before the mid-1970s it was far
* Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh
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more common for the South African state to use non-military means, playing 
upon internal conflicts or cleavages in an attempt to achieve compliant 
regimes. Thus in the early 1960s there was the bizarre plot to split the 
Lozi areas from Zambia to prevent UNIP interfering with labour recruitment 
to South Africa. Even earlier than this the South African government had 
attempted to secure the incorporation of the then High Commission Territor­
ies (Bechuanaland/Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) as bantustans, to ensure 
future control over labour supply and the development of nationalism in 
these territories. This longstanding reliance on political intervention 
continues today, and should not be neglected at the expense of military 
intervention, even though the latter has become so intense and widespread 
of late as to indicate a strategic rather than merely tactical switch in 
policy.
South Africa, therefore, does not only send its own troops into 
neighbouring states, and train military units made up of the latters' 
nationals. It also sustains and directs opposition groupings such as UNITA, 
the MNR and the LLA; it backs factions competing for power, as in the 
recent events in Swaziland; and it manipulates internal conflicts in order 
to embarrass, divert and pressurize frontline governments, as may well have 
happened with the events in Matebeleland in 1982-83.
The reason that such intervention is so widespread and takes place 
with so much apparent ease is not simply the relative military, diplomatic 
or economic weaknesses of the states concerned. Equally significant are 
political weaknesses, stemming from the nature of the political 
systems in these states, and in particular the relationships between state 
and citizen and between the state and the major class forces. Thus, although 
the MNR's origins appear to lie first in the activities of the Portuguese 
secret police and then those of the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia, 
making it a wholly illegitimate organization, it was later able to achieve 
a measure of local acquiescence and support in certain areas of Mozambique 
in the early 1980s. The reasons for this lie in the weak legitimacy of 
FRELIMO in these areas, itself the product of economic problems on the one 
hand and of increasingly authoritarian government on the other. FRELIMO's 
initial response to MNR incursions was one which served in some ways to 
make matters worse, because it was based on the assumption that mass
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participation, so much a part of the guerrilla war against the Portuguese, 
had little or no part to play in eradicating the MNR. Regular troops were 
deployed erratically against it,but the peasants were not protected from 
it. Recent successes against the MNR have been based on a changed polit­
ical strategy rather than on greater military efficiency, with the use of 
veteran guerrilla commanders and mass mobilization at the local level. 
Combined with this has been a greater awareness of the dangers of the 
development of an authoritarian state at the national level.
Similar arguments have been made in the Angolan case. UNITA has been 
more "successful" than the MNR, while the MPLA has faced a far 
greater level and frequency of external intervention than has FRELIMO.
The MPLA has also suffered from a far weaker degree of popular mobilization, 
which has forced it to rely even more on bureaucracy and coercion than 
FRELIMO.
Thus destabilization may be seen in terms of how the nature of the 
political system permits and shapes South African (and other) intervent­
ion, both in the current period and in the preceding two decades. 
Intervention is easiest and can take the most varied forms when ^ regime 
lacks popular support and when competition within and conflict between 
classes is met by repression rather than accomodation. As is clear from 
the most obvious cases of intervention elsewhere in Africa - Chad,
Zaire, and the Horn, for example - such basic weaknesses in political 
systems are usually manifested in a high degree of political instability, 
though this is by no means necessary. What is important in the longer 
term is not how stable or unstable a regime appears to be but the means 
through which stability is sought and achieved. The Swazi political 
system, for example, may ultimately be less securely founded than those 
in Mozambique or Zimbabwe, despite the ease with which the Swazi royal 
family has gained, exercised, and retained political power from the 1960s 
onwards. The reason why the South African government has always found 
it easy to intervene in Swazi politics, from the days of Van Wyk de Vries 
to the present succession crisis (Fransman 1978; Daniel 1983), lies in 
this insecure foundation of political power as much as it does in the 
role of South African capital within the economy, or the place of migrant 
labour within the Swazi social formation.
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I propose to discuss the question of the domestic political system 
and destabilization from a perspective with which I am particularly 
familiar, that of the place of the working class and its organizations 
within the political system. Working class political activity has had 
an important influence on African political movements and systems since 
the late 1930s. At the same time, the relationship between the state and 
the working class, revealed in the treatment of trade unions, wage 
determination and strikes, is a reasonably accurate indication of the 
nature of the political system at any given time. The role and treatment 
of workers, and particularly of trade unions, is of direct relevance to 
an understanding and critique of governments and of the underlying political 
systems in southern Africa, and thus of their response to South African 
destabilization strategies.
Trade Unions and Domestic Political Stability
Most African governments regard the working class in general and 
trade unions in particular as sources of political instability. Like their 
colonial precursors they have argued that unions are too politicised and 
pursue damaging sectional goals. Legislative and administrative controls 
are necessary, therefore, to ensure "responsible" behaviour. Such argumets 
have centred around three claims: that unions are politically partisan, 
and thus that union activity has political rather than economic goals; that 
unions are channels for external influences; and that wage claims injure 
the peasantry by increasing already wide urban-rural income differentials, 
and injure economic development by discouraging investment, notably foreign 
investment, thereby also undermining political order. What sort of case 
can be made to support such claims?
Partisanship
During the colonial period it was common for the colonial authorities 
and their apologists to argue that the trade union movements were 
controlled by nationalist parties, and in the case of the French colonies 
by the French Communist Party (Allen 1970). Similar claims were advanced 
in the period immediately before and after independence in Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland by what are now the governing parties or authorities. Thus
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in Swaziland the King and other leaders of the Imbokodvo National Movement, 
together with their allies among local capital, presented the early trade 
unions as creations of Dr Ambrose Zwane's Ngwane National Libertory 
Congress (or before its formation, his wing of the Swaziland Progressive 
Party). The strikes of 1962-64 were seen as an attempt by the NNLC to 
bring about by industrial action what it had failed to achieve by electoral 
means: to dislodge the King and the INM from power. There is some weight 
to these claims, for the leadership of the trade union movement was drawn 
almost entirely from supporters of the NNLC or of the earliest Swaziland 
nationalist party, the Democratic Party. Leaders of these essentially 
petty bourgeois parties came to play an important role in the organization 
of the Swazi working class and in the articulation of its demands. Macdonald 
Maseko and Dumisa Dlamini of the NNLC are two examples of such leaders.
In Lesotho the bulk of the labour movement supported the Basutoland
Congress Party of Ntsu Mokhehle during the 1960s. As part of an early
factional struggle, Mokhehle "engineered the formation of the Basutoland
Federation of Labour" with his brother Shakane becoming its secretary
(Halpern 1965, p.177). The BFL included nearly all of the main unions
i
and was affiliated to the BCP until 1970. Thereafter, according to Strom, 
it became "more difficult to distinguish the work of the BFL from that of 
the BCP," at least until 1975 (Strom 1978, p.69). Chief Jonathan's governm­
ent clearly believed this at the time, since in the repression that followed 
the 1970 coup large numbers of trade unionists were detained, while the 
government refused to recognize the BFL or its affiliates. Instead it 
encouraged the creation in 1970 of a rival trade union centre, the Lesotho 
Council of Workers, and attempted to ensure that it had a monopoly of 
external resources and the sole right to represent workers. Despite 
such advantages, the LCW gained very little support (Ananaba 1979, pp.89-101).
The pattern in Botswana differed in detail. Initially, "the 
urbanised working class... largely supported the then Bechuanaland People's 
Party" (Parson 1980, p.46). But by 1965 the governing Democratic Party 
of Seretse Khama had succeeded in gaining the support of several leading 
trade unionists, one of whom, Gabriel Mmusi, founded the Botswana Federation 
of Labour. As in Lesotho, an alternative centre aligned with a rival party 
came into existence. This was the Botswana Trade Union Congress of K.K.
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Motshidisi, linked to the Botswana National Front. Both centres 
were dissolved in 1969 under the Trade Union Act of that year. A new 
centre was not created until 1977. Its chairman and general secretary 
were both BDP supporters, the former being secretary of the BDP Youth 
Wing (Ananaba 1979, pp.64-65; Matlhabaphiri 1980).
External Links
The significance of external links is seen as twofold. They permit 
unions and union centres or federations to survive, even when there is 
little popular support for them; and they act as channels for external 
influences which affect both the trade union movement and the political 
system as a whole. Thus affiliation to one of the three international 
trade union centres - the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Inter­
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the World Confederation 
of Labour - provides access to information, training, materials and 
funds. It also helps to make the union leadership less reliant on 
membership or affiliates for active support and thus for finance. The 
combination of competition for affiliates between the three international 
bodies and the search for resources by union leaders quite frequently leads 
to the creation of bogus unions and centres, to divisions within the 
national trade union movement, and to corruption within the union leadersh­
ip (see, for example, Allen 1975).
Thus in Botswana the BTUC promptly affiliated to the All-African 
Trade Union Federation, while the BFL remained aligned with the ICFTU and 
its African regional organization. In Lesotho the main union centre or 
federation, the BFL, was also affiliated to the AATUF in the 1960s, while 
the pro-BNP Lesotho Council of Workers was linked with the Catholic 
Pan-African Workers Council. A third centre, aligned with the small royal­
ist party, the Marematlou Freedom Party, and lacking almost totally in 
popular support, became a WFTU affiliate, despite having no socialist 
inclinations (Ananaba.1979). The pro-NNLC unions in Swaziland had links 
with the AATUF, and with WFTU through the South African Council of Trade 
Unions. This led almost automatically to ICFTU support for their rivals, 
in the form of an attempt by the local ICFTU representative to create a 
national centre in 1963, combining unions whose leaders had sympathies with
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the Democratic Party. This later gained the support of Imbokodvo, and a 
centre was formed with M.Z. Thabede, an INM supporter, as president. Within 
a year this had collapsed due to lack of support for either the SDP or INM 
among workers, as opposed to individual union leaders. The ICFTU then 
ceased attempts to create an affiliate (Lynd 1968, chap. 3).
The problem of external influence arises because the divisions within 
the international trade union movement mirror those within global politics. 
The WFTU has increasingly aligned with the Soviet bloc, especially since 
1949 when its Western affiliates left the organization and formed the 
ICFTU which has since become aligned closely with the US and its NATO 
partners (Busch 1980; Windmuller 1980). Thus the activities of these 
bodies become part of the foreign policy of the major powers. Similar 
problems arise with regional organizations such as the AATUF (once a rather 
ineffective vehicle for Ghanaian foreign policy and Pan-African ambitions), 
and with individual national centres, notably the American AFL-CIO which 
operates through the African-American Labour Centre, 90 per cent of whose 
funds come from the US government. These bodies have had an important 
impact on the workings of individual African unions, many of \fhich have 
reason to be grateful for the training, office equipment, cars, or funds 
that have allowed them to function on their members behalf. Their depend­
ence on external aid, however, makes it possible for African unions to 
become vehicles for external intervention. All these external bodies are 
deeply involved in training, which includes a substantial ideological 
component, and each of them has been involved in the gathering of intellig­
ence, the supply of funds to political leaders, and the cultivation of 
2
potential leaders. Colonial governments were well aware of this, and 
allowed the anti-Communist (and mildly anti-colonial) ICFTU free access, 
while banning or restricting WFTU activity. A similar pattern can be seen 
in southern Africa, where the Lesotho and Botswana governments have allowed 
the virulently anti-Communist AALC to operate while restricting other links 
and affiliations.
Sectional Claims
The general substance of the argument that unions pursue unfair 
sectional claims is well summarised by Jack Parson. Writing on incomes
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policy in Botswana, he says:
Domination of the working class is quite comprehensive and this 
domination is materially reproduced in the operation of laws, 
policies and administrative activity. Ideologically this domination 
is represented by the specifically petty-bourgeois idea of the 
'labour aristocracy' in Botswana. The urban manual worker is told 
he/she is 'privileged' to have a job at all, regardless of the wage, 
in comparison with the rural farmer. If the worker is so ungrateful 
for the job he/she can easily be replaced by someone from the labour 
reserve hinterland. This is reproduced as well in the intellectual 
gymnastics accompanying the political act of setting working class 
wages. The so-called legal minimum wage for the unskilled...'is that 
it should equal the average rural income of the farmers with an 
allowance for any differential in the overall costs of urban living'. 
(Parson 1980, p.51)
The argument that wage claims discourage investment can be illustrated from 
Swazi sources. Fransman (1982, p.75) quotes the Swazi National Council 
as saying:
The Swazi National Council believes in the encouragement of industry 
and commerce and the investment of outside capital in the territory 
leading to full local employment. The Swazi National Council likens 
capital investment to a bird sitting ina tree. If you make threats... 
the bird will fly away and the Council cannot afford to lose capital 
investors for the sake of self seekers who use the trade unions for 
their political ends.
Similar arguments have been advanced in Botswana (Massey 1980, pp.19-20). 
Their.significance lies not only in their use to justify low wages but also 
in their linkage with arguments about economic growth and political instab­
ility. Thus King Sobhuza was reported in 1972 to have:
condemned the methods and philosophy of the trade unions and said 
they were causes of industrial unrest through strikes... thus bringing 
the national industrial growth to a standstill. He (the King) said 
those who suffered most from leaders who organised industrial strikes 
are the poor men in the street. (Fransman 1982, p.79)
One year later the Swazi Constitution was suspended a week after a strike 
had begun at the Havelock Asbestos mine over a demand for a 30 per cent wage 
increase. The then Finance Minister justified the suspension by "arguing 
that Swaziland was on the brink of severe industrial strife as a result of 
the activities of politicians, political parties and outside influences."
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All of these arguments are weak, and conceal desires to maximize 
profits, weaken the trade union movement, and prevent political alliances 
between workers and other classes. Not only is it empirically false to 
argue that workers are a privileged group (Allen 1972), but as Jack 
Parson has pointed out:
It means that minimum working class wages are more or less unrelated 
to the value produced by that working class, which means that 
exploitation of the working class is almost certainly increased. 
Secondly it is the case that historically the 'average rural income 
of farmers' has been one of marginal subsistence. Agriculture has 
historically paid part of the cost of reproducing the 'urban* or 
'formal sector' working class. Thus urban and rural 'wages' are 
not comparable and separate things. They are closely tied together. 
(Parson 1980, pp.51-52)
The result of such policies is low wages. In Botswana in 1976 88 per 
cent of public sector workers in the industrial class, and 87 per cent of 
private sector workers, received wages below the Poverty Datum Line 
(Parson 1980, p.47).  Similarly in Swaziland, "the real living standards of 
the majority of workers in the private sector declined somewhat during the 
first four years of independence," helping the multinational sector to 
record profits which a 1976 ILO report estimated as exceeding 20 per cent 
of gross domestic product. The bulk of the profits were expatriated from 
Swaziland (Fransman 1982, p.81). The 1976-81 Botswana National Development 
Plan also "estimates that no less than 41 per cent of gross domestic product 
is appropriated by non-citizens (Massey 1980, p.20). It is hard to see any 
threat to multinational profits arising from modest real wage increases 
in such economies.
The arguments I have been presenting have within them an implicit and 
simple model for understanding African trade unionism. While unions should 
be apolitical, concerned with economic and welfare issues, and neither 
industrially militant nor actively opposed to government (in other words 
they should be "moderate" or "responsible" trade unions), they are prone 
under external influences to become politicised, partisan, actively anti­
government, and industrially militant. The implication of such "irrespons­
ible" trade unionism is the formenting of political dissent and conflict, 
directly or indirectly, and thus the creation of the conditions for destab­
ilization. The conclusion normally drawn is that legal and other controls
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over trade unions, as well as over labour more generally, are essential 
if "responsible" trade unions are to be encouraged.
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have all adopted highly restrictive 
legal and political frameworks within which trade unions can operate. In 
Swaziland the 1973 suspension of the Constitution included a ban on "all 
political parties and similar bodies that cultivate and bring about 
disturbances and ill feelings within the Nation." This was applied to unions 
as well as to opposition political organizations. Furthermore, the government 
at the insistence of the Swazi National Council (and against the advice of 
employers who were sensible enough to see the importance of active trade 
unions in achieving good industrial relations) tried to eliminate trade 
unions as workers' representatives at the work-place. In their place were 
to be works councils, together with officials appointed by the SNC and 
answerable to the King. These works councils were to mediate between workers 
and management, and represent the King to both parties. As a result there 
exists very little negotiating machinery in Swaziland, and until very 
recently there was only one registered trade union. Meanwhile, the works 
councils have not only proved ineffective as worker representatives, but 
have not even been appointed in many places of work (Fransman 1978; Simelane 
1983).
In Lesotho the 1970 suspension of the Constitution heralded a drive 
against the BCP and trade unions. Most unions were excluded from recognit­
ion and bargaining, at least until 1975. No attempts were made, however, 
to strengthen the 1964 legislation referring to unions, essentially based 
on British legislation (Maema 1981).
Finally, while Botswana retains a multiparty system and some degree 
of representation, and has no real history of repression of the trade union 
movement as a whole, there is nevertheless some evidence that a punitive 
attitude exists towards active unions and unionists. The Trade Union Act 
of 1969 dissolved the rival union centres (and thus their external affiliat­
ions), and the new centre that was created in their place is affiliated 
only to the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, which is controlled 
by governments not unions. The 1969 act also makes union formation and 
activity difficult, and prescribes severe penalties for minor infractions
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(Moyo 1978; Parson 1980). Strikes at the Selebi-Phikwe mine in 1975 
were met with intervention by troops and led to mass sackings of union 
members and leaders. Such actions, together with subsequent government 
accusations about the subversive role of unions reflected "government 
perceptions that these strike eruptions have the potential to threaten the 
delicate balance of class forces in the society...(by) mobilising general, 
antigovernmental feeling throughout the country among other groups who feel 
relatively deprived by the rapid and distorted development over the past 
decade"(Cooper 1978, pp.270-72).
Unions and Politics: A Reinterpretation
To assess the arguments outlined in the previous section, it is necessary
to examine postwar political history in the rest of Africa. From this it
might be possible to derive a general account that sets out the relationship
between the political role of labour, the state's strategy towards organized
labour, and political stability. Clearly it will not be possible in a
conference paper of this kind to set out the argument in detail, nor to
3
mention more than a few of the sources used.
\
The development of postwar politics in Africa has passed through 
three stages. Although there are broad regional patterns, these stages 
occurred at different times and with different durations and intensities 
in different African countries. The three stages are those of the devel­
opment of nationalist activity before the decolonization period; decolonizat­
ion and the immediate post-indtpendence period; and the current period.
Each period has involved a different pattern of relationships between 
the party (or the state) and the people, and a linked set of relationships 
between unions and parties (or the state). The key factor in determining the 
nature of each of these periods and the transition from one period to 
another is the development of classes within society and of the conflict 
between them.
Nationalism Before Decolonization
In the 1940s in West Africa, and in the 1950s in East and Central 
Africa, the colonial powers adopted a policy of gradual decolonization, 
based on increased economic and social development, Africanisation of middle-
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level posts, and "training in citizenship" through the devolution of power 
to Africans at local government level, together with limited representation 
and still more limited power at central level. The nationalist organizations 
at this stage were small, and their leaders were drawn from the educated 
elite and the petty bourgeoisie. Their strategies were based on petitioning 
the colonial governments for greater elite representation and influence on 
government.
Increasingly, however, three factors made for rising nationalist 
militancy: the absence of major political reforms; growth in the size and 
organization of the working class, peasantry, and in some cases migrant 
labour; and increasing intervention by the colonial state in production, 
with a consequent increase in exploitation. This led to the mobilization 
of the urban and rural poor (women included) around broad socio-economic 
rather than class issues, to the simultaneous growth of the nationalist 
movement, and to the development of a radical wing within it. While the 
leaders of the radical wing were still largely drawn from the same social 
categories as before, they drew support from the newly mobized poor, and 
organizational strength from their national and local organizations, notably 
trade unions. This radical wing frequently contested for the leadership 
of the entire nationalist movement, either within the main nationalist 
party, as with the Zikist wing of the Nigerian NCNC, or as a distinct party, 
such as the CPP in Ghana or the Camerounian UPC (Olusanya 1973; Kraus 1971; 
Joseph 1977). In addition, it directly confronted the colonial powers in 
an attempt to force the abandonment of colonial rule, using in the process 
the tactics of its social base - strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and 
even rural revolt in the case of Kenya and to a lesser extent in Zambia 
(Buijtenhuis 1982; Bratton 1978).
Trade unions were a crucial element in the development of radical 
nationalism. Workers were the most mobilized group among the urban populat­
ions, and were frequently involved in strikes with an increasingly anti­
colonial content. The union leaderships that grew out of this period of 
militancy in the late 1940s and early 1950s were active nationalists, and 
they came to form a significant proportion of the leadership of the radical 
nationalist parties or wings. They were also an important radicalizing 
force at the level of ideas and in the strategy of political action adopted
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(Jeffries 1978). Workers also seem to have provided a high proportion of 
the active supporters of radical nationalist movements, though this is more 
difficult to prove (Joseph 1977).
Decolonization and Independence
Both the colonial government and the conservative wing of the national­
ist movement were opposed to the radical nationalists, and joined in attempts 
to eradicate them. In this they were sometimes aided by errors on the part 
of the radicals. To secure the support of the conservative nationalists 
(and in some cases of the less committed leaders of the radical wing), while 
also undermining the basis of support for the radicals, the colonial governm­
ent crushed the radical wing and abandoned gradual decolonization in favour 
of "electoral decolonization." This was the relatively rapid devolution of 
central power and authority over public spending to African governments, 
with electoral competition between rival claimants for office. The main 
implication of this was the need for the rival nationalist leaderships to 
mobilize politically the entire electorate rather than specific and already 
socially mobilized groups. Mobilizing the largely rural electorate had to 
be achieved in a very short period of time - in some cases onl^y a few 
months - and in the absence in most cases of any widespread party 
organization. The party leadership had little or no choice, therefore, but 
to rely on the existing bases of support at local level, and on local leaders. 
They therefore built their parties around communal groupings (ethnic, 
religious, regional, and so on), around communal and traditional leaders, 
and around other local notables such as traders and wealthier farmers. They 
held their parties together not by ideology or even nationalism, but through 
clientelism - the gaining of political support by the actual or promised 
allocation of public resources, such as schools, wells, or jobs, to particular 
localities or groups through their own leaders. Such local leaders, therefore, 
came to control local spending and were judged on their ability to obtain 
resources for their areas or groupings. Political competition under such 
circumstances was competition for resources, and took place between local 
or communal groupings rather than class groupings.
This strategy was initially effective, as nationalist parties came to 
enjoy control over increasingly large resources, a pattern which
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continued and expanded after independence. There were, however, a number 
of crippling contradictions in clientelist politics. Some of these 
were evident before independence; others emerged more clearly in the 
post-independence period. The following are some of the main contradictions:
(a) Clientelism depends on being able to allocate resources to voters 
and their leaders - not only to supporters but also to a limited 
degree to opposing factions - because clientelism is most 
effective when no group is permanently excluded from success in 
competition. This leads to increasing demands on limited resources, 
which can only be satisfied by drawing more and more resources into 
the pool. Public policy, and especially development policy, 
increasingly becomes determined by clientelist competition and not 
by development needs or administrative rationality.
(b) Since electoral recruitment depends also on communal divisions, 
these become politicized by the increasingly intense competition 
for resources, leading to "tribalism" and related phenomena. In 
turn this intensifies political conflict, and leads to a tendency 
for local and central conflicts to enhance each other and to 
become more and more difficult to control.
(c) The class basis of the nationalist party alters, from the class 
alliance of the radical nationalist period to a consortium of 
local notables and national elites (often called the petty 
bourgeoisie, though this remains in many ways an unsatisfactory 
term). Given the role of this class in allocating resources, and 
the weakness of its economic base and social cohesion, there 
emerges a pattern of individual, and to a lesser extent collective, 
enrichment through legal and illegal means. The concomitants are 
endemic corruption, the strengthening of the "petty bourgeoisie"
as a class, and the repression of rival class institutions such 
as trade unions.
(d) Access to resources depends primarily on the control of the 
machinery of government. Competition for power,therefore, becomes 
more intense at all levels. In response, the governing party or
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faction attempts to prevent its removal from office by using 
undemocratic and increasingly violent means, such as the repress­
ion or banning of opposition parties and organizations, the rigging 
of elections, and the assassination or exiling of opposition 
leaders.
(e) This intense competition for power leads to a tendency for the
dominant faction to monopolize resources and resource allocation 
(a "winner takes all" situation). The losing factions tend to 
turn increasingly to undemocratic and violent means to unseat 
the ruling group. This quite frequently involves the mobilization 
of ethnic sentiments, and the use of assistance from outside 
powers.
Thus clientelist regimes tend to become the scene of increasingly 
intense conflict, both ethnic and class, and of increasingly violent 
repression in which rival parties are banned. Meanwhile governing parties 
abandon their mobilizing and representative functions in favour of policing 
the electorate. As the underdevelopment of the economies of these countries 
leads to growing economic crises and a sharp squeeze on resource allocation, 
such regimes very often lose control of public order and cease to have 
any popular legitimacy and consent. The stage is ultimately set for 
the military coup (though the reasons for military intervention do not 
lie simply in the problems of the political system).
The trade union movement goes through a related transformation, from 
accomodation to the colonial authority, through adaptation to clientelist 
politics, to response to the contradicitons of clientelism and the 
resulting repressive conduct by the state. The repression of the radical 
nationalists involves repression of their trade union supporters (through 
such things as the jailing of union leaders, and the dismissal of both 
leaders and members). This allows a more conservative leadership to 
take control of the union organization, or to build a new organization 
altogether, often with government or ICFTU assistance. Sometimes it 
was not necessary to repress individual union leaders. The more compliant 
ones could be bought instead. Resources could be allocated to them, which 
they could use to enrich themselves and to increase their political control
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over the union organization by distributing benefits such as scholarships, 
trips abroad, materials and money to lower level leaders and their 
followers.
Union leaderships thus became part of clientelistic politics, but 
at a cost. This cost was the increasing financial and structural 
detachment of the leadership from their members (matching the governing 
party's loss of active popular support). For as long as real wages rose, 
or at least did not fall, the workers were often prepared to consent to 
such leaders remaining in office. The internal contradictions of 
clientelism, however, involve an increasing redistribution of resources 
away from the poor and underprivileged towards the petty bourgeoisie. This 
leads to declining real wages and a parallel decline in the level of 
rank and file support for both government and union leaderships. In turn, 
this gives rise to increasingly frequent and large scale strikes, 
over which the union leaders have little control. The government's 
initial response is very often to concede wage increases. But the effects 
of these are very often quickly eroded, and repression becomes a far more 
common response. Unofficial strikes become part, and in some cases the 
crucial part, of the breakdown of civil order and the crisis df governmental 
legitimacy that frequently ushers in the coup.
Contemporary Regimes
The military will normally ban any surviving political parties. But 
the regimes that emerge from coups, whether military or civilian, tend 
to conform to the decaying clientelist type outlined above. What develop­
ment there is will in most cases be towards an exaggeration of the features 
that led to military intervention in the first place - lack of participat­
ion and legitimacy, repressive state politics, intense competition for 
spoils within the petty bourgeoisie, and so on. Such regimes are therefore 
no more stable than their predecessors, and a series of coups, attempted 
coups, and counter coups is often the result, as in Nigeria and Ghana.
Some regimes, however, have not suffered this fate. Examples are 
Egypt, Somalia, Zaire, Togo, and eventually Dahomey (now Benin). The 
reason for this lies in the adoption by such regimes of a different
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political system, one that was capable of resolving the contradictions 
of clientelism, though not those of class. At the root of this transform­
ation were two key structural changes: the confinement of clientelist 
competition to local political arenas; and the replacement in whole or 
in part of the governing party by a centralised bureaucratic structure 
that controls resource allocation. The best examples are not the military 
regimes mentioned above, as a brief examination of recent Zairean history 
will show, but those states that have avoided coups by introducing these 
changes before the clientelist system had decayed too far - Senegal, 
Tanzania, Guinea, Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Cameroun, and to a lesser extent 
Kenya, Zambia and Botswana. The methods used to bring about the 
transformation differ, of course, but the basic strategy and its effects 
are the same.
The commonest structural changes introduced were those in the Presidency, 
national representative institutions, and local or sectional representative 
institutions. An executive presidency is usually created, with substantial 
formal powers. These include the transfer of certain ministerial functions 
and funds to the Office of the President, and the expansion of that part 
of the civil service which reports to the President. This allows the 
President to stand apart from factional conflict, and to some degree to 
regulate it, whereas under the clientelist system the President or Prime 
Minister was no more than the leader of the dominant faction, in compet­
ition with all other factions.
Control of national representative institutions from the centre is 
achieved by replacing the party - or more accurately displacing it - 
by a centralised bureaucratic structure responsible to the President. 
Alternatively, the party itself may be transformed into such a structure, 
as in Tanzania where party and state were merged at the local level. A 
single party state is usually declared, with the national officers 
appointed by the President. At local level, competition for party posts 
is usually allowed. Parliament may continue to exist, but is emptied 
of its original functions. Where legislation is concerned, parliament 
will rubber-stamp executive decisions, and only rarley criticise their 
content. Elected members are increasingly selected by the President, as 
in Malawi, or joined by presidential appointees. The Cabinet is drawn less
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from MPs and more from party and state officials. Local government, where 
it consisted of elected institutions, is replaced by systems of appointed 
councils or committees made up of local officials, answering to the regional 
level of administration and ultimately to the President.
Sectional organizations like trade unions and co-operatives quite 
frequently remain in existence, but their activities are strictly controlled 
by the local and national administration. Increasingly trade unions and 
other voluntary organizations come to implement government policy rather 
than representing the interests of their members.
Despite the control of representative institutions in this system, 
some degree of participation and representation is still possible within 
it, and in fact is essential to its stability. At local level,parties or 
in some cases sectional organizations continue to be involved in political 
competition. This is organized along clientelist lines, and is for control 
of resources allocated to the party or sectional organization by the central 
administratin. This permits the representation of local interests and 
demands, without allowing the national centre to become the focus of 
clientelist conflict. That this representative function is important is 
shown by the level and intensity of competition, and by the high turnover 
of those who fail to be effective local patrons. Those who are effective 
contribute to the stability and legitimacy of the regime.
National elections, when and where they occur, perform similar 
functions. They also serve to recruit powerful local figures into the 
party and state structure. Those who are able to get themselves elected 
several times, and especially those who can influence the election of 
others, are clearly important local political bosses. And these are 
best placed inside the central ruling group rather than outside and in 
competition with it.
The following are some of the main differences between the decaying 
clientelist and the centralised-bureaucratic systems:
(a) Resource allocation in the clientelist system is the key prize 
in political competition, giving rise to intense conflict, 
corruption, and the determination of resource allocation by what
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is largely communal conflict and personal greed. In the 
centralised-bureaucratic system resource allocation is 
determined at the centre by the President and the party 
or state bureaucracy. Central competition is thereby reduced 
to manageable proportions, while local competition and conflict 
continues, though around a limited amount and range of resources.
(b) Ethnic, religious, regional and other forms of conflict are 
intensified by the clientelist system, especially at the centre, 
but they are reduced in the centralised-bureaucratic system.
Only at the local level is such conflict permitted to thrive
to any degree.
(c) Participation is first reduced and then eliminated in the client- 
ist system. In the centralised-bureaucratic system it is 
limited and confined essentially to local arenas. But far
from being eliminated it continues to play an important part 
in reproducing the regime’s legitimacy.
(d) Communal competition undermines elite cohesion in the clientelist 
system. Although in economic terms the petty bourgeoisie is 
able to accumulate rapidly in such a system (indeed this rapid 
accumulation is a major cause of the system's problems), it 
cannot achieve class cohesion. This reduces its political 
authority and capacity. In the centralised-bureacratic system 
the central management of competition makes it somewhat easier 
(but not that easy) to achieve elite and class cohesion.
The position of the trade union movement in decaying clientelist 
regimes differs sharply from that in centralised-bureaucratic ones. In 
the former we find a strong tendency for the earlier patterns of union- 
state relations to be repeated, although the nature of the trade union 
movement itself undergoes some change. Thus unions may be banned altogether, 
or they may be allowed to function only under highly restrictive conditions. 
Where they do function, governments attempt to co-opt union leaderships 
through a combination of clientelism and coercion, and try to manipulate 
union elections or intervene in factional conflicts within the unions.
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Militant leaders and rank and file activists are severely repressed.
Sometimes they are detained and even killed. While the regime may at first 
try to gain the support of the workers by raising wages, the erosion of 
real incomes by inflation very often leads to large sectoral or national 
strikes which threaten political order. The strikes may easily threaten 
the regime's stability and lead to its collapse. The new regime, however, 
is quite likely to repeat the whole cycle again, as in Ghana (Crisp 1979,
1980, 1981).
The reason for this lies in the regime's failure to control labour 
politically, and to ensure the preservation of real wages. Co-optation 
of union leaderships alienates them from their members, leading to unofficial 
strikes and to the emergence of rival leaderships at lower levels, over 
which the official leaders have little or no control. This process is 
hastened by the increasing level of class consciousness on the part of the 
workers, and especially by their belief that rulers, management, and the 
union leaders increasingly come to share a common interest that is opposed 
to that of the workers (Peace 1979; Burawoy 1972, 1982; Sandbrook and Arn 
1977). Under such conditions, the only options open to government are 
to concede real wage increases (which its own class interest will not allow 
to occur all the time), or to repress workers' organizations and activity, 
which leads to the erosion of public order and government legitimacy.
In contrast, centralised-bureaucratic systems have been much more 
successful in coming to terms with organized labour. The trade union 
structure and leadership become part of the state, involved in implementing 
policy, especially on incomes and industrial action. At the same time there 
are fewer and politically less threatening strikes. In addition, relations 
between workers and employers, and between workers and government, are 
regulated in ways that help to minimize conflict and allow it to be routinely 
and readily resolved.
This pattern is made possible by three features of union-state relations 
in such systems. First, there is a high degree of central control over 
union organization and leadership. Government determines the union structure 
and conditions of membership, and appoints the top union officials (or 
arranges their "election"). Competition for union posts continues at lower
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levels, allowing partcipation and representation to occur. Second, an 
elaborate and effective industrial relations system is created (usually 
based on the colonial systems of the 1950s), which while prohibiting or 
restricting strike action, does recognize the unions' right to bargain, 
and provides machinery to allow such bragaining to proceed relatively 
smoothly and routinely. Third, the outcome of bargaining and other forms 
of union pressure is seen in material gains for the membership. Such 
gains are not simply in terms of wages, for real minimum wages may 
decline, but more in terms of real incomes, through the impact of social 
security provisions, job security, promotions and increments for experienced 
workers, and so on. The system is centralised and authoritarian, therefore, 
but it does not suppress unions and it does allow regular and to some 
degree predictable gains. The effectiveness of the system should not 
be exaggerated, however. Since the class interest of the petty bourgeoisie 
and that of the working class cannot be permanently reconciled, the 
system will be unable to control labour effectively in the long run.
Conclusion
Trade unions, and labour more generally, have thus been deeply 
involved in African politics. They have often functioned as a radicalizing 
influence, usually in opposition to government and sometimes participating 
in its demise. They are not responsible, however, for political instability; 
nor are they creatures of political parties and outside agencies, though 
individual union leaders have often been both. The supposedly malignant 
effects of trade unionism which were outlined earlier in this paper can 
now be seen to be features of the political system within which unions 
operate, or products of party or state action directed against them. It 
is not the trade union movement that needs reform, but the political 
system. And it is not the unions that cause instability, but the 
system's internal contradictions.
Interaction between the political system and the trade union 
movement, especially in its effects on union leaderships, has been 
equally damaging to unions as repression by the state. It is common 
to find a pattern of declining support for unions in the clientelist 
period of the 1950s and 1960s, which manifested itself in falling
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membership and dues, and later in the alienation of members from the 
union leaderships. In Lesotho and Swaziland the unions were so badly 
repressed in the 1970s that it is difficult to find any trace of these 
effects, as opposed to that of repression. It is interesting to contrast, 
however, the relative vitality of the BFL in the years 1970-75, when it 
had to struggle for recognition and its members interests, with its 
relative decline since recognition was granted in 1975.
In Botswana the trade union movement has not been repressed on 
a regular basis, yet it is none the less ailing. According to its 
chairman, the Federation of Trade Unions - the new centre set up in 
1977 with AALC assistance - is still "heavily dependent" on the AALC 
and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a West German counterpart of the 
AALC (Matlhabaphiri 1980). Its leadership is drawn largely from the 
governing party, and from "unions which represent petty bourgeois interests 
in alliance with the local governing class" (Parson 1980, p.50). Its 
membership has stagnated from 7,000 members in 8 unions in 1977 to 6,000 4
in 11 unions in 1978 (Parson 1980, p .51),despite an increase in the work, force.
Thus in none of these three states has the trade union movement been 
able to play a full part in the political system. This has largely been 
a result of the nature of that system and the regimes in power. A greater 
role for unions as representatives of workers, and as part of a general 
move to increase mass partcipation and representation, would strengthen 
these systems considerably. A greater political role for labour would 
lead to more radical politics and to popularly based regimes. And both 
of these would make for states that were more resistant to destabilization.
NOTES
1. I do not argue, however, that it is only political and local factors
that underlie destabilization.
2. Not surprisingly, it is difficult to document these statements. They 
are based on materials I have examined in the ICFTU and WFTU files, 
and those of the Ghanaian TUC and Bureau of African Affairs, together 
with conversations with trade unionists, especially in West Africa.
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See, however, Busch (1980,1983), Ray (1980), and Counter-Spy (1975).
3. I hope eventually to publish a fuller version. Neither version, 
however, can apply to South Africa, Namibia or the former Portuguese 
territories, as the starting point is peaceful decolonization. For 
a useful survey of material on African labour and trade unions, see 
Copans (1981).
4. Matlhabaphiri (1980) gives a much larger figure (16,000) for 
membership in 1980. Parson's figures come from the Labour 
Department and are probably more accurate.
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SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGY OF DESTABILIZATION  
THE CASE OF LESOTHO
R.O.K. Ajulu*
The imperialist onslaught in the sub-continent has today turned 
southern Africa into a battlefield. The mass of the populations of 
South Africa and Namibia, led by their national liberation movements, 
are ranged against apartheid South Africa and its imperialist backers. The 
issues at stake are clear. Pretoria is fighting to preserve apartheid, 
capitalist domination, and imperialist hegemony in the sub-continent. The 
people of southern Africa are fighting to extricate themselves from capital­
ist exploitation and racial oppression. Confronted by a deep seated crisis 
since the early 1970s, the racist minority regime has decided to regionalize 
apartheid and turn southern Africa into a battlefield. It is within this 
broad framework that Pretoria's strategy of regional destabilization can 
best be understood.
This paper attempts a brief analysis of Pretoria's strategy of regional 
destabilization, with particular emphasis on Lesotho. The first section 
of the paper attempts to situate the origins of destabilization within 
the crisis of apartheid and capitalism in South Africa from the early 1970s 
onwards. The second section examines the origins and nature of South 
Africa's destabilization of Lesotho. A final and very brief section poses 
the question of the way forward for Lesotho.
* National University of Lesotho
The Origins of Regional Destabilization
The Shift in the Balance of Forces - the external dimension
The collapse of Portuguese colonialism in the mid-1970s, and of the 
Smith regime in Rhodesia in 1980, created a new strategic situation in the 
sub-continent and shifted the balance of forces in favour of the national 
liberation movements. Gone now was the cordon of vital buffer states 
on South Africa's vulnerable northern frontier. In its place was a new 
cordon of hostile states, committed to the support of the liberation forces 
in Namibia and South Africa. In a historic show of solidarity and intern­
ationalism, the MPLA offered bases to SWAPO and the ANC, thus facilitating 
the advance of liberatory forces to the very frontier of the last bastion 
of colonialism in the sub-continent. These developments struck panic in 
the ranks of the white minority ruling class in South Africa, while at the 
same time giving encouragement to the forces of resistance inside South 
Africa. New avenues for the intensification of mass resistance against 
apartheid were therefore opened up.
The Shift in the Balance of Forces - the internal dimension
After nearly a decade of rapid economic growth in the 1960s, the 
1970s witnessed the beginning of a crisis of capitalism in South Africa.
This was manifested at several levels: high rates of unemployment, 
predominantly among the black population; high rates of inflation; serious 
balance of payments problems; shortages of skilled manpower; and many more. 
The pressure was greatest on the black workers. Thus the 1970s saw the 
rapid growth of black working class organizations. The increasing militancy 
of such organizations revealed itself in a spate of strikes which hit 
South African Industry very hard. Of particular importance were the Durban 
strikes of 1972-73, which at their height involved more than 100,000 workers 
and literally paralysed the manufacturing sector in the whole of Durban. 
Between 1973 and 1976 no less than 800 strikes wera recorded throughout 
the Republic, involving hundreds of thousands of African workers.
Out of the Durban strikes emerged a number of unregistered trade 
union bodies committed to the organization of the black working class. The
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battle against capital and the state was fought at two levels: the struggle 
for higher wages and better working conditions; and the struggle for the 
right of the black working class to organize trade unions independently.
Hot on the heels of the Durban and post-Durban strikes came the Soweto 
student uprising of 1976. By October 1977, when the uprising subsided, 
it had become nationwide, involving not only students but also elements 
of the working class. In the aftermath of the uprising, many students left 
the country to swell the ranks of the liberation movements and to prepare 
for the liberation of their country. By the end of 1977 many of these 
"Soweto graduates" were beginning to return home after guerrilla training 
overseas. This marked the beginning of the present phase of armed struggle.
At another level, the 1970s also witnessed the emergence and consolid­
ation of monopoly capitalism in South Africa. Particularly important was 
the rise to prominence of Afrikaner monopolies, such as Sanlam, Santam, 
Rembrandt and Volkskas, and the development of closer unity between 
English and Afrikaner capital. These developments ushered in a realignment 
of class forces within the dominant Nationalist Party. Formerly an alliance 
of agricultural capital, the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, commercial 
and financial interest, and the white working class, the Nationalist 
Party began to disintegrate at the edges. Monopoly capital, and Afrikaner 
monopolies in particular, no longer needed the narrow national chauvinism 
of its traditional Afrikaner base. The new conditions of capital accumul­
ation demanded a relaxation of certain aspects of "petty apartheid." On 
the labour front, this involved the relaxation of influx control and job 
reservation,as well as the training of blacks to meet the critical shortage 
of skilled labour and to increase productivity. Such measures were of course 
opposed to the interests of white labour, and provoked retaliatory action, 
most notably in the white mine workers strikes of 1979. This had its origins 
in the demand by the white Mine Workers Union that no skilled Coloured 
workers be employed at Nababeep mine in Namaqualand, a demand which the mine 
owners found unacceptable (South African Labour Bulletin, 5,3, 1979: 4-11). 
The MWU was also opposed to the reforms recommended by the Wiehahn 
Commission. These conditions led to a realignment of class forces and to 
a rift within the Nationalist Party, which finally revealed itself in 
the defection of Andries Treurnicht and his supporters within the NP to
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form the new and extremely right-wing Conservative Party.
By the late 1970s, therefore, the apartheid state was confronted 
with an unprecedented crisis. Not only was it suffering from economic 
recession; it was also faced with serious ideological and military 
problems. In short the South African state could no longer rule in the 
old way. If capital accumulation was going to continue, and if the 
hegemony of the dominant classes was to be guaranteed, the state would 
have to be restructured. This was not long in coming.
The South African State Responds
It was in these circumstances that a quiet coup took place in South 
Africa. Following the Angolan adventure and the information scandal 
("Muldergate"),the Vorster-van den Bergh clique was pushed into the backg­
round, and the military elite, symbolized by P.W. Botha and General Malan, 
entered the political arena. This elite saw the defence of apartheid 
and the response to the crisis facing South Africa in a new way. General 
Malan, the Minister of Defence, who has emerged as the ideologue of the 
new regime, consistently emphasised that "the problem is 80 per cent politic 
and only 20 per cent military." The apartheid defences were drawn around 
a plan that has come to be known as Total Strategy. Its architects, and 
General Malan in particular, defined it as a:
comprehensive plan to utilise all means available to the state 
according to an integrated pattern...A Total strategy is therefore 
not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels 
and to all functions of the state structure... Total strategy should 
emcompass the state, the private sector, diplomacy, commerce, 
industry, and organisations like Armscor, The Council for Scientific 
Research (CSIR), and the Human Science Research Council (HSRC).
(South African Government, Defence White Paper, 1977: 5-7).
Thus total strategy - a plan to utilize all the resources available 
to the state in the defence of apartheid - emerged at a specific 
conjuncture in South Africa, as a response to deep seated crisis. It 
must be emphasised that total strategy is by no means a purely military 
strategy. It has many separate components dealing with specific areas of 
the crisis. These include labour and reforms (the Wiehahn and Riekert
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Reports); the Constellation of Southern African States proposal, and 
the general question of economic co-operation with neighbouring states; 
the destabilization of neighbouring states; and the militarization of 
the South African political economy.
It is within this broad framework of total strategy that we can now 
begin to understand Pretoria's strategy of regional destabilization. While 
pursuing a policy of so-called internal "reforms" (restructuring new 
conditions of capital accumulation and the hegemony of racial domination), 
Botha's regime has since 1979 pursued a policy of carrot and stick towards 
its neighbours. Within the government's new plan the enemy has been 
redefined in class terms. According to Prime Minister Botha, the enemy 
is no longer the black danger (Swartgaaver), but the Marxist onslaught on 
free enterprise in the sub-continent. Addressing a Nationalist Party 
conference in Durban in 1979, he warned his white audience that "there 
existed a threat of Soviet-inspired Marxist onslaught against South Africa'.' 
He concluded that the best strategy for tackling this was by taking the 
fight beyond the borders of South Africa. Since this time, Pretoria has 
arrogated to itself the duty of policing the entire region of southern 
Africa.
The initial strategy was to woo moderate southern African states to 
Pretoria's side, with promises of economic co-operation and aid, while 
isolating those states perceived as hostile and/or "puppets of Moscow."
It was the failure of this strategy, and especially of the Constellation 
of States proposal, that led South Africa to intensify regional 
destabilization. Since 1980, Pretoria's flagrant interference in the 
affairs of its neighbours has taken the form of sponsoring bandit organiz­
ations, such as UNITA, the MNR, and the LLA, as extensions of the South 
African Defence Force. The coming to power of Reagan in the US, with 
his policy of "constructive engagement", also helped to give Botha a 
relatively free hand in pursuing his destabilization objectives.
Lesotho: A Case Study
The Kingdom of Lesotho is a small mountainous country, completely 
surrounded by South Africa. Only 13 per cent of the land area is arable;
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the rest is too mountainous to be suitable for agriculture. The result 
is that the country's structural dependence on South Africa, which origin­
ated in the late nineteenth century with the advent of colonial rule, has 
become deeply entrenched. Over half the adult male population is absent 
at any given time, working in the mines and industries of South Africa.
Over 70 per cent of rural household income is made up of remittances from 
migrant workers. Only 6 per cent of the labour force is engaged in formal 
employment in Lesotho. Half of the country's food requirements are imported, 
the vast majority from South Africa. Finally, Lesotho runs a rapidly 
growing balance of payments defecit, which is largely financed through 
revenue from the Southern African Customs Union and through migrant 
remittances under the deferred pay scheme (Kingdom of Lesotho, Third 
Five-Year Development Plan, 1980-85, Maseru: Central Planning and 
Development Office, 1981).
Since 1970 this precarious economic situation has been exacerbated 
by acute political polarization. The para-military coup,through which 
the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) usurped power after its defeat 
in the 1970 general election, consolidated the division of the country 
into two camps - those supporting the BNP, and those supporting the 
opposition Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) of Ntsu Mokhehle. (See B.M. 
Khaketla, Lesotho 1970: An African Coup Under the Microscope, London:
Hurst, 1971). The repression that followed the aborted elections of 
1970 hardened feelings further in both camps. Because of its narrow 
class base, and its lack of a popular mandate from the people, the BNP 
government has had a difficult time in establishing its legitimacy. In 
Lesotho, therefore, foreign interference that is directed against the 
government has had a receptive ear from opposition elements.
In the period up to the mid-1970s, the government had little reason 
to fear such foreign interference, and certainly not from South Africa.
The staunchly pro-South African stance of Chief Jonathan and the ruling 
BNP ensured good relations between the two countries. The Lesotho 
government also received substantial support from Pretoria in the 
period before and after the 1970 coup. By the mid-1970s, however, the 
BNP began to champion a more independent and progressive foreign policy, 
and moved gradually to a position of positive non-alignment. By 1975,
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Lesotho had severed its political proximity to South Africa. That same 
year, Lesotho was one of the African countries present at the independence 
celebrations of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique. The following year, 
Lesotho and Mozambique entered into diplomatic relations at ambassadorial 
level. The ruling BNP was thus gradually distancing itself from Pretoria's 
orbit, where it had once firmly belonged. In 1976, Lesotho was one of 
the first African countries to refuse to recognize the "independence" 
of the Transkei, and when the Transkei retaliated by closing the Lesotho- 
Transkei (i.e. South African) border, Chief Jonathan took Lesotho's case 
to the UN, accusing South Africa of intimidation. In 1978, Lesotho 
hosted a UN Symposium on Apartheid and Prison Conditions in South Africa, 
at which many of the delegates, and particularly those from the South 
African liberation movements, condemned South Africa. And at the 
beginning of 1979, Lesotho was one of the first countries to reject 
P.W. Botha's proposal for a Constellation of Southern African States.
In the meantime, relations between the BNP and the ANC, both at party and 
government level, had improved considerably.
Within a period of less than five years, therefore, the BNP government 
had made a complete about-turn, usurping in the process the mantle of 
radicalism in foreign policy that had once belonged almost exclusively 
to the opposition BCP. By so doing, the government was able to improve 
its own image, both internally and especially externally. Foreign 
donors, impressed by the brave and radical stance taken by the government, 
poured increasing amounts of aid into the country. This enthusiasm was 
not shared by Pretoria, of course. And by the late 1970s it was clear 
that South Africa had decided that Lesotho would have to be "persuaded" 
back into the fold.
By this time, the evidence suggests that Pretoria was in contact
with the exiled opposition leader Ntsu Mokhehle.  ^ It would also seem
2
that Mokhehle and his externally based faction of the BCP, outmanoeuvred 
by the BNP and believing that the only road to political power in Lesotho 
was through Pretoria, were prepared to collaborate with South Africa.
This willingness to collaborate was an important element in Pretoria's 
arsenal of strategies. The exiled faction of the BCP had a legitimate 
power base in Lesotho and Mokhehle still commanded considerable popular
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support, making him and his faction an ideal instrument for Pretoria's 
destabilization strategy. In mid-1979,South Africa helped to launch 
the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) on to the political scene. This was 
the military wing of Mokhehle's BCP faction. Three distinct phases 
can be identified in Pretoria's use of the LLA and related tactics 
to destabilize Lesotho. Let us consider them briefly.
1. 1979-80: Attempts to Intimidate the Lesotho Government and to Woo
it back into the South African Fold
Early in May 1979, two bombs exploded in Maseru, causing extensive 
damage to the central post office and to two high-tension electricity 
pylons, as well as to the headquarters of the Lesotho Electricity 
Corporation. These were followed by a spate of bombing across the country. 
For some time no-one claimed responsibility; but finally Mokhehle's 
external wing of the BCP did so. A spokesman for the organization 
announced through the South African news media that the LLA had been 
established with the aim of toppling the government of Chief Leabua 
Jonathan from power. Later in 1979, the main centre of LLA activities 
shifted to the Butha-Buthe district in the northeastern part of Lesotho.
The South African press, and the Rand Daily Mail in particular, carried 
reports of hundreds of Basotho crossing into South Africa after heavy 
fighting between LLA insurgents and the government's paramilitary 
forces (the PMU).
The Lesotho government reacted by blaming Pretoria. Addressing a 
number of rallies in Butha-Buthe in November 1979, the Prime Minister 
accused South Africa of aiding Mokhehle to topple his government from 
power by "providing Mokhehle with bases from which to attack Lesotho." 
(Lesotho Weekly, Maseru, 14/11/79).
Apart from the extensive damage to the central post office, the 
bulk of the LLA's activities were fairly amateurish at this stage. No 
really serious confrontation between the LLA and the PMU took place 
between 1979 and early 1980. If anything, this first phase was calculated 
to cause panic, to create chaos, and to undermine confidence in the BNP 
regime, thus forcing it to seek talks and rapprochement with Pretoria.
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Pretoria undoubtedly hoped by these actions to to create divisions 
within the ruling BNP, and to force it to abandon its independent foreign 
relations, particularly its support for Mozambique and other socialist 
inclined states in southern Africa.
As sporadic LLA attacks continued, relations between Lesotho and 
South Africa inevitably soured. Finally, a meeting was arranged between 
the two Prime Ministers, Jonathan and Botha, at Peka Bridge in August 1980. 
The outcome of this meeting was never revealed to the press, but 
diplomatic hostilities between the two countries were certainly reduced 
in the period following it. Some observers believe that a quid pro quo 
must have been agreed (see The Vanguard, Roma, December 1980). The 
major differences between the two countries remained, however. For as 
Chief Jonathan has recently explained,..."The principal problem is over 
the philosophy of apartheid; it is this that stands in the way of peaceful 
coexistence or good neighbourliness between ourselves and South Africa." 
(Interview with New African, April 1983).
2. 1980-82: Intensification of Destabilization and Attacks
on ANC Refugees
By the end of 1980, LLA attacks had resumed on a much wider scale.
The reason is not difficult to find. 1980 witnessed the intensification 
of the struggle inside South Africa by cadres of the ANC; the rejection 
of Botha's labour reforms by the majority of South Africa's black trade 
unions; and a chain of industrial strikes that shook the manufacturing 
and mining industries to the core. From 1981, Umkhonto we Sizwe, the 
military wing of the ANC, was beginning to hit at will inside South Africa. 
Botha and his generals were obliged to restore confidence in the white 
population, and to show that they were capable of stemming the tide of 
the imminent onslaught. The war had to be taken increasingly into the 
neighbouring countries. Pretoria's belligerence in the sub-continent 
was reinforced by the growing support of the Reagan administration. Witness, 
for example, the Matola raid into Mozambique in January 1981. In Lesotho, 
far from being intimidated, the government was pushed closer to the ANC 
and the frontline states. This second phase therefore marks the beginning
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of attacks on so-called ANC bases inside Lesotho. The pattern of attacks 
also changed. Through the LLA, Pretoria embarked on the attempted 
assassination of leading members of the BNP, as well as on members 
of internal factions of the BCP opposed to Mokhehle's collaboration with 
South Africa. The most prominent figures to have been murdered in this 
campaign of assassination, both in mid-1982, were the BNP Minister of 
Works, Joba Rampeta, and the BCP Secretary-General, Koenyama Chakela, 
who had earlier returned to Lesotho under the government's 1980 amnesty 
offer. At the same time, an orchestrated campaign was initiated by 
Pretoria and its local agents to discredit the ANC and isolate it from 
its local support in Lesotho.
It would seem that during this second phase Pretoria still hoped 
to win over the BNP. For while concentrating the bulk of its fire on 
the ANC community in Lesotho, the assassination of selected targets 
within the BNP was seen as an attempt to further intimidate the government 
and the party. Chief Jonathan refused to be intimidated, however, and 
in what was seen as a final rupture with Pretoria he now turned for support 
to the Communist bloc. This not surprisingly provoked Pretoria, and by 
the end of 1982 a form of undeclared war was being waged on Lesotho by 
South Africa. This culminated finally in the brutal raid by the South 
African Defence Forc6 on Maseru on 9 December, in which thirty ANC 
refugees and twelve Basotho citizens were murdered in cold blood. Although 
a military success, the raid was a political disaster for Pretoria. It 
provoked a storm of international condemnation, even from its closest 
allies such as the UK and the US (though perhaps not surprisingly the 
American censure was relatively muted).
3. December 1982 to the Present: Co-ordinated Attempts
to Overthrow the Lesotho Government
Following the December 1982 raid, Pretoria has stepped up the pressure 
on Lesotho. This third phase of destabilization has seen the selective 
use of economic intimidation as well military incursions. Militarily, 
the last six months has witnessed a series of co-ordinated incursions into 
Lesotho, the bulk of them carried out by SADF personnel together with LLA 
bandits. The pattern of these latest attacks has clearly demonstrated a well
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co-ordinated strategy, designed to stretch Chief Jonathan's security forces 
to the limit. Several attacks have often taken place at the same time 
but in different places frequently hundreds of kilometres apart, putting 
increasing pressure on the already over-stretched resources of the security 
forces. At the same time, Pretoria has refused to guarantee the safe 
passage through the Republic of Lesotho's military hardware stranded in 
South African ports. The involvement of SADF personnel in the latest 
attacks on Lesotho suggests that Pretoria is convinced that the LLA can 
no longer do the job properly by themselves.
Military incursions have been accompanied by economic threats and 
pressures. The economic embargo imposed on Lesotho early in May 1983, 
through go-slows and closures at the South African border gates, was only 
lifted when concessions, particularly on the ANC's presence in Lesotho, 
were extracted from Chief Jonathan's government. In addition, since 
June 1983, Lesotho had complained bitterly about South Africa's delay in 
meeting its customs union payments.
This combination of military and economic muscle has had a telling 
effect on the Lesotho government. And in the last month or so, Chief 
Jonathan appears to have given in, at least partially, to Pretoria's 
demands, by accepting what has been euphemistically described as the 
"voluntary" deportation of ANC refugees from the country. What is clear, 
however, is that Pretoria is no longer interested solely in the removal 
of ANC refugees from Lesotho. Since Chief Jonathan's tour of the 
Communist bloc early in 1983, and the establishment of diplomatic relations, 
with North Korea, Communist China, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union at 
ambassadorial level, Pretoria seems intent on stopping any possible 
consumation of these diplomatic relations. With encouragement from Britain 
and America, Pretoria would quite clearly like to force Lesotho to 
reverse its new policy of diplomatic ties with the East. As Chief Jonathan 
seems likely to resist such pressure, Pretoria may well work towards 
his replacement by a more acceptable candidate, probably from the extreme 
right wing of the BNP. Rumours of a possible palace coup within the 
ruling party have circulated freely in Lesotho for some time now, and 
so have rumours of South African involvement. This in brief is the position 
Lesotho finds itself in today.
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What is the Alternative?
The problems for Lesotho arising out of South Africa's destabilization 
startegy are twofold. First, Lesotho's territorial sovereignty is at 
stake. Second, and related to the first problem, Lesotho's right as 
an independent nation to determine her own destiny is being called into 
question by Pretoria. In short, Pretoria wishes to reduce Lesotho to 
the status of a bantustan. Unfortunately, Lesotho, like most other small 
states in the region, lacks the military capability to counter Pretora's 
offensive.
Should the Lesotho government seek accomodation with Pretoria, therefore 
The answer is no. If present trends are anything to go by, one concession 
will merely lead to another, until finally Lesotho's independence and national 
sovereignty will disappear. The only effective answer to the present crisis,
I would suggest, is the formation of a broadly based democratic government 
of all shades of opinion in Lesotho, or rather all shades of opinion that 
are united in at least one crucial respect, and that is their opposition 
to South African destabilization and US imperialism in southern Africa. 
Central to this strategy is the recognition that the battle for South 
Africa has begun. As the ANC intensifies the armed struggle inside the 
Republic, Pretoria will dispense with all diplomatic niceties. Instead, 
it will seek to intensify destabilization on an unprecedented scale.
To resist this, it is imperative that a broad democratic front is 
mobilized within Lesotho, and that the agents and sympathizers of South 
Africa and imperialism must be identified and isolated. This will 
be a most difficult task. But unless it is attempted, the prospects 
for Lesotho's future look very bleak indeed.
In concluding, I must emphasise that the future of the people of 
Lesotho cannot be divorced from that of the mass of the people of 
South Africa. Their battles are our battles. Such battles will 
be difficult ones, involving many sacrifices. But they will have to 
be fought if all the peoples of southern Africa, and especially those 
of South Africa and Namibia, are to enjoy genuine freedom. It is 
our duty as intellectuals to teach our people that we shall have to
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sacrifice now so that peace may come in our lifetime. In so doing, we 
must strive to give the maximum support to the national liberation 
movements. This is the only way that we can make a meaningful contribution 
to the battle that is now raging in southern Africa.
NOTES
1. See the interview with Chakela in The Vanguard, June-September 1980, 
Roma, Lesotho.
2. The opposition BCP has undergone several splits since 1973, when
the Deputy Party Leader, G. Ramoreboli, led a group into the Interim 
National Assembly in defiance of Mokhehle and the Executive Committee 
of the party. Perhaps the most serious split occurred in 1977, 
when the Secretary-General of the party, the late Koenyama Chakela, 
broke from Mokhehle's external wing of the party. At the time of 
this break, Chakela accused Mokhehle of working closely with the 
then Bureau of State Security (BOSS). Thus the term BCP (Mokhehle) 
is used here to denote the faction loyal to Mokhehle and closely 
allied to Pretoria. See, for example, the interview with Chakela, 
ibid.
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN-SWAZI STATE RELATIONSHIP 
IDEOLOGICAL HARMONY AND STRUCTURAL DOMINATION
John Daniel*
Shortly after the Maseru raid of 9 December 1982, Die Transvaler 
described all of southern Africa as an "operational area," highlighting 
thereby the dramatic change that has come over southern Africa in the 1980s. 
The struggle for political change in South Africa has become a regional war.
In the last two years, South African military forces and their armed 
surrogates, as well as hired security agents, have undertaken aggressive 
acts in at least seven neighbouring or nearby states, in the Seychelles, 
and in places as far away as London where the offices of the ANC and SWAPO 
were blown up in 1982.
This campaign, described by Stanley Uys as one of "segmental 
destabilisation" (Rand Daily Mail, 18/12/82), is the South African 
government's response to three major political developments that in 
the last decade have so altered the balance of political forces in the 
region that South Africa's regional hegemony has been seriously threatened. 
These events were:
(a) the collapse of Portugal's African empire in 1974, and the
* University of Swaziland
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overthrow of white rule in Zimbabwe in 1980, which brought into 
the region radical governments sympathetic to the South African 
liberation movements;
(b) the emergence of a powerful black trade union movement in 
South Africa; and
(c) the growing frequency and effectiveness of ANC operations inside 
South Africa.
Faced with this new situation, South Africa found it could no longer rely 
for domination on its economic power alone, and has thus had to resort 
increasingly to military means not only to impose its will on the whole 
region but also to protect the apartheid system itself. The many and varied 
military methods employed can be classified into the following 
categories:
(a) direct military occupation, as in the case of 50,000 square 
kilometres of southern Angolan territory;
(b) the arming, training, and other forms of sponsorship of 
so-called dissident groups in the neighbouring states, and 
especially UNITA in Angola, the MNR in Mozambique, and the LLA 
in Lesotho. In Zimbabwe the MNR has also reportedly been in 
action, and there is evidence of infiltration by soldiers 
based in the northern Transvaal;
(c) cross-border raids on alleged ANC targets;
(d) the killing, attempted killing, or kidnapping of ANC officials 
and sympathisers;
(e) the attempted overthrow of legitimate governments, as in the 
case of the Seychelles where the mercenary group involved 
included members of South Africa's intelligence services; and
(f) acts of economic sabotage, such as the blowing up of the Beira
pipeline and the Luanda oil refinery, as well as countless numbers 
of bridges, roads, railways, water systems, and power lines.
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The immediate aim of this campaign has been to punish those who give 
assistance to the ANC and to dissuade those governments that might be 
tempted to do so. The ultimate objective seems to be to so pressurize 
the governments of the region, or to so cripple their economies, that 
their very survival will require the expulsion of the ANC and other 
liberation movements from their territories. By so doing, the pre-1974 
"cordon sanitaire" can be re-created.
It must be admitted that this South African offensive has so far 
been successful. South Africa seems able to strike at will whenever 
and wherever it chooses, and it seems as though there is no-one with the 
will or capacity to halt its aggression. The evaluation of the State 
Security Council in Pretoria appears to be that, if the Israelis can 
destroy West Beirut and get away with it, then who will prevent its more 
limited operations in Maputo and Maseru? But the fact is that the states 
of southern Africa, already suffering from the effects of drought and 
the international economic recession, are being forced to their economic 
knees by the effectiveness and ferocity of the South African offensive.
ANC elements have already had to leave Lesotho and Swaziland, and the 
Mozambiquan government is under severe pressure to withdraw ANC operational 
units from the south of the country as the price for South African 
assistance in clamping a leash on MNR operations. To the spectacle of 
the PLO's withdrawal from its frontline in 1982, could soon be added that 
of the ANC.
In the context of the increasing conflict and political polarization 
in southern Africa, this paper attempts to analyse Swaziland's position 
and the role it can be expected to play as events unfold. The proposed 
land deal will also be considered to see where this fits into South Africa's 
political masterplan. To deal with these questions, an analysis of the 
Swazi state and political economy will first be provided by way of 
background. ^
Swaziland under colonial rule is all too often depicted as having 
been a neglected backwater of the British empire. Acquired for the 
strategic reason of protecting the eastern flank of British capital 
on the Witwatersrand, the argument is that capital had no essential interest
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in Swaziland itself and that colonial capitalism had only the most 
minimal effect on the Swazi social formation. In this regard the suggest­
ion is that the Swazi experience was not fundamentally dissimilar to that 
of Botswana or Lesotho.
This view is a serious distortion of the reality of the Swazi colonial 
experience (and of course of the experiences of Botswana and Lesotho as well). 
Albeit on a smaller scale, the Swazi experience was similar to that of 
Southern Rhodesia in that it involved amongst other things:
(a) wholesale land alienation - the 1907 Land Proclamation stripped 
the Swazis of their occupancy rights to 67 per cent of the land 
and confined them to 32 so-called "native areas";
(b) the imposition of a crippling tax burden - Alan Booth has
2
argued elsewhere that the level of taxation of the Swazis was 
the highest in Anglophone Africa;
(c) penetration by both settler and multinational capital, the former 
of British and South African origin, and the latter overwhelmingly 
British, at least in the period up to independence in 1968; and
(d) large scale proletarianization of the Swazi peasantry, involving 
both out-migration to the mines of the Rand and the farms of the 
eastern Transvaal, and in-migration to local centres of capital.
The net effect of all this was Swaziland's complete integration 
into the world capitalist system.
These developments naturally undermined the position and authority 
of the Swazi traditional rulers. Nevertheless, the colonial state took 
care to ensure that this erosion did not go too far. At crucial stages the 
state intervened to bolster the hegemony of the traditionalists over the 
non-capitalist sector. In the early 1940s, for example, the British 
government gave the King a large cash grant to accelerate his programme 
of buying back the land of which the Swazis had been dispossessed. Through 
such initiatives and their own efforts, the traditional strata retained 
coherence and entered the immediate pre-independence period as the single
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most powerful indigenous group and the natural claimants to state power.
In this period King Sobhuza formed a political party, the Imbokodvo 
National Movement (INM), and in an alliance with settler and multinational 
capital this party captured all the seats in the first post-independence 
legislature.
Constitutionally, Swaziland inherited the usual Westminster 
parliamentary framework, with the King as a figurehead monarch and real 
power vested in a bi-cameral legislature. The reality, however, was 
different. Effective legislative power was in the King's hands and the 
legislature did nothing without his stamp of approval. The one area 
over which he lacked control was the judiciary, and it was the decision 
of the Swazi High Court to declare null and void a constitutional 
amendment enacted by the legislature that precipitated the 1973 constitutional 
crisis. The King's response to the Court's decision was to revoke the 
constitution, dissolve parliament, ban all political parties including 
his own INM, introduce a state of emergency which included a provision 
for detention without trial for 60 day periods, announce the formation of 
a national army, and assume all executive, legislative and judicial powers. 
Some years of personal rule ensued (through a Council of Ministers). This 
gave way in 1979 to a new state form under which real power remained vested 
in the King and the Liqoqo (an inner council or executive of the Swazi 
National Council, a body to which all adult Swazi males belong). But their 
decisions were now to be enacted as legislation by a resuscitated parliament 
comprised of carefully chosen traditionalists. A cabinet headed by a 
prime minister exists, but it has never been a powerful policy-making 
body. Its primary function is to administer through the civil service 
decisions made by others in the traditional power structure.
King Sobhuza's death in August 1982 removed a towering and revered 
figure from the political arena. It also created a major power vacuum.
This was filled by a three-part collective structure. The first part 
is the Regency, headed by Queen Regent Dzeliwe and including the new office 
of Authorised Person. This innovation within the traditional institutional 
framework is perhaps best described as a special advisory position to the 
Queen Regent. Its incumbent is Prince Sozisa, for years one of Sobhuza's
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closest advisors and a major figure in the ranks of the traditional 
politicians. The second part is the Liqoqo with 16 male members, the 
great majority of whom are princes, chiefs, councillors or ndvunas, with 
actual or close ties to the Royal Family. The handful of commoner members 
are all longstanding allies of the late King. Under Sobhuza the Liqoqo 
functioned in near anonymity but today it is a highly visible body. Its 
members were sworn in by the Chief Justice, they are salaried, they 
feature prominently in the local media, and without question they 
constitute the centre of state power in the post-Sobhuza era. It is not 
for nothing that the local press frequently describes the Liqoqo as "The 
Supreme Council of State." The third part of the new triangular power 
structure are Parliament and the Cabinet, whose functions remain essentially 
as they were under Sobhuza. Despite a remarkable independence of expression 
by some of its backbench members, parliament essentially rubberstamps 
into law the Liqoqo's decisions, with the Cabinet seeing to their 
implementation. The recent political crisis in Swaziland was largely 
prompted by former Prime Minister Mabandla's attempts to alter this 
subordinate position of the Cabinet. His abrupt dismissal has served 
to confirm that the Cabinet and Parliament will remain excluded from 
the arena of effective policy-making.
Basically this new Swazi state form amounts to the imposition over 
the whole society of the longstanding traditional structures of power, 
which under colonialism were restricted to the non-capitalist sector. 
Coexistent with this spread of traditional political power has been a 
second important change - the development by the traditional rulers 
of a material base in the capitalist sector of the economy. Under 
colonialism they had no such base, as the capitalist mode was kept under 
exclusive foreign domination and control. The most important reason 
for this change was Sobhuza's skilful use of a power given to him at 
independence, namely the control over Swaziland's mineral wealth. Shortly 
before independence he established the Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Fund as the 
depository for all monies from mineral royalties. As capital accumulated 
in the fund, he nominated a committee to manage it. Amongst the uses 
made of Tibiyo's capital have been:
(a) the purchasing of freehold land as part of the programme to restore
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the land to Swazi control. Much of this land has been used for 
agricultural schemes, the most notable being the Simunye project 
which has vastly increased the acreage under sugar cultivation. 
This project is managed by the British multinational, Tate and 
Lyle;
(b) the acquiring of shares to establish joint ventures in a range of 
businesses, including most of the major multinational corporations 
operating in Swaziland (such as the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation, Lonhro, Anglo-American, Cortaulds, Turner and 
Newall, and Rennies); and
(c) the launching of new business ventures such as Tibiyo Insurance 
Brokers (in conjunction with Hill Samuel), the Royal Swazi 
National Airline (originally in conjunction with Alitalia and 
Fokker), and brick manufacturing (in conjunction with a major 
British concern.
Tibiyo has thus emerged as the major vehicle for domestic capital 
accumulation in Swaziland. But the point to note is that this revenue 
does not accrue to the Ministry of Finance but to the traditional rulers. 
Furthermore, Tibiyo is exempt from the payment of taxes and its operations 
are not publicly accountable to parliament. Its six trustees include 
three princes of the Royal Family (one of whom is the Prime Minister, 
while the other two are members of the Liqoqo), as well as the former 
private secretary to the late King. Its management committee is headed 
by Dr Sishayi Nxumalo, one time cabinet minister and roving ambassador 
for the King, and one of the handful of Swazi politicians to be involved 
in the land deal negotiations.
Another major point worth noting about Tibiyo is the close working 
relationship that it has developed with foreign capital. In fact, Tibiyo 
has grown from a bank account into a royalist-controlled capitalist 
corporation, operating as a junior but nevertheless important partner in 
a growing and spreading alliance with multinational capital. When Tibiyo 
first began the process of acquiring equity it concentrated on the large 
multinationals involved in mining and in agro-industry. More recently it
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has widened its operations and is now involved in the hotel and gambling 
sector (with Rennies), breweries (with South African Breweries), forestry, 
travel, insurance, and printing and publishing (including the production 
of its own weekly newspaper, The Observer, which was reportedly set up 
with the help of personnel from Tiny Rowland's operation in Zimbabwe). 
Presently Tibiyo is negotiating for shares in the largest internal haulage 
company in Swaziland, the British owned Swaziland United Transport. It 
is also branching out into the manufacturing sector with a recent agreement 
to make both clay and straw bricks in conjunction with two British firms, 
while plans are afoot to manufacture guava juice and marmalade.
Clearly then Tibiyo is spreading its net into all sectors of the 
economy. As it does so, the traditional rulers consolidate their economic 
power. In classic Marxist terms, Tibiyo can be analysed as a comprador 
element, an intermediary between those who exercise effective state power 
in Swaziland and foreign capital. Put another way, Tibiyo represents the 
means whereby the traditional rulers have turned themselves into capitalists.
State power in Swaziland can therefore be analysed in the following 
terms. Political power rests firmly in the hands of a traditional 
aristocracy, headed by a monarch and an enormous royal family, and 
including an elaborate network of chiefs, ndvunas and headmen - a power 
structure not unlike those in South Africa's bantustans. Like those 
homeland governments, the Swazi regime is conservative, and anxious 
to preserve traditional custom and culture as part of the general desire to 
maintain the status quo. It is opposed to radical ideologies that 
advocate mass political participation and an alternative economic order 
to that of capitalism. As such it is ideologically anti-Communist; far 
more so than either Botswana or Lesotho where diplomatic ties exist with 
Cuba, China, the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Swaziland has 
no such radical ties beyond a necessary and diplomatically correct 
relationship with its neighbour, Mozambique. Its other diplomatic links 
are with such anti-Communist nations as Taiwan and Israel, as well as 
with the UK and the US.
Furthermore, the regime is committed to capitalism in a particularly
purist form. It shares the "fruits" of capital's presence in Swaziland 
via Tibiyo and sees the role of government as being to provide the 
necessary wherewithal for capital's essential task of accumulation.
Recently, in a speech that could well have been written by Adam Smith, 
former Prime Minister Mabandla described the government's role in the 
economy as "largely limited to providing the physical infrastructure 
needed for private enterprise to flourish and it is intended to keep 
it that way." (Times of Swaziland, 8/12/82).
What this means is that in the ideological divide between capitalism 
and socialism in southern Africa, Swaziland stands firmly in the former 
camp. From this the assumption can be made that the presentSwazi ruling 
order probably perceives a more serious threat to its survival from the 
spread of Mozambiquan-style socialism or the emergence of an ANC government 
in South Africa than from the continuation of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa. In fact, Swaziland is South Africa's most reliable partner in the 
whole regional network of states, and in a situation where it may have to 
take sides between the interests of Pretoria and those of the ANC it will 
undoubtedly chose the former. The critical point to understand is that 
this decision is prompted not only by the likely adverse consequences of 
siding with the ANC, or by the fact of Swaziland's structural integration 
into the South African economy, but also by important ideological factors.
In many respects the Swazi and South African ruling classes view the world 
through the same eyes; between the two there is an ideological harmony of 
interests. This was clearly illustrated when the Swazi Commissioner of 
Police justified his recent banning of a meeting scheduled by the Federation 
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of South Africa on the grounds that 
"these people were going to use their meeting as a platform to criticise 
South Africa. Also on their agenda was how they could assist the liberation 
movements fighting South Africa." (Times of Swaziland, 7/4/83).
This ideological factor should not be construed to mean that the 
Swaziland government endorses the racism that is inherent in the apartheid 
system. It does not. It has always abhorred racial discrimination in 
South Africa and is genuinely committed to the non-racial ideal. Where 
it sees eye-to-eye with South Africa's rulers is in a mutual conception of
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how political power should be held and exercised, a mutual belief in 
capitalism, and a shared perception of the so-called "Soviet threat" 
to southern Africa.
The octopus-like grip which South Africa has on the Swazi economy 
serves to reinforce this ideological bond. It also gives Pretoria an 
array of potentially coercive mechanisms with which, should it be necessary, 
it could bend Swaziland to its will, or at least ensure that Swaziland does 
nothing to jeopardize South Africa’s security. Some of the most important 
mechanisms can be outlined briefly.
(a) Foreign ownership and control of the economy
The Swazi economy, like most Third World capitalist economies, 
is overwhelmingly owned, controlled or managed by outsiders, 
mainly South African. Within the constellation of capitalist 
forces in the economy, South African capital has now eclipsed 
British as the most powerful. Today, British capital dominates 
only the banking and agricultural sectors, while South African 
capital virtually monopolizes manufacturing, trade, tourism, 
and transportation and communications, while holding a sizeable 
stake in the mining industry. The extent of South African invol­
vement in the Swazi economy can be illustrated by the fact that 
in every year since independence South Africa has supplied 
Swaziland with just over 95 per cent of its imports, through the 
transportation monopoly held by South African railways over the 
haulage of freight both in and out of the country. Visitors to 
Swaziland often express amazement at the array of goods available 
to the consumer. One can buy virtually anything in towns like 
Mbabane (the capital) and Manzini, whilst in many African 
countries it is often hard to buy even basic commodities.
The reason for this is that Swaziland's wholsesale and retail 
sectors are simply extensions of the South African mercantile 
market. Metro monopolizes the wholsesale trade, while OK Bazaars, 
Spar and Dee Bees are the largest retail outlets. Two consequences 
flow from this. One is that South African capital is a major 
employer in the economy, probably only second to the sugar
industry, in which South Africa is not involved. The other is 
that the South African presence,in a material sense,provides 
"the good life" in Swaziland, not to mention the considerable 
trade generated by Zambian and Mozambiquan residents on their 
frequent shopping incursions. In a situation of rapidly rising 
unemployment in Swaziland, any significant withdrawal by South 
African capital would have grave consequences, while the 
accompanying decline in living standards would seriously affect 
the urbanized and westernised classes. The Swazi rulers are 
anxious to avoid such developments, and this means that they 
can ill afford to alienate the South African government or to 
allow events to occur that could adversely affect the investment 
climate for South African capital.
Transportation links
Mention has already been made of the near monopoly enjoyed by 
South African Railways over Swaziland's import and export traffic 
The only dent in this situation has been the small flow of goods 
transported through Maputo harbour on what from 1964-80 was 
Swaziland's only railway, running from near Mbabane to Maputo. 
Given the relatively short distance between these two points, and 
the fact of Mozambique's recent decolonization, logic would have 
suggested an increased use of this line as a way of reducing 
Swaziland's dependence on the South African connection. This, 
after all, is an explicit goal of SADCC of which Swaziland is 
a member. But Swaziland in fact has moved in the opposite 
direction, consolidating its reliance upon South Africa. A new 
railway line has been constructed from the centre of the country 
to Richards Bay in South Africa, and a recent decision has been 
taken to extend this line northwards to link up with the South 
African rail system at Komatipoort. The costs of this project 
will be shared, with Swaziland and South Africa financing the 
stretches in their respective countries. The whole line, however 
including the 80 kilometre stretch inside South Africa, will 
be managed by Swazi Railways. The line will carry South African
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phosphate, coal, and citrus through Swaziland to Richards Bay, 
as well as sugar from Mhlume in Swaziland, previously exported 
through Maputo. One result of this link will be the increasing 
integration of the Swazi and South African rail systems and 
the diversion of Swazi exports away from Mozambique. As 
Swaziland's need for the Maputo link declines, it could become 
increasingly vulnerable to South African attacks as a means of 
still further depriving the Mozambiquan government of the vital 
foreign exchange earned by Maputo harbour.
(c) The South African Customs Union (SACU)
Swaziland has been a member of this Union since 1909, together 
with South Africa and the other two BLS countries (Botswana and 
Lesotho). It operates on the basis of unanimous consent, and 
the dissenting vote of one party can forestall any agreement. 
Analysis of the use of this veto power shows that it has been 
exercised more often by South Africa than by the three other 
members put together, a fact which is hardly surprising given 
the "David and Goliath" nature of the relationship between the 
BLS countries and the Republic. In recent years South Africa has 
used the veto to block the development of industries in the BLS 
countries that could rival established South African concerns 
(it blocked, at least for an initial period, construction in 
Swaziland of textile, fertilizer and television component plants.
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Ultimately, the latter two were built). While Pretoria's actions 
can be interpreted in terms of protectionist economics, it would 
also be equally plausible to see them as part of a design to 
maintain the subordination of the BLS economies. More recently, 
Pretoria blocked a new sharing formula that had been painstakingly 
negotiated over an 18 month period by an all-party group. The 
new formula stood to increase the BLS share of SACU's revenue. 
Explaining his government's actions, P.W. Botha stated that...
"we see the Customs Union not in isolation, but as part of a 
comprehensive regional development strategy." Interestingly, 
this statement was made at the so-called "confederation summit"
of South Africa and its "independent" homelands, and it seems 
clear that the customs union agreement has become a key 
instrument of Pretoria's overtly interventionist foreign policy 
in the region. The suspicion exists that the bait of increased 
SACU revenue is being used (i) to pressurize the BLS countries 
into accepting the bantustans into SACU, thereby conferring a 
degree of international recognition on them, (ii) to draw the 
BLS states in a de facto manner into the Constellation of 
Southern African States framework, or (iii) to integrate them 
in some way into the new regional "deconcentration" strategy. This 
latter is perhaps the most likely. This would have the effect 
of increasing the degree of economic integration in the region 
under South African domination, which in turn would add to 
South Africa's political leverage over the region. Whatever 
the case, the BLS states clearly face an agonising dilemma, 
especially as their share of custom union receipts constitute huge 
and vital sources of domestic revenue - 71 per cent of the 
Lesotho government's revenue, 63 per cent of Swaziland's, and 37 
per cent of Botswana's in 1981-82. ^ Can these countries really 
refuse to dance to Pretoria's tune under such conditions?
Electricity and fuel supplies
In 1981 Swaziland imported 68 per cent cf its electricity from 
ESCOM in South Africa. A major hydro-electric project presently 
under construction will only reduce this dependence to 50 per 
cent. As one government official once told me..."South Africa 
can literally turn out the lights in Swaziland." It could 
also bring the country to a standstill, for South Africa is 
Swaziland's sole supplier of fuel. There has been talk in recent 
years of importing fuel through Maputo, but nothing has yet 
been done to diversify Swaziland's fuel dependence on the 
Republic.
Citrus exports
Canned and citrus fruits constitute Swaziland's fourth largest
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earner of export revenue, and the industry is the country's 
largest employer of female labour. It is an important sector of 
the economy, and one controlled by the Swaziland Citrus Board.
By agreement between the Swazi and South African governments, 
this board markets its fruit through the South African Co-operative 
Citrus Exchange, which is responsible for marketing policy, 
distribution, promotion, and sale of the fruit, both in South 
Africa and in Swaziland's main overseas markets.
(f) Employment
In comparison with Botswana and Lesotho, the flow of migrant 
labour to South Africa's mines is relatively low in Swaziland.
At its peak in the late 1970s, the country supplied 28,000 
miners. The present figure is around 14,000. However, we 
must add to this figure the unknown but not insignificant 
number of Swazis who work as migrants on the farms in the 
eastern Transvaal. With the rising level of unemployment in 
Swaziland already causing concern, and with less than half 
of the country's school leavers now being absorbed into the wage 
economy, any cutback in the migrant flow to South Africa would 
exacerbate a serious problem. Swaziland cannot therefore risk 
South Africa’s wrath and suffer the expulsion of its labour, as 
has been the fate of Zimbabwe and to a certain extent Mozambique.
The conclusion that follows from all the above is that Swaziland 
exists as a satellite of South Africa. So too, of course, do Botswana 
and Lesotho. But there is a difference. While there is probably little 
of significance that the BLS countries can do to extricate themselves 
from the mesh of South African economic domination, there is little evidence 
that Swaziland, in contrast to Botswana and Lesotho, seriously wishes to 
do so; a fact that is not really surprising, given the ideological bond 
that exists between Swaziland and South Africa. This difference was 
illustrated by the reaction of the BLS governments to the Maseru raid. 
Botswana and Lesotho were unequivocal in their condemnation of Pretoria, 
but from Swaziland there was not one word of explicit official criticism.
The Swazi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Richard Dlamini, described the raid
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as "a terribly sad and tragic example of what can result from lack of 
tolerance, understanding, and above all the lack of dialogue," and 
stressed his government's determination "not to allow people who come 
to our country under the camouflage of refugees and accept our hospitality 
to use our peaceful land to launch at tacks on our neighbours with whom we 
wish to live in peace." (Swazi Observer, 18/12/82). It does not seem 
unfair to suggest that what Minister Dlamini was really saying to the 
ANC was..."you got what you deserved." During the recent budget debate 
on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Swazi Parliament, a backbench 
MP, Prince Maquba, asked whether the Minister had consulted the Cabinet 
before making these statements. He then went on to state that "the 
raid was particularly painful because it was a white regime attacking black 
people. It was, therefore, especially sad that the Minister appeared 
to be congratulating the South African government for that incident."
(Times of Swaziland, 30/3/83).
Turning at last to the land deal, the negotiations over this deal 
have been shrouded in secrecy, and the South African government has not 
explained its motives beyond Minister Koornhof's improbable statements 
about "correcting history" and "uniting peoples who belong together."
In the absence of offical explanations one is left with speculation.
Among the various theories advanced, two seem most favoured. Both relate 
to South Africa's foreign and strategic objectives in the region. The 
first sees the plan as an attempt to lure Swaziland into the Constellation 
of States. This would have the advantage of rejuvenating the constellation 
plan, as well as of weakening SADCC, which Pretoria regards "very negatively 
as a counter-constellation which threatens the country's traditionally 
firm economic grip on the sub-continent. The Government (South African) 
may be looking to detach Swaziland from SADCC and favour it economically, 
so that the alliance of black states loses credibility" (Peter Vale in 
The Star, 9/8/82). The second theory sees the land deal as part of 
Pretoria's "total strategy," and views it as a means of "persuading" 
Swaziland to take decisive actions against the ANC in order to close 
off its use of Swaziland as a conduit.
My view is that these are only the incidental and secondary objectives
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of the land deal; objectives that Pretoria is already pursuing by other 
methods outlined earlier in this paper. It is in any case hardly 
necessary to take so drastic a step as the ceding of territory to 
persuade a pliable client like Swaziland to fall into line with South 
African wishes. I therefore believe that the primary motivation lies 
elsewhere, and is to be found in the context of apartheid's grand 
design to impose "independence" on its homelands, irrespective of their 
wishes, and thereby denationalize the majority of South Africa's population. 
The problem is that certain stubborn homelands refuse to play the game.
Two of these are KaNgwane and KwaZulu, and Pretoria has come up with 
typically drastic proposals to deal with their resistance. Most drastic 
is the complete elimination of KaNgwane by giving it to Swaziland. In 
this way Pretoria's denationalization objective is realized with some 
800,000 South African Swazis being removed from the citizenship role.
The transfer of the Ingwavuma region will not solve South Africa's "KwaZulu" 
problem in the same way, but it could be an effective means of pressurizing 
and warning Gatsha Buthelezi of the adverse consequences of his continuing 
opposition to apartheid's plans. In short, the Swazi land deal is part 
of a scheme to further a key aspect of the Nationalist Party's domestic 
policies, as well as being a stick with which to beat a stubborn homeland 
leadership.
As well as speculating about Pretoria's motives, it is also interesting 
to ask what is in this deal for Swaziland? Why risk international 
opprobrium, including possible expulsion from the OAU and SADCC, to gain 
two pieces of territory that are little more than rural slums, into 
which hundreds and thousands of South Africa's so-called "surplus citizens" 
have been dumped, and in which unemployment is massive and per capita 
incomes pitifully low. Moreover, in both KaNgwane and KwaZulu there 
seems to be overwhelming opposition amongst the residents to the land 
transfer, opposition which in KaNgwane has been organized by an articulate, 
non-aristocratic politician into a political movement that embraces goals, 
if not methods, similar to those of the ANC. This organization and its 
leader would not easily be assimilated into a systematically depoliticised 
society like Swaziland. So why does Swaziland want it?
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The answer really lies in the political ambitions of the late King 
Sobhuza. His three overriding goals were to regain the political 
independence of his kingdom, to redress the pattern of landownership 
inside the country in favour of the Swazis, and to reunite the Swazi 
people. The first two he achieved. The proposed land deal offered the 
chance of at least partially fulfilling the third. And such was the King's 
standing in the eyes of his people that he legitimated the deal and enabled 
them to disregard its negative implications. For the South African 
government and other protagonists of the deal, Sobhuza's death was 
particularly inopportune, as it robbed the scheme of much of its legitimacy. 
Given this fact, and the degree of opposition inside South Africa, the 
plan, as originally conceived, is now almost certainly dead, although 
a compromise version might still emerge from the Rumpf Commission which 
is studying the question.
Some observers have suggested that the recent Swazi crackdown on 
the ANC indicates a hidden security factor in the proposed land deal.
It is impossible to know for certain if this is the case, although it 
would not be an unreasonable speculation. My view, however, is that this 
crackdown would have happened anyway, land deal or no land deal. And 
here again Sobhuza's death has made an important difference. Sobhuza 
had a long historic association with the ANC and he was known to have 
respected the organization's top leadership. As such, he was prepared 
to allow a limited ANC presence in the country, provided Swaziland was 
not used as a springboard for attacks on South Africa. However, as the 
tempo and effectiveness of ANC operations increased, and evidence mounted 
that Swaziland was being used as a transit route for ANC guerrillas,
Pretoria increased its pressure on the Swazi authorities. The first 
casualty was the lonstanding ANC representative in the country, Stanley 
Mabizela. This highly regarded official was forced to leave the country 
early in 1982 after direct talks between the then Swazi Prime Minister 
and the ANC in Lusaka. Three months later, Mabizela's deputy, Petros 
Nzima, was killed in a car bomb explosion together with his wife, Jabu, 
who was SACTU's regional chief. No replacements for these officials 
have been allowed to enter the country. It is known that at this time 
(mid-1982) the Swazi security police had wanted to round up and expel
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ANC members from the country. Sobhuza prevented this. His death removed 
the obstacle, and the Maseru raid provided the pretext. Under the guise 
of "protecting" the lives of ANC members and innocent Swazi citizens, 
those who comprised the organized infrastructure of the ANC presence in 
Swaziland were rounded up,and shortly thereafter most of them agreed to 
leave the country "voluntarily" for Mozambique. Some of those detained 
remain in Swaziland, but the ANC's presence is a mere shadow of what it 
was 18 months ago.
The recent dismissal of Prime Minister Mabandla has weakened that 
faction of the Swazi political establishment who shared Sobhuza's sympathetic 
attitude towards the ANC, even though the power struggle that produced 
Mabandla's political demise was not a reflection of serious ideological 
differences within the Swazi power bloc. What Mabandla was trying to do 
was to weaken the Liqoqo's monopoly over policy-making in favour of a 
stronger influence for the Cabinet. Had he succeeded, the major impact 
would have been on domestic rather than foreign policy, with one important 
exception - the land deal. It appears that Mabandla was opposed to the 
deal, and had he prevailed in the power struggle this would undoubtedly 
have been the final nail in the coffin for this scheme. His eclipse will 
have little effect, perhaps, on the ultimate fate of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma, 
but it has certainly strengthened the political grip of the more conservative 
faction in Swazi politics. The result is likely to be a deepening of the 
political and economic links with South Africa, greater co-operation on 
security issues, and a more hostile attitude towards the ANC and political 
refugees in general. Swaziland will continue to claim that its attitude 
towards the liberation struggle in South Africa remains one of neutrality.
But the fact is that in 1982 the position shifted significantly, away 
from neutrality and towards the interests of the status quo in South Africa. 
Given the ideological and structural factors in the present South African- 
Swazi state relationship, no other position could realistically have 
been expected from the Swazi rulers.
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IMPERIALISM, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE DESTABILIZATION 
OF ZIMBABWE
L.M. Sa c h i k o n y e *
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South Africa's destabilization of her neighbours is the most serious 
threat so far to stable international relations, regional security, 
and co-operation in southern Africa. As a means of creating instability 
and the disruption of social and political order, destabilization is a 
common strategy perfected by imperialism to block the achievement of 
progressive socio-economic change. In this paper the role of South Africa 
as a sub-imperial gendarme in the region will be analysed within the broad 
context of contemporary patterns of imperialist intervention. In our 
examination of the impact of the different forms of destabilization - 
economic, military, political and psychological - the Zimbabwean 
experience will be cited for illustrative purposes. In the process an 
attempt will be made to reveal the interrelationship between the contemporary 
patterns of imperialist intervention, the surrogate sub-imperial role of 
Pretoria, the intensification of domestic repression within South Africa, 
and the growth of South African militarism and aggression.
Forms and Strategies of Imperialist Intervention
The post-Second World War era ushered in the cold war and intensified 
the geo-political rivalry between the imperialist and socialist powers. 
Whereas the latter threw their weight behind national liberation struggles 
against colonialism and imperialism, the imperialist powers sought to 
dilute the content of the independence they were forced by internal and
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international pressures to grant to tneir territories. Certain forms of 
economic, military and political relationships were retained in the post­
independence period to permit imperialist-nutured forms of dependence.
And when certain states attempted to break free from such relations of 
dependence, the Western imperialist powers quite typically resorted to 
militarist strategies of destabilization. The experiences of Vietnam, Cuba, 
the Congo, Chile, Nicaragua, and many others spring quickly to mind.
If the cold war has generally characterised the uneasy relations 
between the super powers since the end of the Second World War, the 
use of force to block the attainment of national independence and socialism 
has become an intrinsic component of imperialist strategy, as the afore­
mentioned examples of Cuba (after the revolution), Vietnam (during and 
after its national liberation), the Congo (under the progressive stewardship 
of Lumumba), Chile (under Allende), and now Nicaragua show. Imperialist 
destabilization has assumed military, political, economic, and even psychol­
ogical dimensions. The primacy of any one of these is normally dictated 
by the strategic and tactical imperatives of specific situations at specific 
times. In instances where economic and political destabilization may well 
produce the desired results (for example the collapse of a particular 
government), the military option is obviously unnecessary. In others, 
where economic and political destabilization alone cannot achieve the 
desired objectives, the military option may well be used as a last resort. 
This military option can take the form of both direct and indirect 
intervention. As the Vietnamese, Cuban and Nicaraguan experiences 
demonstrate, imperialism increasingly relies on surrogates in its military 
manoeuvres of destabilization. These are usually anti-progressive 
domestic forces but sometimes mercenaries are used.
South Africa's Sub-Imperial Role
The shrinkage of colonial empires since 1945 has heightened the 
struggle for spheres of political, economic and military influence by 
the major imperialist powers. Their perspectives on global development 
and security revolve around their overriding objective - the consolidation 
of their dominance, directly or indirectly, in as many geographical spheres
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of the globe as possible. The quest for strategic resources, such as 
oil, gold, chrome, and many others, assumes unparalleled significance.
Within the imperialist system, South Africa forms an important 
strategic link. As an industrializing capitalist state, it helps to 
serve many of the objectives of the imperialist system, its distorted 
and anachronistic socio-political structures notwithstanding. South 
Africa is a substantial producer and exporter of a number of key strategic 
minerals, such as uranium and chrome, for the military-industrial complexes 
of the Western industrialized nations. It provides extremely favourable 
conditions for investment by transnational corporations, which are able 
to reap mammoth profits from cheap black labour. And South Africa's 
strategic location provides bases from which the West can monitor the 
South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. In the event of a global conflict,
South Africa would clearly be a highly prized ally of the Western powers.
In addition to being a major exporter and importer of goods, and a strategic 
regional ally, South Africa is also viewed by the Western powers as a base 
from which to mount economic expansion into the hinterland of the sub­
continent. In sum, therefore,..."the power of white South Africa is in the 
final analysis the power of Western imperialism, which is its mainstay, 
economically, militarily and politically." *
Specific reference can now be made to the forms of economic and
military relationships between South Africa, the Western powers, and
Israel. The transnational corporations perform a key role in providing
the hardware and finance for the South African arms industry. Their
investments in advanced machinery and equipment has helped to create
the requisite industrial infrastructure to enable Pretoria to produce
2
75 per cent of its own military needs. It is the regime's policy to 
offer as many arms contracts as possible to private companies. The 
banks, including recently the International Monetary Fund, also play 
a vital role in facilitating loans. It has been estimated that South 
Africa is the largest military-industrial complex in the southern hemisphere. 
As an exported of major weapons systems, it is ranked 11th amongst the 
29 leading arms exporting countries. Over 70 per cent of the investment 
in arms manufacturing in South Africa is from the subsidiaries of such 
transnational corporations as Philips, General Motors, Ford, ICL, PLessey,
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Marconi, and Leyland. It emerges clearly, therefore, that:
...the bulk of military production in South Africa is done under licenses 
the Western monopolies grant the South African state and private 
companies. The French company, Marcel Dassault, for instance, sold 
South Africa a license to produce short-range bombers of the 
Mirage-Milan type. The Italian company, Atlas-Macci sold a license 
to produce Impala aircraft, and the French company, Construction 
Mecanique de Normandie Panhard, sold a license to produce armoured 
vehicles. South Africa has also bought licenses for the production 
of helicopters, missiles, warships, small arms etc.... 3
It is also known that four nuclear-powered submarines are currently being 
constructed at a South African naval base under conditions of great secrecy. 
At the same time, reports have circulated that the Botha regime has provided 
financial assistance to Israel for its plans to build a nuclear fighter- 
bomber.
Relations between the two garrison states of Israel and South Africa 
developed throughout the 1970s, culminating in very close strategic and 
defence links. Their use of destabilizing tactics against their neighbours, 
and their close relations with the US, are common similarities between 
the two states. Israel has provided South Africa, amongst other things, 
with Reschef-class warships equipped with Gabriel surface-to-air missiles, 
Ramata patrol boats, aircraft computers, electronic military fences, and 
with help in the modernization of its Centurion tanks. Furthermore, 
nuclear co-operation between the two regimes is believed to have commenced 
immediately after the signing of their scientific co-operation agreement 
in 1976. South Africa is also reported to have obtained assistance in 
nuclear research from Israel scientists, some of whom have been spotted 
at the Pelindaba plant. When a Soviet satellite pinpointed a nuclear 
test site in the Kalahari in 1977, it was widely presumed that this was 
the location for a possible South African-Israeli test site. In September 
1979 both US and USSR satellites over the South Atlantic registered a 
"double flash", characteristic of a nuclear explosion, and a joint South 
Af rican-Israeli task force was known to be in the area at this time.
Defence co-operation between South Africa and Israel has also been
stepped up in counter-insurgency techniques and through joint training
4
programmes. There have consequently been reports of frequent visits to
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South Africa by senior Israeli military personnel to lecture on military 
procedures, of South African teams being trained in counter-insurgency 
techniques and quick-strike tactics by the Israelis, and of Israeli 
advisors having been seen providing support during South African raids into 
Angola.
Adventurism, Militarism and Destabilization
South Africa's short-lived and ill-fated outward looking policy of 
the early 1970s reflected the substantial regional influence that the 
apartheid state possessed over regional security prior to the collapse 
of Portuguese colonialism and of the Smith regime in Rhodesia. The 
changed geo-political landscape in southern Africa following the liberation 
of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe could not fail to have a profound effect 
on the content and orientation of black aspirations in South Africa 
itself.  ^ Soweto and the consequent upsurge in the liberation struggles 
in South Africa and Namibia led to a reassessment of both internal and 
external strategy by the apartheid state. As Mohan has observed:
...both the scale of the Soweto killings and the continual tightening 
of the screws of repression since then proved, if proof were needed, 
that balck resistance is increasingly becoming harder to crush... 
and Pretoria will be obliged by the very 'logic' of the unfolding 
of armed resistance inside South Africa's boundaries to pursue an 
increasingly adventurist and aggressive course against its neighbours...
The shift away from detente towards a much more adventurist and militaristic 
foreign policy was completed in 1975-76, when South Africa invaded Angola. 
Simon Jenkins has identified this shift in the following terms:
...the new South Africa of the 1980s refuses to apologise for anything, 
let alone apartheid. It spurns the "cocktail diplomacy" of the past 
and present foreign ministers. It is built on the reality of South 
Africa's military and economic power, particularly towards the 
frontline states... The gun and the maize train will speak louder 
than a hundred speeches at the United Nations. This transformation 
emanates, like change in the most stable and introverted oligarchies, 
from the armed forces; in this case an elite strengthened by the 
meritocracy of war... ?
This shift in South African foreign policy reflected the increasing
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ascendancy of the State Security Council (dominated by the generals) over 
the Department of Foreign Affairs. Following the collapse of the Constell­
ation of Southern African States idea, armed aggression, such as that against 
Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia, has been an increasingly 
important feature of South African foreign policy in the sub-continent.
As Jenkins reminds us:
Soldiers do not have policies. They have weapons and tactics for 
their use. They point out that Black Africa yearns to destabilize 
South Africa. Black Africa must be shown the price. The armoury 
is formidable: raids on Matola and Maseru; backing for UNITA, ZIPRA,
MNR, and LLA; sabotage of Luanda, Beira, Cabora-Bassa; the manipulation 
of transport links, trade agreements and migrant remittances. Sometimes 
the weapons fail, such as the ludicrous attempt to topple the 
Seychelles regime in 1981. ®
Logistical and material support for bandits in the neighbouring states has 
been aimed at destabilizaing both the social and political order and economic 
structures. Attacks on communication lines in Angola and Mozambique, for 
example, have had the objective of paralysing the transport links of the 
landlocked nations in the region. SADCC's programmes to improve and extend 
the communication networks in the region have therefore been obvious targets 
for South African inspired sabotage. The damaging effects of these attacks 
on SADCC's communications infrastructure have resulted in the loss of millions
9
of dollars, according to the organization's executive secretary.
The Destabilization of Zimbabwe
One of the major objectives of South Africa's ill-fated proposal to 
establish a constellation of southern African states (CONSAS) under Pretoria's 
hegemony was the inclusion of a pliant Rhodesia as a key member of the 
constellation. The victory of the Patriotic Front and the severe electoral 
defeat of the pro-South African parties in Zimbabwe was therefore a major 
blow to Pretoria's plans. Instead, it soon became clear that Zimbabwe's 
new government was not only anti-racist but also a committed member of the 
frontline states and SADCC. Zimbabwe's new stance was obviously anathema 
to the South African leadership which soon made facilities available for 
the military training of several thousand members of the renegade auxiliary 
forces that had previously served the Muzorewa regime. The granting of such
facilities was clearly a hostile act, but one consistent with the militaristic 
trend in Pretoria's foreign policy. The success, prosperity and stability 
of a black-ruled neighbouring state that was non-racial, non-aligned and 
anti-imperialist constituted an obvious threat to the aparthedi regime, 
particularly by providing a "dangerous example" for the South African masses 
to follow in their struggle towards national liberation. Economic, political, 
psychological and military pressures were therefore brought to bear by 
Pretoria in an effort to destabilize a successful experiment in reconstruct­
ion and stability.
Zimbabwe's Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, has succinctly analysed 
the objectives of South Africa's strategy in the following terms: ^
(a) the removal or reduction in the fear of the power of example 
that may become a potent force in giving inspiration to the 
oppressed masses in Namibia and South Africa. Viable economies 
and stable democratic societies in neighbouring states would 
constitute such an example;
(b) the relegation of the neighbouring states to the status of 
economic satellies in accordance with Pretoria's bantustan 
policy and the constellation of southern African states 
proposal;
(c) the intimidation of neighbouring states so that they discontinue 
their support for liberation movements struggling to overthrow 
the apartheid regime; and
(d) the foiling of genuine regional co-operation under the auspices 
of SADCC.
Quite clearly the common thread running through Pretoria's destabilization 
strategy towards its neighbours is the negation of their economic and 
political development in order to prevent them from being in a position 
to support the liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia. Destabil­
ization is essentially a strategy to forestall domestic social and political 
change in South Africa by creating turbulence and chaos in neighbouring 
states. Zimbabwe has no illusions, therefore, that as long as apartheid
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exists the struggle for liberation will intensify, as will South Africa's 
destabilization of those states in the region that support the struggle.
Forms of Destabilization against Zimbabwe
Military and Espionage Activities
>itice Zimbabwe's attainment of independence, South Africa has undertaken 
contingency plans to lauch aggression against the Zimbabwean state and its 
people. It has, for this purpose, trained the auxiliary forces that 
fled Rhodesia at independence. Several training camps have been established, 
particularly in the northern Transvaal. Sabotage groups, consisting of 
black and white mercenaries, have been trained at Letaba and in the 
Transkei. In order to take advantage of the difficult security situation 
in Matabeleland earlier this year, South Africa recruited and trained 
a Matabele brigade. The brigade has reportedly recruited Zimbabwean 
workers in the South African mines, as well as certain elements of ZIPRA.
The saboteurs and mercenaries who have infiltrated Zimbabwe have 
been known to co-operate with the Mozambique National Resistance Movement 
(MNR). Several of them were killed in the Sengwe area in August 1982, and 
some in Mwenezi in October 1982. As recently as September 1983, a number 
of saboteurs, attempting to blow up the fuel depot at Beit Bridge, were 
apprehended. The targets of such saboteurs and killers have included 
the Inkomo Barracks near Harare, the Thornhill air base near Gweru, and 
the ZANU (PF) headquarters, as well as individual targets such as ANC 
representative, Joe Gqabi, who was assassinated in 1981. All this 
evidence demonstrates South African involvement, as do its spy rings, 
one of which (involving Philip Hartleybury and Colin Evans) was exposed 
in 1982. Only the vigilance of the Zimbabwean security services have 
prevented more South African-inspired attacks and sabotage.
Economic Sabotage
South Africa has also attempted to disrupt the Zimbabwean economy 
and paralyse its transport system. At the height of the bumper harvest 
of 1980-81, South African Railways withdrew their locomotives from
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Zimbabwe, thereby severely disrupting internal and external trade flows.
The sabotage of the Beira-Mutare railway dusrupted the flow of trade 
through the port of Beira. The rail link between Zimbabwe and Maputo 
has also been cut. These South African-inspired attacks have been 
accompanied by other acts of economic sabotage, such as the calculated 
repatriation of Zimbabwean workers from South Africa. Together these 
tactics underline Pretoria's strategy of economic warfare against Zimbabwe.
The Propaganda War
An important component of South Africa's destabilization strategy 
against Zimbabwe has been its massive prapaganda barrage against the Mugabe 
government. Reports in the South African media have been extremely 
negative, predicting doom and gloom for Zimbabwe because of its socialist 
oriented stance on domestic and international issues. One radio station 
in South Africa now beams regularly to Zimbabwe to spread alarm and 
despondency in the nation. The foreign press corps, based almost entirely 
in South Africa, have also become a vital medium in the dissemination of 
anti-Zimbabwe propaganda. And the fact that such propaganda has not been 
confined to Zimbabwe,but has also been directed against other frontline 
states, prompted a collective response in the form of the Kadoma Declaration. 
This encourages the international press corps to abandon its biased 
coverage of events in the region from inside South Africa, in favour of 
cn-the-scene objective coverage from within the frontline states themselves.
Conclusion
In this paper South Africa's role in the world imperialist system has 
been analysed, with particular reference to the growth of militarism in 
South Africa and Pretoria's strategy of destabilization against her 
neighbours in the region. It is a role that fulfils a number of imperialist 
objectives, and in particular the accumulation of capital under favourable 
conditions in South Africa itself, the quest for strategic military bases, 
and the destabilization of socialist-oriented states. The attainment of 
these objectives by South Africa would coincide with the defence and foreign 
policy preoccupations of the major imperialist powers. It is fairly clear, 
therefore, that the strengthened links and collusion between South Africa,
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Israel, Taiwan, the US, and a number of Latin American dictatorships 
express certain common strategic interests.
The paper has tried to demonstrate that Pretoria has pursued an 
adventurist and militarist policy against neighbouring states in a frantic 
bid to divert attention from the mounting tempo of the liberation struggle 
within South Africa itself. As the ANC's President, Oliver Tambo, has 
said, Pretoria hardly needs reminding that:
...our bases are in South Africa itself, our bases are among the people 
of our country, our bases are everywhere, in the mountains, near the 
Koeberg nuclear power station in the Cape, a thousand miles from any 
border, near to the SASOL petrol tanks in the heart of the country, 
and yes right in Pretoria itself, close to the Voortrekkerhoogte 
military headquarters. H
In Zimbabwe, South Africa has employed economic and military means, as 
well as propaganda, in an effort to create instability and chaos. Its 
hostile acts of aggression and provocation against the government and 
people of Zimbabwe are legion. There can be no doubt, therefore, that 
Pretoria's destabilization of the surrounding states will not cease as 
long as apartheid exists and the liberation struggle continues.
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SADCC AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Michael Sefali*
Introduction
The majority of African countries have now achieved their political 
independence. The last vestiges of colonialism in Africa are now found 
mostly in southern Africa, and specifically in Namibia and the Republic 
of South Africa where the last liberation struggles are still being 
waged under the leadership of SWAPO and the ANC respectively. The main 
tasks before the majority-ruled states of southern Africa today are the 
consolidation of their political independence and the achievement of 
economic independence. The latter is particularly crucial, for,as Lenin 
pointed out,the achievement of economic independence must always be the 
principal objective of the liberation movement. *
In the struggle for economic liberation, the states of southern 
Africa attach great importance to regional co-operation, and the most 
recent and important initiative towards realizing this was the establishment 
in 1980 of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), 
commonly pronounced as "SADEC".
SADCC comprises the nine southern African states of Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its 
overall objective is the reduction of economic dependence on the Republic 
of South Africa, through co-ordinated regional co-operation between its
* Director, Institute of Southern African Studies, National University of 
Lesotho
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member states.
A number of scholarly papers have already been written on SADCC.
This statement merely seeks to give a brief overview of the socio-economic 
and political background to the emergence of SADCC; the objectives, 
structures, programmes and progress of the organization to date; and 
the problems and prospects for effective co-operation in the southern 
African region.
Integration and Dependency in Southern Africa: The Background 
to the Formation of SADCC
The integration of the indigenous African societies of southern 
Africa into the world capitalist system conformed in many ways to the 
general world pattern. But there were a number of modifications peculiar 
to the specific development of capital accumulation in the sub-continent. 
This process of integration and domination started with the colonization 
of southern Africa by Portuguese and Dutch settlers in the 16th and 17th 
centuries. It has continued upto the present time through a number of 
different stages, associated respectively with Dutch and British merchant 
capital, British finance capital, and finally Western and South African 
monopoly capital.
The development of capitalist integration and dependency was preceded 
by the usual process of primitive accumulation of capital. The process 
was charaterized by the plunder of the African of his livestock by Dutch 
merchants, and his dispossession of land by the settlers. The mechanism 
of unequal exchange between European capitalism and African communalism, 
which characterized this period of primitive accumulation, resulted in 
the extinction of pre-colonial economic systems and in the creation of 
huge colonial surpluses that came to constitute one of the main financial 
sources for the subsequent development of capitalism in southern Africa in 
the second half of the 19th century.
The military subjugation of the independent political systems of the 
African peoples was an essential aspect of the colonization of indigenous 
societies, and of their integration into the mainstream of world capitalist
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development and domination. At the same time, open rivalry between the 
British colonies and the Dutch or Boer republics was brought about by 
the strategic aims of British imperialism, namely the economic and 
political unification of South Africa under the British Crown and the
crucial control of the gold mining industry in the Boer republic of the
2
Transvaal. These objectives were achieved with the establishment of 
the Union of South Africa in 1910, following the British victory in the 
Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.
From the second half of the 19th century, British finance capital came
to play a leading role not only in the development of capitalism in southern
Africa but also in the early formation of the integrationist ties of the
present economic complex of southern Africa. In the mines alone in 1884,
3
British investments were 34 million pounds sterling. The discovery of 
diamonds in the Kimberley area in the 1870s, and gold in the Rand area in 
the 1880s, ushered in an early phase of industrial development that gave 
an additional boost to the integrationist processes in the region.
Capitalist development could not take place on the basis of merchant 
and finance capital alone, of course. A regular supply of cheap migrant 
labour was also needed. The alienation of the African peasant from his 
land helped to solve this problem by "freeing” him to provide labour 
power that could be bought below the value of its reproduction. The 
early beginnings of the integrationist processes in southern Africa came 
to be centred, therefore, around the recruitment of cheap African migrant 
labour to the mines from the so-called "native reserves" within South 
Africa itself and the neighbouring British and Portuguese controlled 
territories. One of the first acts of the Chamber of Mines, established 
in 1889, was to establish a monopsonist labour recruiting agency (WENELA) 
in the Portuguese territories. A similar agency was established in 1912 
to recruit in the British protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and 
Swaziland. By the early decades of the 20th century, the British protect­
orates, the Portuguese colonies, and the South African native reserves 
had become in effect the labour reserves of the industrial centres in the 
Union of South Africa.
165
Other integrationist processes in southern Africa emerged as South 
African capitalism developed quickly on the basis of the exploitation of 
cheap migrant labour. The British protectorates were included as junior 
partners of South Africa in the 1910 Customs Union. Preferential trade 
arrangements were entered into by South Africa with the Portuguese colony 
of Mozambique as well as with the British colony of Rhodesia. These trade 
arrangements were clearly intended to facilitate the flow of industrial 
goods from South Africa to the markets of its neighbouring agrarian and 
labour-exporting appendages. The unhindered flow of labour and goods 
between the South African centre and the labour reserve peripheries 
was also facilitaed by the South African controlled transport and 
communications network. The establishment of this uniform transport 
infrastructure, centred in South Africa, inhibited the development of 
independent national transport systems in the dependent countries of the 
region. Finally, from the beginning of the 20th century the British protect- 
arates came to be included in an informal monetary union with South Africa. 
These territories came to use South African currency (originally the pound, 
later the rand) as their legal tender. Consequently, the South African 
Reserve Bank became in effect the central bank for these countries. This 
seriously impeded the development of independent central financial institut­
ions in them.
After the Second World War, the development of South African capitalism 
into monopoly and subsequently state monopoly capitalism led to the emergence 
of South Africa as a "sub-imperial" power.  ^ On the one hand, South Africa 
remained a sphere of profitable investment for foreign capital, a market 
for high-technology goods and sophisticated military hardware, and a 
supplier of strategic raw materials to the main industrial centres in 
North America, Western Europe and Japan. On the other hand, South Africa 
increasingly began to strive to act as an autonomous force, especially 
through the political suppression and economic exploitation of the 
African people inside the country, and through the regime's neo-colonial 
expansion and intervention throughout the sub-continent as a whole.
In the 1960s and 1970s - the period of the disintegration and 
collapse of the colonial system of imperialism - South African monopoly
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capital further intensified the integrationist ties between South 
Africa and neighbouring states. The 1910 Customs Agreement was 
renewed with the conclusion of the 1969 Agreement by Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa. This new Customs Agreement 
provides for a common external tariff, free movement of goods, and 
a common customs pool managed by South Africa. It purports to offer 
some "protection" to new industires in the BLS countries, but serves in 
practice to enable South Africa's manufacturing sector to monopolize the 
markets of its industrially underdeveloped partners. These partners 
import from 70 to 90 per cent of their consumer and capital goods from the 
Republic. Revenues accruing from customs receipts account for about 34 
per cent of government revenue in Botswana, 45 per cent in Swaziland, and 
60 per cent in Lesotho. An additional guranteed market was acquired by 
South Africa in 1964 with the signing of a trade agreement with the 
Smith regime in Rhodesia.  ^ Moreover, South Africa's trade expansion has 
not been limited solely to the region of southern Africa. The Republic is 
now reported to be engaged in trade with 47 African countries, and in 1980 
its trade with the rest of Africa totalled Rl,024 million. ^
In furtherance of its expansionist economic plans in the region, South 
Africa also concluded the South African Monetary Agreement with Lesotho 
and Swaziland in 1974. This formally established the Rand Monetary Zone, 
under which the South African rand was established as legal tender in 
Lesotho and Swaziland. The South African Reserve Bank became the de facto 
central bank for these countries, controlling their monetary policy. The 
subsequent creation of national central banks, and the circulation of national 
currencies side by side with the rand in Lesotho and Swaziland, did little 
to diminish South African control in the monetary sphere.
A key aspect of the integrationist processes in southern Africa has 
always been the movement of cheap migrant labour from neighbouring territor­
ies to South Africa. Agreements proving for this flow of migrant labour were 
concluded with several countries: with Malawi in 1967, with Lesotho in 1973, 
and with Swaziland in 1976. However, the unreliability of the South African 
labour market for the independent states of southern Africa has been 
underlined by recent political events in the region. The collapse of
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Portuguese colonialism in the mid-1970s, and the subsequent emergence of 
radical socialist regimes in some of South Africa's traditional labour 
reserves, struck panic within the ranks of the South African ruling class, 
which consequently opted for a strategy of reducing dependence on foreign 
sources of migrant labour (see table 1).
Table 1: Foreign Workers in the Republic of South Africa
1965 1977
Lesotho 117 000 163 000
Mozambique 161 000 69 000
Malawi 80 000 34 000
Botswana 59 000 39 000
Swaziland . 39 000 15 000
Rhodesia 27 000 31 000
Angola 11 000 700
Zambia 16 000 800
510 000 352 500
Source: K.W. Grundy, "Economic Patterns in New South African 
Balance." Reproduced in A Report to the Congress on 
Development Needs and Opportunities for Co-operation 
in Southern Africa. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Agency for International Development, March 1979.
Perhaps largely because of their geographic proximity to the Republic 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are still heavily dependent on South African 
transport and communications systems for outlets to the outside world. The 
achievement of independence by Zimbabwe in 1980 improved however the 
hitherto limited access of Botswana to the north through the Caprivi Strip. 
Swaziland's border with Mozambique has also offered since the mid-1970s 
an alterrative to dependence upon South Africa (an alternative admittedly 
that the Swazi rulers have so far done little to avail themselves of). 
Lesotho's enclave position within South Africa continues to render it much 
more vulnerable than the other two countries.
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Lately, South Africa has increased its capital investments in the 
countries of southern Africa, and especially in the BLS countries, Zimbabwe 
and Malawi. The establishment in the early 1970s of the Bank Edesa was 
an important step in facilitating this expansion. Set up by leading South 
African financiers and industrialists, such as Anton Rupert, with an initial 
capital of R20 million, the bank has proved an effective instrument of 
economic penetration in both the bantustans and neighbouring states.
By way of summary, it can be said that the majority-ruled states of 
southern Africa maintain economic relations with the Republic of South Africa 
that are characterized by important, though admittedly varying, degrees of 
economic dependence. The pattern of communications in the sub-continent is 
such that the majority of states are dependent on South African transport 
and routes for outlets to the outside world. South Africa's neighbours 
still to a very large extent rely on foreign trade relations with South 
Africa not only for the import of manufactured goods and the export of their 
raw materials, but also for their food supply. Several hundred thousand 
migrant workers from neighbouring countries depend on the South African 
labour market for their livelihood, however unreliable this has proved to 
be at times. Not only do Lesotho and Swaziland belong to a monetary 
agreement dominated by South Africa; their economies are also dominated 
by South African capital, as are the economies of most of the states in 
the region. In short, southern Africa has witnessed the emergence of a 
particularly extreme form of economic dependency; one which has resulted 
(as table 2 shows) in glaring disparities in economic growth and wealth 
between South Africa and its dependent neighbours.
The Birth of SADCC: Objectives, Structures and Progress to Date
The struggle of the independent states of southern Africa for economic 
liberation is an integral part of the global struggle by Third World 
countries for a new international economic order. After the attainment 
of political independence, through their own individual efforts at the 
national level the countries of southern Africa have attempted to 
disengage from the inegrated regional economic complex dominated by South 
Africa. With the collapse of the Portuguese African empire in the mid-1970s 
and the liberation of Zimbabwe in 1980, more favourable conditions were
Table 2: Basic Indicators for SADCC Countries and the Republic 
of South Africa
Popul­
ation
(a)
GNP
(b)
Area
(c)
Adul t 
Liter­
acy 
(d)
GNP per 
Capita 
(e)
Average
Annual
Growth
Rate
(d)
Life
Expec
ancy
Birth
(f)
1979 1979 1976 1979 1960-79 1979
Angola 6.9 3 036 1 247 NA 440 -2.1 42
Botswana 0.8 576 600 35 720 9.1 49
Lesotho 1.3 442 30 52 350 6.0 51
Ma1awi 5.8 1 160 118 25 200 2.9 47
Mozambique 10.2 2 550 783 NA 250 0.1 47
Swaziland 0.5 325 17 65 650 7.2 47
Tanzania 18.0 4 680 945 66 260 2.3 52
Zambia 5.6 2 800 753 39 500 0.8 49
Zimbabwe 7.1 3 337 391 NA 470 0.8 55
SADCC TOTAL/ 
AVERAGE
56.2 18 900 4 884 52 336 1.3 49
REPUBLIC OF 
SOUTH AFRICA
28.5 49 000 1 221 NA 1 720 2.3 61
Source: Accelerated Development in Sub-•Saharan Africa. Washington
D.C. : World Bank, 1981; World Development Report.
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981.
(a) = Millions
(b) = Million US Dollars
(c) = Thousand Square Kilometres
(d) = Percentage
(e) = US Dollars
(f) = Years
NA = Not Available
170
created for these national efforts to be enhanced by joint struggles, 
aimed at reducing the collective dependence of the southern African 
states on South Africa, and at replacing this dependence by effective 
forms of regional co-operation.
The first economic summit of heads of state and representatives of 
the nine southern African countries of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe took place in Lusaka, 
Zambia, on 1 April 1980. It was here that the historic decision was taken 
to form the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference as an 
organization of economic liberation and regional co-operation. The estab­
lishment of SADCC was a logical outcome of the development of the liberation 
struggle from the political to the economic phase. It was also a direct 
response to Pretoria's neo-colonial scheme for a constellation of southern 
African states under South African hegemony.
At the end of the summit meeting, representatives of the nine states 
present adopted a document entitled Southern Africa: Towards Economic 
Liberation. Declaration by the Governments of the Independent States of 
Southern Africa.  ^ Now commonly known as the "Lusaka Declaration", 
this document laid down the strategy of economic liberation through 
regional co-operation in southern Africa in the following words:
In the interests of the peoples of our countries, it is necessary 
to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of 
South Africa, to overcome the imposed economic fragmentation, and 
to co-ordinate our efforts towards regional and national economic 
development. This will be as great for Namibia as it is for all the 
independent states of the region. ®
The main development objectives to be pursued by co-ordinated regional 
action were set out clearly in the declaration. These were first, the 
reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not solely on the 
Republic of South Africa; second, the forging of links to create genuine 
and equitable regional integration; third, the mobilization of resources 
to promote the implementation of national, inter-state, and regional 
policies; and fourth, concerted action to secure international recognition 
and co-operation within the framework of the strategy for economic liberation.
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• In order to achieve these goals, each SADCC member state was assigned 
the responsibility for sectoral co-ordination, in accordance with its 
specific interests and resources, as follows:
Angola Energy conservation and security.
Botswana Control of animal diseases and crop research.
Lesotho Soil and water conservation, and land utilization.
Malawi Fisheries, wildlife and forestry.
Mozambique Transport and Communications.
Swaziland Manpower development.
Tanzania Industrial development.
Zambia Mining, and the South African Development Fund.
Zimbabwe Food security, and the Southern African Documentation 
and Information System (SADIS).
Unlike many other regional economic bodies, SADCC is characterized by 
quite a high degree of decentralization. There are distinct regional and 
national mechanisms for the co-ordination of its activities. At the 
regional level, the supreme consultative body is the Annual Summit Conference 
of Heads of State. Next in the line of authority is the meeting of the 
Council of Ministers, which exercises overall responsibility for the 
supervision of SADCC affairs in between these summit meetings. Then 
there is a standing committee of officials, which is responsible to the 
Council of Ministers and acts as an executive. A permanent secretariat 
headed by an executive secretary has been established in Gaborone, the 
capital of Botswana, with the responsibility for routine administration 
and co-ordination of SADCC activities. Finally, with the regional secretariat 
still playing a relatively modest role, greater responsibility for the 
co-ordination of SADCC's sectoral development has fallen on the shoulders 
of the relevant national ministries in each of the member states.
A key feature of SADDC's activities is the Annual Conference. This 
is organized in three phases: first a meeting of officials; then a meeting 
of the Council of Ministers; and finally a donor conference, where projects 
approved by the Council of Ministers are presented to donors and aid agencies 
" financial support. The first major annual conference of Economics
Ministers of the frontline states was held at Arusha in July 1979, before 
the formal launching of SADCC at the Lusaka summit in 1980.
SADCC's second annual conference was held in Maputo on 27-28 November
1980. At the meeting there were representatives of the nine member states, 
officials from thirty other governments outside the region, and representat­
ives ••of eighteen international organizations. The Maputo conference was
the first major attempt to mobilize international financial and technical 
support for SADCC's strategy of economic liberation and regional co-operation. 
By the end of the conference, US$650 million had been pledged for projects 
identified as priority areas.
The third annual conference was held in Blantyre, Malawi, in November
1981. Representatives of twenty-three donor nations and agencies attended. 
Having reviewed the progress over the past year, the conference decided
to establish a permanent secretariat in Gaborone.
SADCC held its fourth and latest conference in Maeru, Lesotho, in 
January 1983, against a background of intensified destabilization by the 
Republic of South Africa, exemplified by the Maseru raid of 9 December
1982. In addition to the SADCC members, representatives of twenty-nine
other governments and twenty-three international organizations and
development agencies attended the conference. In the documents presented,
progress was reported in the implementation of a number of SADCC's sectoral
projects. This was particularly the case with respect to transport and
communications, perhaps the single most important sector, regarded by
SADCC as "vital to break away from subordination to the South African
10
economy." This sector is co-ordinated by Southern African Transport
and Communications (SATCC), based in Maputo. By January 1983, SATCC had 
submitted 106 projects for implementation, with an estimated total cost 
of $2.53S billion. Of this amount, $665 million had already been pledged.
The main rail-port projects to have been identified so far are the Maputo, 
Beira, Ncala, Dar es Salaam, and Lobito port transport systems.
SADCC also attaches great importance tu agricultural development in 
general, and food self-sufficiency and food security in particular. This ' 
priority sector is co-ordinated by Zimbabwe, through the administrative unit
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of the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture. Feasibility studies have already 
been conducted in the areas of a regional resources information system 
(RRIS), an early warning system for food security to monitor the food 
situation in SADCC countries, and a regional inventory of agricultural 
resources. To date, thirty agricultural projects have been identified 
for implementation, with an estimated total cost of $100 million. In 
the area of the control of foot-and-mouth disease, Botswana has successfully 
developed an improved vaccine, and has achieved the capacity to supply 
the entire SADCC region.
At the 1983 Maseru conference, the SADCC energy sector, co-ordinated 
by Angola, presented a project to open and improve the Chicamba hydro­
electric line in Mozambique which runs to Mutare in Zimbabwe. Angola, 
the only oil producing member of SADCC, has also offered to sell oil at 
preferential prices to SADCC members. Lesotho, which has responsibility 
for soil and water conservation, as well as land utilization, submitted 
a project for regional river basin management.
Meanwhile, Malawi has made headway in promoting the exchange of 
information amongst SADCC members concerning fisheries, wildlife and 
forestry. And in the field of manpower development, for which Swaziland 
is responsible, a regional training council has been established and 
meets regularly in Mbabane, the capital. Four studies have been 
commissioned by Swaziland on manpower needs in the fields of sugar 
production, mining, health, and teacher training.
In the mining sector, Zambia continues to gather data with a view 
to tabling projects at future conferences. And in the industrial 
development sector, co-ordinated by Tanzania, concrete proposals for 
feasibility studies and implementation were presented at the Maseru 
meeting. About fifty industrial projects, costing $800 million, have 
so far been identified for implementation. According to some observers, 
however, SADCC's industrial programme, especially in areas such as 
clothing and food, has "attracted little support from donors,"^ primarily 
because of its import substitution bias and the absence of foreign 
investment policy guidelines among SADCC member states. It is diificult, 
however, to see how an industrial strategy aimed at reducing dependence on
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imported goods could be anything other than an exercise in import substit­
ution. As for the call for investment codes, it is perhaps appropriate to 
mention that these already exist in most SADCC countries. The real issue 
here is surely that the regional strategy of industrial development 
envisaged by SADCC prefers state enterprise to foreign private capital 
investment.
Problems and Prospects for Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa
Three years have passed since SADCC was established at the Lusaka 
summit in April 1980, and during these three years SADCC has made impress­
ive strides in the development of regional co-operation. But there are 
still problems, of course. Some of these are of a largely technical nature, 
and should be overcome with time. Others are of a more fundamental 
character.
One of the most important technical difficulties facing SADCC 
during its formative stage is that of manpower shortages. The national 
ministries responsible for co-ordinating SADCC projects are very much 
under-staffed. Already struggling to meet the manpower needs for their 
own national development goals, such organizations must now face the 
additional strain of meeting their SADCC committments. The problem is 
complicated by the fact that the regional secretariat in Gaborone is not 
envisaged as an operation headquarters with the necessary infrastructure 
to implement or at least monitor the implementation of projects. This is 
an inherent feature of SADCC's decentralized structure, intended to avoid 
the growth of an enormous bureaucracy in Gaborone. It was confirmed by 
the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Botswana's Vice-President Mr Mmusi, 
in his opening statement at the Maseru conference in January 1983. He 
declared that the SADCC secretariat would play a "communications role in 
representing and projecting SADCC to our friends. Functional sectoral 
programme responsibility will, as I noted in Blantyre, remain with SADCC 
and the sectoral co-ordinating states."
Another technical problem is that, as of now, SADCC has no data base 
from which to co-ordinate the exchange and flow of information among the 
SADCC countries and sectoral ministries. So much data and material has been
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generated by SADCC in its three years of existence that there is already 
an urgent need for storage and dissemination of this material. Luckily, 
awareness among both government officials and information professionals 
of the importance of information as a vital resource for achieving socio­
economic goals gave birth to the idea of the Southern African Documentation 
and Information System (SADIS). In Dar es Salaam in May 1983, SADIS was 
approved as a priority sectoral project by the Council of Ministers of 
SADCC.
There are, however, a number of more fundamental problems of a socio­
political nature that are likely to trouble SADCC for some time to come. 
First, SADCC member countries differ considerably in their levels of econ­
omic development and resource endowment. Zimbabwe, for example, is 
relatively advanced in its level of capitalist development, while countries 
like Lesotho lag far behind. Countries such as Angola, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe are rich in mineral resources, whereas those such as Malawi and 
Lesotho are much less fortunate.
Second, SADCC member states vary in the degree to which they have been 
integrated into the world capitalist system. Most SADCC countries are 
signatories of the Lome Convention, which established a neo-colonial 
association between the developed capitalist countries of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
(ACP). Countries like Angola and Mozambique, however, are not signatories 
of the Lome Convention, and have established ties with the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance of the socialist countries (CMEA). Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland of course are still entangled in the South African dominated 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU).
Third, and perhaps most important, is the divergent paths of socio­
political development being pursued by the different SADCC states. The 
majority are pursuing a capitalist path, while a few, most notably Angola 
and Mozambique, are committed to a socialist reconstruction of society. 
Zimbabwe too has proclaimed a socialist perspective as its future goal.
Fourth, there is growing concern, especially among academics in the
SADCC region, that SADCC's almost exclusive reliance on the West for 
financial support may well lead to a new form of collective neo-colonialism, 
under which the SADCC region is developed as a profitable reserve for 
exploitation by transnational corporations. It is to be hoped that SADCC 
will attempt to diversify its external economic relations in line with 
its founding principle of reducing economic dependence in any shape or 
form.
Finally, and of considerable importance, is the problem posed for SADCC 
by Pretoria's campaign of destabilization in the region. South Africa is 
clearly determined to frustrate the development of SADCC as a viable 
alternative to its own scheme for a constellation of southern African 
states. Directly, or through its proxies, Pretoria is engaged in a 
wholesale campaign of economic destabilization, involving the destruction 
of projects, the blowing up of railways, roads, pipelines, oil depots 
and hydro-electric stations, the sabotage of industrial plants, the 
kidnapping of foreign technicians, and many more.
Destabilization was condemned at the Blantyre conference, and it 
was clearly the main concern of most if not all of the participants at 
the Maseru conference in Januray 1983. To emphasise the seriousness of 
the matter, this latter conference issued a strongly-worded communique 
condemning South Africa's deliberate interference in the affairs of SADCC 
member states, and calling on Pretoria to immediately cease such interfer­
ence. There are no signs as yet that Pretoria is likely to heed such 
demands. Instead, South Africa will undoubtedly continue with its destab­
ilizing activities. In particular it will almost certainly continue to 
take advantage of the various opposition groups that, rightly or wrongly, 
question the legitimacy of their domestic regimes. In order to prevent 
the apartheid regime from fishing in such troubled waters, the SADCC 
countries should strive to normalize and democratize their political life 
and thus provide the best possible climate for economic liberation and the 
best possible defence against the destabilizing policies of their racist 
neighbour.
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The problems outlined briefly above, daunting as they may be, should not
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lead us to forget that in the long-run there are reasons for believing 
that SADCC stands a better chance of success than many other experiments 
in economic co-operation in Africa and elsewhere. What are these reasons? 
First, SADCC is not just another common market or customs union, concerned 
largely with the marketing of foreign produced goods. It is essentially 
a body concerned with the rational co-ordination of all aspects of 
production, distribution and exchange, and especially production. For 
the growth in production, through the infusion of science and technology, 
is the surest way to the achievement of economic self-sufficiency.
Second, SADCC is not a neo-colonial creation designed to integrate 
Europe's former colonies more effectively into the world capitalist 
system. It is an independent body established to realize the tasks of 
economic liberation and regional co-operation. Finally, according to its 
founding principles, SADCC is committed to economic disengagement not only 
from apartheid South Africa but also from international capital as a whole. 
It is this genuine anti-imperialist element in SADCC's philosophy that 
could prove one of its most effective weapons in resisting the pressures 
of South African destabilization and Western imperialism.
Conclusion
The achievement of political independence by the majority of southern 
African states by the second half of the twentieth century created 
favourable conditions for the birth of SADCC as an instrument of economic 
liberation and regional co-operation. In the past three years, SADCC 
has registered modest and yet significant progress in the implementation 
of its programme of action.
Many problems lie ahead. But the prospects for the realization of 
SADCC's objectives are still promising, provided all nine SADCC member 
states show an unflinching committment towards the underlying philosophy 
of the Lusaka declaration; provided they take a common political and 
diplomatic stand in relation to South Africa; provided they have a similar 
conception as to who are their real friends and adversaries in the struggle 
for political and economic liberation; and provided they rely on their 
own resources and the international solidarity of all anti-imperialist
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forces throughout the world.
In the long-run, of course, the success of the struggle for economic 
liberation and regional co-operation in southern Africa will depend on 
the dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a new non-racial 
democratic order in South Africa. International public opinion must 
be mobilized therefore against the apartheid regime and its destabilizing 
policies in the region; it must also be mobilized against any form of 
political, economic, diplomatic or military collaboration between South 
Africa and the imperialist powers, designed to suppress the forces of 
liberation in the region.
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APPENDIX
Additional Papers Presented at the Inaugural Workshop of 
the Southern African Development Research Association 
R o m a , 18-20 October 1983
Micro-Economic Implications for Self-Sufficiency in Maize Production 
as a Response to South Africa's Destabilization Policies
by Thambo E. Gina, University of Swaziland
Some Remarks on the Problems of Research for Development in Southern 
Africa
by V.I. Kyulule, Institute of Development Studies, Dar-es-Salaam
United States Policy in Southern Africa: Geo-Strategic, Political 
and Economic Considerations
by Chisepo Mphaisha, University of Zambia
Foreign Aid versus Self-Reliance: Whither Way for Countries in 
Southern Africa?
by Issa Musoke, University of Swaziland
Destabilization as a Counter-Revolutionary Strategy 
by B. Tsie, University of Botswana
Copies of all of these papers can be obtained from the 
Institute of Southern African Studies, National University 
of Lesotho, P.O. Roma 180, Lesotho, Southern Africa.
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